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Abstract 
 
In the years since Mao Zedong’s death, the people of China have been impelled to reevaluate the 
legacy and character of their still iconic leader. One of the more notable trends in this process of 
posthumous reevaluation is the tendency of some individuals and groups (most often, the rural 
peasantry) to interpret the deceased Chairman along “theological” lines, assuming that his still-
efficacious spirit will provide protection and good fortune to those who honour him. 
 
In exploring the genesis (and continued salience) of these beliefs and practices, the present 
research delves into popular Chinese religiosity, exploring the porosity of the traditional 
cosmology, the centrality of perceived spiritual efficacy (ling) in determining the popularity of 
religious cults, and the theological and cosmological resonances extant within traditional 
understandings of political leadership. The body of metaphors, narratives, and tropes drawn from 
this historical overview are then applied to popular characterizations of Mao, with the resulting 
correspondences helping to explicate the salience of these modern religious interpretations. To 
further investigate the source of Mao’s persistent symbolic capital, the present research also 
explores the role of Cultural Revolution-era ritual in valorizing and reifying the power and 
efficacy then popularly ascribed to the Great Helmsman’s person and teachings. This study’s 
conclusion, in brief, is that participants in the posthumous cult of Mao are utilizing these cultural 
materials in both traditional and creative ways, and that such interpretations speak to the 
exigencies of life in the turbulent, ideologically ambiguous culture of modern China. 
 
In performing this evaluation, the present research makes use of the standard phenomenological/ 
historiographic approach of religious studies scholarship, though it is also informed by narrative 
methods, cognitive science, and current perspectives on the role and function of ritual. In 
particular, the analysis of Mao-era rituals (as a source of Mao’s continued symbolic potency) is 
performed using the cognivistic typology of ritual proposed by E. Thomas Lawson and Robert N. 
McCauley, with additional materials drawn from the research of Catherine Bell, Roy Rappaport, 
Pascal Boyer and Adam Chau. 
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Chapter 1: Methods, Introductory Matters, and Mise-en-Scène 
 
Background 
 In the summer of 2005, I climbed into a taxi in Qufu (a city in Shandong province) and 
noticed a small amulet hanging from the driver’s rear-view mirror. At first, it did not seem 
terribly noteworthy, in that it was virtually identical to any number of similar icons that I had 
already seen since arriving in China – a loop of red thread with a “lucky knot” underneath of it 
and an iconic image of a religious figure. However, instead of depicting Guanyin or the God of 
Wealth, this particular charm was emblazoned with an image of a glowing red sun, which was 
partially obscured by Chairman Mao Zedong’s smiling face. Later, in a visit to the Zhou Enlai 
Museum in Tianjin (a site brimming with historical PRC tchotchkes), I saw (and was compelled 
to purchase) a set of similar charms (depicting Mao, Zhou and the diminutive Deng Xiaoping) 
from the official gift shop. 
 
My experiences with these perplexing artifacts were neither isolated nor anomalous. In 
fact, they are emblematic instances of the religious interpretations of Mao that have emerged 
among some segments of the Chinese population since the early 1990s – a process that was first 
described in academic literature in Alvin P. Cohen’s 1993 article, “A New Deity in the People’s 
Republic of China: Mao Zedong.” In his paper, Cohen details his first encounter with these 
amulets, wherein a taxi driver informed him that Mao’s image “would protect the car from 
accidents and protect him from harm.” Extrapolating on this, the driver also offered the 
theological speculation that “Mao Zedong has become like a deity (shen).”1 In a like manner, 
Emily Chao, in an anthropological account from 1999, offers a similar account of these 
phenomena in Lijiang (the town where she did her fieldwork), noting the role of the deceased 
leader’s perceived posthumous efficacy2 in encouraging such devotions, as well as the 
government’s tacit acceptance of these practices:3  
                                                 
1
 Alvin P. Cohen, “A New Deity in the People’s Republic of China: Mao Zedong,” Journal of Chinese Religions, 
Fall 1993 (21), 129-130. 129. 
2
 The role of spiritual efficacy (ling 靈) in the folk psychology of Chinese popular religion and in religious 
interpretations of Mao is explored at length in the second and third chapters of the present study.  
3
 Though the government’s ambiguous position on these issues is outside the scope of the present study, it is 
discussed at some length in the conclusion (ff. 11) as a topic for future research. 
 2 
Mao memorabilia (or “Maomorabilia”) in the form of taxi amulets, Mao buttons,  and 
commemorative Mao fountain pens were being sold at both the open market (which 
caters to national and international tourists) and the government department store (whose 
customers are local people). The presence of such items and their local buyers illustrates 
the ling (magic power) that continues to be associated with Mao.4 
 
Over and above these accounts of Mao’s image in apotropaic talismans, some sources also 
describe his incorporation into various other religious observances, including pilgrimages and 
temple worship.5 Indeed, one of the most notable elements of these religious interpretations is 
their seeming inexorability, as quintessentially summarized by an interview with a visitor to the 
Mao temple in Gushuicun, who felt compelled to visit the shrine because, “[a]fter all, he [Mao] 
will be a god one day.”6  As such (and in spite of the fact that this type of popular deification was 
only one of many perspectives on Mao adopted during this period),7 it remains the case that the 
popular worship of China’s deceased political dynamo is a matter deserving serious attention 
within the academic study of religion. 
 
In interpreting these occurrences, it is tempting simply to note the great irony in the fact 
that Mao Zedong, who did all that he could to eradicate “feudal superstition in the P.R.C.,” “was 
now being worshipped as a deity (at least by some peasants)”8 – a perspective that is echoed by 
many others in academic and popular discourse.9  This approach, while understandable, belittles 
these peasants by making the paternalistic assumption that they would alter their wrong-headed 
                                                 
4
 Emily Chao, “The Maoist Shaman and the Madman: Ritual Bricolage, Failed Ritual, and Failed Ritual Theory,” 
Cultural Anthropology 14(4) (1999): 505-534. 531 ff. 16. This comment was paralleled by my own experiences in 
the Zhou Enlai Museum – a government-owned facility that also sold these devotional artifacts. 
5
 Cohen (1993), 129-130. See also: Nicholas D. Kristof, “China's Newest God: The Godless Mao,” The New York 
Times (Jun 2, 1992), A1/A8, and, for an indigenous perspective, Xin Yuan’s “A Place in the Pantheon: Mao in Folk 
Religion” in Shades of Mao: The Posthumous Cult of the Great Leader, edited and translated by Geremie R. Barmé, 
(Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1995), 195-200. 
6
 Jane Macartney, “A cigarette is tucked into the statue's hand. Thirty years after his death, Mao is revered as less 
than a god but more than a man,” Times Online (September 9, 2006), 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article633620.ece. Given that this interview was undoubtedly 
translated from the Chinese, it should be noted that the English word “god” is typically used as an analogue of the 
Chinese shen 神, despite the fact that there are numerous differences between their denotations and connotations. 
Those particularities of popular Chinese theologies (and their attendant cosmologies) that are relevant to 
understanding religious interpretations of Mao are treated at length in chapter two of the present study. 
7
 Indeed, Barmé (1995) argues that Mao has been “commercialized” (through memoirs, audio cassettes, and cultural 
tourism), “lampooned” (through satirical literature and visual art) and “sanctified” (through the development of 
various Mao cults) (49), as will be discussed in chapter three. 
8
 Cohen (1993), 130. 
9
 For some examples, see Kristof (1992); Jonathan Watts, “Mao returns to haunt and comfort his people,” The 
Guardian (Saturday December 27, 2003); Jacob Heilbrunn, “Mao more than Ever,” The New Republic (April 21, 
1997), 20-24. 
 3 
perspectives “if they only knew what we know.”10 One particularly egregious example of this 
intellectually imperialistic stance can be found in Dick Wilson’s (uncritically titled) The People’s 
Emperor, Mao, where he laments that “the trouble was that the Chinese clung obstinately to their 
old ways of doing things, and much of Mao’s energy had to be expended on efforts to change 
irrational traditions before new rational substitutes could be implanted.”11 As will be seen, this 
perspective proves to be mistaken in its dismissal of China’s religious and cultural traditions and 
in its characterization of these traditions as maladaptive. 
 
The impetus for the present research emerges from an unwillingness to accept these 
explanations, especially given the failure of many studies12 to acknowledge the role of traditional 
Chinese concepts and practices in informing present-day realities (such as the recent (and on-
going) Mao craze described above). In contrast to this, my contention is that understanding the 
public’s (re)appropriation of Mao requires attention to the multivalent and interrelated 
perspectives on religion and politics developed throughout the panoply of Chinese history. The 
failure to attend to China’s cultural and historical context often leads to a depiction their subjects 
as backwards or even irrational. Moreover, such approaches are predicated upon an unjustifiably 
constrained picture of human cognition, ignoring a considerable body of modern research that 
characterizes human mental processes as being utilized and developed as much through 
                                                 
10
 Intriguingly, this type of characterization bears considerable similarities to the paternalistic theories developed by 
Frazer and Durkheim, each of whom largely denied the functional utility of any form of cognition aside from 
Western-style, analytic thought. See Catherine Bell, Ritual: Perspectives and Dimensions, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1997), who summarizes this overall approach (48). 
11
 Dick Wilson, The People’s Emperor, Mao: A Biography of Mao Tse-tung, (New York: Lee Publishers Group, 
1979). 493. 
12
 For example, Erika Evasdottir’s excellent Obedient Autonomy: Chinese Intellectuals and the Achievement of 
Orderly Life, (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004), which provides a detailed and intriguing description of the lives of 
modern Chinese intellectuals without acknowledging the implicitly Confucian ethos underlying their social 
interactions and their understandings of human relationships. Similarly, many biographies of Mao, including 
Stephen Uhalley Jr.’s Mao Tse-tung: A Critical Biography (New York: New Viewpoints, 1975) and Quan Yanchi’s 
Mao Zedong: Man, Not God (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press), greatly downplay the relevance of existing cultural 
images and tropes in Mao’s life, thought and impact. Some older articles, based on their inaccurate predictions 
concerning “the future” of China also fail to acknowledge the possibility of the public Mao cult. One example can 
be seen in Stuart R. Schram’s otherwise excellent “Party Leader or True Ruler? Foundations and Significance of 
Mao Zedong’s Political Power” in Foundations and Limits of State Power in China, edited by Stuart R. Schram, 
(London: School of Oriental and African Studies / Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1987), 203-256, 
where he makes the following faulty assertion: Mao has not “become ‘even more sacred,’ nor has there been even 
‘some deification’ of Mao. … As for his charisma, it cannot be said to have been routinized, or mis-appropriated, 
since it is scarcely in evidence. Indeed, it seems rather to have evaporated” (244). While this statement may have 
been true in 1987, when the article was released, it has been utterly contradicted by historical developments since its 
publication (such as the phenomena described above and at length in chapter three).  
 4 
performance13 and analogy14 as through discrete, dialogical cogitation. Thus, this treatise will 
attempt to address the religious reinterpretation of Mao (and the constellation of beliefs and 
practices that surround it) by exploring the roles of metaphor and ritual in Chinese thought, as 
exemplified by their historical understanding of (and response to) gods and political leaders. 
From this perspective, the popular conception of Mao becomes far more coherent, as it then 
becomes not only internally consistent, but also historically situated and 
(performatively/praxically) rational. 
 
More specifically, the present study advances two related hypotheses concerning these 
religious re-appropriations of Mao: first, that descriptions of Mao as a god15 emerge from a 
culturally conditioned understanding of the relationship between worldly and spiritual power; 
and, second, that one of the primary means by which such images became both personally 
meaningful and socially functional is through their inculcation via ritual means. In exploring 
these two related contentions, the present study subdivides the problem into three components, 
each of which are dealt with in their own chapters. In particular, chapter two delves into role of 
ling (spiritual efficacy) in the traditional Chinese understanding of ghosts, gods and ancestors, 
and notes the functional (and metaphorical) similarities between the role of emperors and gods in 
Chinese society – both of which help establish a historical precedent for the apotheosization of a 
political leader. Chapter three explores various popular characterizations of Chairman Mao (as 
presented in ethnographies, scholarly studies, newspaper reports and popular literature) and 
demonstrates their compatibility with the spiritual potency framework outlined in chapter two. 
Finally, chapter four addresses one of the means through which these characterizations of Mao 
would have derived their salience – namely, through his incorporation into the canon of Chinese 
ritual. In making this case, I begin by exploring some relevant classical Chinese and modern 
                                                 
13
 For example, see Tambiah (72-73) for a discussion of the role of ritual/performative action in maintaining and 
developing relationships and social mores (72-73).  
14
 For a neuroscientific approach, see Steven Pinker’s How the Mind Works, (New York: W. W. Norton and 
Company, 1997), where he argues that one of the basic processes underlying human thought is the ability to relate 
abstract ideas through temporal and spatial metaphors – a process he claims is central to the bulk of higher mental 
functions (352-358). For a more theoretical perspective, see Douglas Hofstadter’s work, particularly his essay 
“Analogies and Roles in Human and Machine Thinking” and his voluminous treatise Gödel, Escher and Bach: An 
Eternal Golden Braid – A metaphorical fugue on minds and machines in the spirit of Lewis Carrol, where the 
relationship between self-reference, analogy making and consciousness are explored in great detail. 
15
 Likewise, I argue that images of Mao as an emperor also follow this pattern, given the historical relationship 
between imperial power and spiritual power (not to mention the cosmological and “theological” significance granted 
to the ruler in the traditional Chinese worldview). These issues are explored in detail in chapter two. 
 5 
western theories on the function of ritual, and then proceed to outline some Mao-centered rituals 
within that theoretical context.  
 
Before delving into this argument, however, it is first necessary to explore some broader 
concerns that have motivated the shape of the entire project, such as the rejection of the (often 
implicitly) Orientalist discourse referred to above, a conviction concerning continuity in Chinese 
history, and some reflections on the relationship between language, culture, and cognition. 
 
Theoretical Perspectives 
Ahistoricism: The May 4th Movement and its Modern Fate 
 Given that many Western studies adopt an ahistorical position in dealing with modern 
China, the first theoretical issue to be assessed is the propriety of this stance. Intriguingly, while 
such approaches do in fact bear marked similarities to many twentieth-century Chinese 
perspectives on their own culture and traditions, I would argue that they are becoming 
increasingly ill suited for current Sinological scholarship  (especially in the context of popular 
belief and practice).16 To demonstrate this fact, it is first necessary to briefly outline the 
twentieth-century Chinese experiment with ahistoricism, in order to demonstrate its gradual loss 
of intellectual currency. 
 
In brief, twentieth-century China’s entry into the modern era was characterized by a 
considerable attempt to distance itself from its own historical legacy, largely motivated by its 
defeat during the Opium War and its humiliation throughout the following decades of 
imperialistic occupation, with many intellectuals viewing these affronts as caused by failings of 
(or lacunae in) traditional Chinese culture. This trend reached its apex in the May 4th movement, 
during which leading thinkers argued that the only way for China to truly take its place in the 
                                                 
16
 This being said, it should be noted that ahistoricism is a multivalent term. On one hand, it can simply be seen as 
an indifference towards historical processes, often with the assumption that they are irrelevant. On the other, it can 
also be characterized as an active rejection of (or rebellion against) these historical realities. An analogy can help 
make this point: just as some atheists consider speculations on the existence of god/gods to be meaningless non-
issues, others feel compelled (often due to their own personal experiences) to rail against all forms of religious 
belief. Without oversimplifying the issue, I would suggest that the bulk of “ahistorical” Western scholars can be 
grouped into the first category, while the majority of “ahistorical” Chinese scholars are better categorized as 
belonging to the second. This is nowhere more clear than amongst the intellectuals of the May Fourth Period (which 
will be discussed presently).  
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modern world was to adopt Western-style democracy, science and philosophy. Though some 
moderate scholars argued that the two traditions could potentially reinforce one another (most 
typically using the rhetoric of “Chinese substance” and “Western function” (zhongti xiyong)),17 
the majority wholeheartedly propounded the iconoclastic thesis that modernization required 
China to divorce itself from its “backward” cultural institutions (including, but not limited to, 
Confucianism).18 This seeming desire to downplay (or even utterly deny) historical realities 
reached its apex in the Chinese Communist movement, which, at the height of its own totalistic 
influence, urged citizens to Smash the Four Olds (“old ideology, culture, customs and habits”).19 
The nadir of this ahistorical iconoclasm can be seen in Levenson’s rather dismal assessment of 
the continued relevance of Chinese historical traditions: 
The first commitment [to “truth”] brings many men to intellectual alienation from 
Chinese tradition, while the second [to “tradition”] leaves them with an emotional tie to 
it. … I believe that an understanding of this principle make the chronological sequence in 
modern Chinese history logically comprehensible. As traditional ideas change in losing 
their unquestioned intellectual adaptability, and traditionalists fail thereby to maintain the 
harmony of special and general, “mine” and “true” iconoclasm thrives. But iconoclasts, 
of the mildest or deepest hue, face the danger of the same failure, and their ideas change 
– in a series of acceptance, rejection, and acceptance of something new – as they seek a 
formula which will keep the psychological peace. The quest for this formula has been the 
common ground of all the new currents of Chinese thought since the Opium War. How 
can the thinker scrap Chinese ideas which the western impact has made to seem 
                                                 
17
 See Joseph R. Levenson, Confucian China and its Modern Fate (Vol. I), (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1969), 59-78, for a good overview of the development of the ti / yong dichotomy as a paradigm for 
Chinese modernization. 
18
 For a good overview of the May Fourth Movement (with particular reference to its impact upon the Chinese 
assessment of the Confucian tradition), see the first two chapters of Umberto Bresciani’s Reinventing Confucianism: 
The New Confucian Movement, (Taipei, Taiwan: Taipei Ricci Institute, 2001). For a concise and helpful online 
resource, see also Yih-Hsien Yu’s article on "Modern Chinese Philosophy (1901-1949)" in the Internet 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2007. http://www.iep.utm.edu/m/mod-chin.htm#SH4b. Accessed July 11, 2008. As 
this article notes (quoting from Wing-tsit Chan’s Source Book in Chinese Philosophy), “At the turn of the [20th] 
century, ideas of Schopenhauer, Kant, Nietzsche, Rousseau, Tolstoy, and Kropotkin were imported. After the 
intellectual renaissance of 1917, the movement advanced at a rapid pace. In the following decade, important works 
of Descartes, Spinoza, Hume, James, Bergson, and Marx, and others became available in Chinese. … Almost every 
trend of thought had its exponent. … For a time it seemed Chinese thought was to be completely Westernized” (Yu 
(2007)). Thomas Metzger makes a similar point in Escape from Predicament: Neo-Confucianism and China’s 
Evolving Political Culture, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), when he notes that “the slogan of ‘total 
Westernization’ was popular for a time, and Marxism flourished amidst the ferment of this attack on the Confucian 
tradition” (191). 
19
 For an overview of these policies and a “ground-level” description of their devastating effects upon Qufu (the 
birthplace of Confucius), see Wang Liang, “The Confucius Temple Tragedy of the Cultural Revolution” in On 
Sacred Grounds: Culture, Society, Politics, and the Formation of the Cult of Confucius. Edited by Thomas A. 
Wilson. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2002. 376-400. 
 7 
inadequate, while he preserves his confidence of Chinese equivalence with the West? 
How shall he see himself as modern man and modern Chinese together?20 
 
It should be noted that the above quotation is not included to imply that Levenson was ahistorical 
in his own approach (indeed, he was probably more conscious than most western scholars of the 
weight of China’s history upon its modern occupants) but instead that he acknowledged the 
predominance of iconoclastic ahistoricism in the Chinese self-understanding – at least as it 
appeared at the time of his book’s publication (in 1969). 
 
Despite the fact that these Mao-era excesses have since been curbed, the equation 
between progress and Westernization has been a common touchstone of Chinese philosophy and 
political policy until the relatively recent past,21 though some signs, including the renewed 
promotion of Confucius as an ethical exemplar, suggest that this trend is in the process of being 
reversed22 – some dismissive Western assessments notwithstanding.23 In support of this 
assertion, I not only argue that these historical traditions are central to fully understanding 
various modern Chinese phenomena, but that they are in fact “alive and well” (at least in their 
popular manifestations). This position is forcefully expounded in Xing Lu’s Rhetoric of the 
Chinese Cultural Revolution, where she makes the following argument: 
While Mao worship resembled the mass mobilization and personality cults of other 
totalitarian societies such as Nazi Germany and Stalin’s Russia, it can also be traced to 
                                                 
20
 Levenson, xxxii-xxxiii. My apologies for the gender-insensitivity of this passage. 
21
 This being said, Metzger convincingly argues that many leading intellectuals – even those who iconoclastically 
attacked Chinese cultural traditions (in general) and Confucianism (in specific) – were, in fact, informed by a 
distinctively Confucian ethos concerning the need to seek moral ideals and harmonizing transformation within 
society: “It seems clear that much of this ethos has persisted in the twentieth century, notably the continuing trend 
away from Western individualism; the totalistic emphasis on eliminating selfishness and achieving social oneness; 
the ontological faith in the oneness of spirit and matter, which has given Marxist materialism an intellectual context 
and support missing in the West; and the tendency towards ‘ideological’ thought, common to the Communists, the 
Kuomintang, scientistic liberals like Yin Hai-huang, and tradition-oriented thinkers like T’ang Chün-i” (195-204, 
210). 
22
 Geoffrey York, “Beijing uses Confucius to lead charm offensive,” Globe and Mail (09/09/2005), A1, A8. For a 
discussion of the role of Confucius Institutes in promoting Chinese culture worldwide (and the connection between 
this type of promotion and China’s increasing global influence), see Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How 
China's Soft Power is Transforming the World, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007): “Beijing now funds at 
least the first year of what it calls Confucius Institutes, Chinese-language and -culture schools created at leading 
local universities in countries from Kenya to South Korea to Uzbekistan to Australia. China plans to open at least 
one hundred Confucius Institutes around the world within the next five years. These Confucius Institutes are 
reminiscent of the British Council or the Alliance Française, which have helped promote British and French cultural 
brands without being explicitly linked, in people's minds, to Whitehall or the Elysée Palace. (The name Confucius 
Institute betrays no links to communism or to the Communist party, and actually repudiates Mao, since the 
Chairman had tried to wipe out the teaching of Confucian beliefs)” (68). 
23
 Mentioned above (ff. 10). 
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the Chinese tradition of emperor veneration, although the scale of mass hypnosis during 
the Cultural Revolution was unprecedented in Chinese history. Similarly, the process of 
memorizing and reciting Mao’s quotations is akin to the way Confucian classics were 
learned in the past. As Lucian Pye (1985) points out, the great man ideal “is an 
amplification of the Confucian model of the father as the ultimate authority in the family” 
(185). The cult of Mao was in many ways consistent with traditional Chinese culture 
rather than a radical departure from it.24 
 
As I am in utter agreement with her assessment, I realized that my own research required me to 
draw inspiration from scholars who adopt a similar hermeneutical viewpoint on the continued 
importance of China’s historical context. 
 
An excellent example of this application of Chinese historical realities to modern issues 
(in this case, to Mao Zedong himself) can be found in the academic output of James Chieh 
Hsiung, a Taiwanese-born scholar who has been an active force in modern Chinese studies for 
the last thirty-five years. In his persuasive Ideology and Practice: The Evolution of Chinese 
Communism, he offers a valuable corrective to the ahistorical approach taken by the scholars 
critiqued above. More specifically, in explaining his own motivations for producing the 
aforementioned tome, he states that it consists of an attempt “to interpret the Chinese Communist 
phenomenon by examining its intellectual roots.”25 His approach can be summarized as follows: 
It is guided by the belief that past and present, old and new, and Chinese and Marxist are 
interrelated in a complex, organic whole and cannot be compartmentalized…. As part of 
modern China’s prolonged process of cultural change, Chinese Communism has 
encountered the same set of problems that previously confronted other imported ideas 
and ideologies. They include justification (the need for cultural change), equivalence (the 
maintenance of cultural equilibrium amid the cultural borrowing), congruence between 
old and new, and absorption of borrowed elements into the indigenous culture.26 
 
In this way, Hsiung’s approach exemplifies a “middle way” between traditionalism and 
ahistoricism by acknowledging both the continuities and the disjunctions between the 
(post)Maoist present and the classical Chinese past.27 While this type of historically-
                                                 
24
 Xing Lu, Rhetoric of the Chinese Cultural Revolution: Impact on Chinese Thought, Culture and Communication, 
(Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2004), 70-71. 
25
 James Chieh Hsiung, Ideology and Practice: The Evolution of Chinese Communism, (New York: Praeger, 1970), 
4. 
26
 Ibid. (Emphasis original). 
27
 The necessity of such an approach within the academic study of Maoism is further attested to by the fact that Mao 
himself acknowledged the historical and cultural context that he was operating within, a context developed through 
“the history of our great people over several millennia [, which] exhibits national peculiarities and many precious 
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contextualized study is certainly not unique within the study of Chinese religion (as exemplified 
in the research Adam Chau, Julia Ching, Jordan Paper, Mu-chou Poo, Richard von Glahn, and 
many others), my own research seems to be one of a very small number of studies that explore 
religious perspectives on Mao within the broader context of traditional Chinese culture. 
 
Though Hsiung’s approach is compatible with the ideological and methodological stances 
adopted by the present study, it contains two particular lacunae. First, it lacks analysis of the 
contemporary issues (namely the posthumous cult of Mao) introduced above – an unsurprising 
fact, given that it was published prior to the Chairman’s death.28 Second, it overstates the 
importance of political ideologies in the formation and maintenance of both the classical and 
Maoist social orders, choosing to privilege a “top-down” understanding of cultural 
development.29 This emphasis is made at the expense of an in-depth discussion of religious, 
psychological, and cultural factors – especially in their popular manifestations.30 Resultantly, the 
present study can be seen as something of a companion to Hsiung’s work, as it explores popular 
manifestations of the Mao phenomenon and notes the means through which they were (and are) 
understood, practiced, and promulgated. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
qualities” (Mao Zedong, Lun Hsin Chieh-tuan, quoted in Hsiung, 69). It was in this context that Mao argued for the 
necessity of a “concrete Marxism … applied to the concrete struggle in the concrete conditions prevailing in China” 
(ibid.). 
28
 The text’s historical context is forcefully established through the “framing questions” contained within its 
Concluding Remarks – “It remains to be seen whether the suppression of the Red Guard movement will leave any 
residue of cynicism about the methods and goals of Mao’s revolution, and whether the thought of Mao will long 
survive Mao himself” (300). 
29
 This omission is especially puzzling, given his observation that “there has been no sharp separation in China 
between the moral and religious spheres of life, on the one hand, and the social and political, on the other” (291). 
The porosity of these boundaries in the Chinese folk cosmology is discussed at length in chapter two. A detailed 
assessment of these issues in their classical context can be found in Roger Ames’ The Art of Rulership: A Study in 
Ancient Chinese Political Thought, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1983) and Julia Ching’s Mysticism and 
Kingship in China: The Heart of Chinese Wisdom, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
30
 For instance, Hsiung describes Confucianism as a “cultural-ideological” system that was replaced by 
Marxist/Maoist ideology (86-87). This is problematic for two reasons: first, it conflates ideology (which is a 
primarily intellectual and elite-centered phenomenon) with culture (an embodied, multivalent social reality that is 
participated in by all members of society); second, it denies the agency of the people in evaluating, modifying and 
(in some cases) rejecting the imposed ideology. This second issue (and the difficulties arising from it) is prominent 
in the discussion of the differences between the Chinese and Russian revolutions, where Hsiung opines that these 
differences can be attributed to economic and political problems and to ideological differences, utterly ignoring the 
cultural differences between the two groups (105). However, it should be noted that Hsiung adopts a somewhat 
idiosyncratic notion of Maoist “ideology” based upon its practical character, a fact that is discussed below and that 
mitigates this criticism to some extent. 
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A further result of my contact with Hsiung’s work was the realization that the scholarly 
issues surrounding the historical Mao himself (as represented in biographies and speeches, as 
well as his written output (including philosophy, poetry, and policy statements)) are both too 
broad and too multifarious to be reasonably addressed in a study of this length – especially one 
that primarily focuses on public responses. As such, the particulars of Mao’s character and his 
rule will not be addressed, save to the extent that they bear upon these public perceptions. While 
I acknowledge that this represents a gap in my own work, it is entirely in keeping with the 
present project’s status as an initial investigation into the issues under discussion. 
 
Culture as an Embedded (and Embodied) Phenomenon 
As a corollary of the concerns highlighted above, the present study also aims to avoid 
falling into the intellectualist trap that ensnares many scholars when analyzing cultures with 
well-established traditions of elite and popular practice. In particular, while it is tempting to rely 
solely upon the discursive theories of social elites (as these theories are often the most readily 
accessible and clearly articulated), such an approach ignores the interactive and embodied 
elements of culture – elements that all members participate in and help to shape. For this reason, 
it is helpful to expand the scope to include an examination of ritual and popular narrative, as 
these two factors elegantly reflect the embodied, participatory and analogical nature of human 
intellection and interaction. Not only have these domains received increasing amounts of 
scholarly attention of late for their general utility in exploring cultural phenomena, but they also 
are particularly apt tools for providing insight into the popular Chinese context of the present 
study. Within this context, familiar images, symbols and rituals all become relevant, because 
they are all constituent elements of shared (popular) culture – a system of beliefs, practices and 
responses that are used by individuals in interpreting and evaluating the world around them. 
 
There are two fundamental premises underlying this understanding of culture: first, that it 
is instantiated, and, second, that it is functional (as opposed to being constitutive). In brief, the 
first of these premises implies that culture is not an externalized, reified entity, but that it is 
instead a multiplicity of interrelated concepts instantiated in the minds of individuals. Describing 
this perspective, Dan Sperber notes: “cultures are the collective output of human mental abilities. 
In principle, then, cultural anthropology and psychology should have a close and fruitful 
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relationship. They will deal with outputs of the same general device: the human mind.”31 This 
cognitivistic approach to culture, unlike many earlier perspectives,32 has a far easier time 
explaining creative uses of cultural materials,33 in that the interpretation of these materials is 
embodied within the lived experience of individuals: 
The tacit knowledge of a participant in a symbolic-cultural system is neither taught nor 
learned by rote. Rather each new participant in a system of cultural symbolism 
reconstructs the rules which govern the symbolic-cultural system in question. These 
reconstructions may differ considerably, depending upon such factors as the personal 
history of the individual in question.34 
 
In this way, the instantiated understanding of culture also provides insight into its functionality, 
as will be demonstrated presently. 
 
Specifically, this cognitive approach allows for a clear understanding of the means by 
which cultural materials fulfill social and psychological functions – a fact that is elegantly 
represented through Ann Swidler’s metaphorical description of culture as a “toolbox.” This view 
suggests that an individual’s cultural inheritance can be fruitfully characterized as a learned body 
of beliefs, practices and behaviours that are utilized in response to the trials and tribulations of 
embodied existence. In “Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies,” she describes this 
metaphorical toolbox as follows:  
[It is] a general way of organizing action (depending upon a network of kin and friends, 
for example, or relying on selling one's skills in a market) that might allow one to reach 
                                                 
31
 Dan Sperber, quoted in E. Thomas Lawson and Robert N. McCauley, Rethinking Religion: Connecting Cognition 
and Culture, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 68. Theorists who follow this interpretation suggest 
that cultures can maintain their cohesiveness because, even in cases of incomplete or inadequate transmission, 
individuals tend to interpret cultural materials in highly predictable ways due to the underlying structure of the 
human mind. These “inference systems,” which govern the perception and interpretation of various fundamental 
realities of human life (including agency, biology, and physical causality), are described at length in Pinker (1997) 
and in Pascal Boyer, Religion Explained: The Evolutionary Origins of Religious Thought, (New York: Basic Books, 
2001). 
32
 For instance, Ann Swidler notes that the Weberian and Parsonian approaches turn individuals into “passive 
cultural dopes” through their contention that the primary purpose of culture is to provide value orientations (which 
then function as incentives towards adopting particular behaviors) (274). “Culture in Action: Symbols and 
Strategies,” American Sociological Review 51:2 (April 1986), 273-286. 
33
 These “cultural materials” can be understood in reference to Delwin Brown’s concept of “canons,” which he 
describes as “reasonably defined ‘spaces,’ bodies of material – texts, doctrines, symbols, rituals, and so on, or 
combinations of these – within which and with which … negotiation is conducted. Negotiating identity in 
relationship to a canon is a process of employing the materials of canon – which necessarily means construing the 
canon in this way or that – as a framework in terms of which one understands oneself one’s social and natural world, 
and one’s place in it” (90). Boundaries of Our Habitations: Tradition and Theological Construction, (Albany, N.Y.: 
State University of New York Press, 1994). 
34
 Lawson and McCauley, 68. 
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several different life goals. Strategies of action incorporate, and thus depend on, habits, 
moods, sensibilities, and views of the world (Geertz, 1973a). People do not build lines of 
action from scratch, choosing actions one at a time as efficient means to given ends. 
Instead, they construct chains of action beginning with at least some pre-fabricated links. 
Culture influences action through the shape and organization of those links, not by 
determining the ends to which they are put.35 
 
The notion of the cultural “toolbox” provides a meaningful account of the means by which 
cultures function – namely, by providing canonical vocabularies of symbols and actions that can 
be used in navigating the challenges of embodied, social existence. 
 
 The functional understanding of cultural materials outlined above has numerous points of 
correspondence with the “narrative turn” recently taken by many researchers in the humanities 
and social sciences.36 This emerging interdisciplinary consensus centers on valorizing the central 
role of (personal and cultural) narratives in the formation and reinforcement of human minds and 
human societies, with the suggestion that stories serve explanatory, empathetic and constitutive 
purposes. Jerome Bruner, one of the most distinguished proponents of this theory, provides an 
excellent summary of this approach to narrative: 
It has an available cultural tool kit or tradition on which its procedures are modeled, and 
its distributional reach is as wide and as active as gossip itself. Its form is so familiar and 
ubiquitous that it is likely to be overlooked, in much the same way as we suppose that the 
fish will be the last to discover water. As I have argued extensively elsewhere, we 
organize our experience and our memory of human happenings mainly in the form of 
narrative-stories, excuses, myths, reasons for doing and not doing, and so on. Narrative is 
a conventional form, transmitted culturally and constrained by each individual's level of 
mastery and by his conglomerate of prosthetic devices, colleagues, and mentors. Unlike 
the constructions generated by logical and scientific procedures that can be weeded out 
by falsification, narrative constructions can only achieve “verisimilitude.” Narratives, 
then, are a version of reality whose acceptability is governed by convention and 
“narrative necessity” rather than by empirical verification and logical requiredness 
although ironically we have no compunction about calling stories true or false.37 
 
                                                 
35
 Swidler, 277. 
36
 For an overview of this valorization of narrative, see David Maines, “Narrative’s Moment and Sociology’s 
Phenomena: Toward a Narrative Sociology,” The Sociological Quarterly 34:1 (1993). 17-38. For a detailed account 
of the relationship between Swidler’s view of culture and the narrative perpectives outlined below, see Christopher 
Jensen, “Religion and Ideology: Using Ann Swidler’s Theory of Unsettled  
Cultures to Explore the Notion of Religious Fundamentalism,” Journal of Religion and Culture 18/19 (2007). 135-
157, 138-143. 
37
 Jerome Bruner, “The Narrative Construction of Reality,” Critical Inquiry 18:1 (Autumn 1991), 1-21, 4-5. 
 13 
This same principle was expressed somewhat more pithily by Thomas King, who began his 
Massey Lectures by stating, “The truth about stories is, that’s all we are.”38 
 
In this context, three principal features of narrative are relevant to the present discussion 
of culture: normativity, narrative accrual, and hermeneutic composability. The first principle 
describes the fact that narratives (whether shared or internalized) derive their dramatic impetus 
from the contravention of an ordered state (be it natural, social or moral), which means that they 
contain within themselves an (often implicit) account of this order.39 As such, they represent 
means through which cultural norms can be challenged, inculcated or reified. The second 
principle, narrative accrual, describes the fact that narratives are inherently iterative and 
recursive, in that they both reference and redefine that which came before them. While this 
capacity is evidently important to the construction of coherent identities (as contained in internal 
autobiographical narratives), it is an equally important element of narrative as a cultural process:  
What creates a culture, surely, must be a "local" capacity for accruing stories of 
happenings of the past into some sort of diachronic structure that permits a continuity into 
the present-in short, to construct a history, a tradition, a legal system, instruments 
assuring historical continuity if not legitimacy. ... The perpetual construction and 
reconstruction of the past provide precisely the forms of canonicity that permit us to 
recognize when a breach has occurred and how it might be interpreted.40 
 
The third principle (hermeneutic composability) refers to the fact that narratives (and, more 
broadly, the cultural materials out of which narratives are drawn) are inherently hermeneutical 
entities, by which I simply mean that they require interpretation. Moreover, the originators and 
disseminators of narratives have little-to-no control of the manner in which their accounts will be 
received, internalized and (potentially) reapplied.41 As Bruner suggests, “the word hermeneutic 
implies that there is a text or a text analogue through which somebody has been trying to express 
a meaning and from which somebody is trying to extract a meaning. This in turn implies that 
there is a difference between what is expressed in the text and what the text might mean, and 
furthermore that there is no unique solution to the task of determining the meaning for this 
                                                 
38
 Thomas King, The Truth About Stories: A Native Narrative, (Toronto: House of Anansi Press, 2003), passim (he 
uses this phrase to introduce each chapter). 
39
 Bruner, 15-16. 
40
 Bruner, 19-20. 
41
 Bruner, 7. For a discussion of this interpretative paradigm as it pertains to sociology, see Maines, 18-23. 
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expression.”42 All three of these elements (normativity, narrative accrual, and hermeneutic 
composability) will be utilized in our discussion of historical Chinese realities and their 
impingement upon modern (re)appropriations of Mao. 
 
As a final addition to this discussion of culture, we must now turn to two varieties of 
cultural materials, both of which will be used in the analysis to follow: namely, metaphor and 
ritual. The topics are mentioned in tandem due to their functional similarities, as they are both 
means by which cultural patterns and tropes are transmitted and reified. In the case of metaphor, 
it suffices to note that the linguistic structures utilized by individuals to describe social realities 
offer profound insights into the functional and structural relationships between concepts (on 
levels of both psychology43 and culture44). These factors will be taken into account in chapter 
three, which explores the metaphorical and symbolic content of the modern religious 
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 Bruner, 7. He goes on to consider the role of innate mental faculties in the hermeneutic endeavour: “The telling of 
a story and its comprehension as a story depend on the human capacity to process knowledge in this interpretive 
way. It is a way of processing that, in the main, has been grossly neglected by students of mind raised either in the 
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reasoning, with the means we employ for establishing the necessary truth inherent in a set of connected propositions. 
… Empiricists, for their part, rested their claims on a mind capable of verifying the constituent "atomic 
propositions" that comprised a text. But neither of these procedures, right reason or verification, suffice for 
explicating how a narrative is either put together by a speaker or interpreted by a hearer. This is the more surprising 
since there is compelling evidence to indicate that narrative comprehension is among the earliest powers of mind to 
appear in the young child and among the most widely used forms of organizing human experience” (8-9). 
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 For an excellent overview of the psychological literature on this topic, including Lakoff and Johnson’s pioneering 
research into the pivotal role of metaphor in human cognition, see Edward Slingerland, “Conceptual Metaphor 
Theory as Methodology fro Comparative Religion,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion, March 2004, 72 
(1), 1-31. Therein, Slingerland argues that “human cognition – the production, communication, and processing of 
meaning – is heavily dependant on mappings between domains, with ‘mapping’ understood as ‘a correspondence 
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Slingerland, 9). Intriguingly, current research is noting that many such mappings occur at a pre-linguistic level, such 
that “linguistic manifestations of cross-domain mappings are merely surface manifestations of deeper cognitive 
processes” (ibid.). This notion is entirely commensurate with Pinker’s empirical research into the storage, accession 
and utilization of “mentalese” representations in cognition (with linguistic representation as a second-order process) 
(69-70). Likewise, parallels can also be seen with the Chomskyan notion of “deep structures” (a hypothesis that he 
first explored in Syntactic Structures, (The Hague: Mouton, 1965)). 
44
 For instance, Ning Yu, while acknowledging the fundamental role of metaphor in human psychology, offers the 
proviso to these primary experiences are then informed by culture: “The interaction between common bodily 
experiences and varied cultural experiences determines the extent to which conceptual metaphors are universal, 
widespread or culturally-specific. At the same time, the same basic embodied experiences, in which many 
conceptual metaphors are grounded, may be defined differently by different cultural beliefs and values ([as per] 
Gibbs, 1999). Also, our cultural models may be constructed metaphorically, thus framing our worldview 
metaphorically. As such, the relation between metaphor, body, and culture is extremely intricate, with all of them 
mingled together, and each of them penetrating the others, giving rise to a colorful spectrum of cognition” (14). , 
“Metaphor, Body, and Culture: The Chinese Understanding of Gallbladder and Courage,” Metaphor and Symbol 
18(1) (2003), 13-31. 
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reinterpretations of Mao.45 In the case of ritual, the present study reaffirms its importance in 
understanding human cultures, given its role in defining social roles and obligations,46 creating, 
reaffirming and reifying cultural doctrines,47 and reorienting life in light of an authoritative 
order.48 Given that the entirety of chapter four is devoted to outlining a particular theory of ritual 
and utilizing these conclusions to interpret certain Mao-era rituals within the broader Chinese 
context, it is unnecessary to delve further into these matters at this time. 
 
The understanding of culture outlined above, which acknowledges the importance of 
narrative, metaphor, ritual, and canonical discourse, and which notes the embodied and 
“cognitivistic” character of culture, is particularly relevant to the present research due to the fact 
that it can meaningfully account for both cultural continuity and cultural creativity.49 This makes 
it an ideal tool for exploring the religious interpretations of Mao in modern China, due to the fact 
that these interpretations often rely upon the application of traditional symbols and tropes in new 
settings and contexts. 
 
Contra Orientalism (A Proviso) 
The types of issues raised above enter potentially dangerous terrain, in that they could be 
construed as manifestations of Orientalist discourse – aiming to describe the Chinese as an 
“Other,” whose thought processes, by their very nature, are utterly different from those of 
                                                 
45
 While this perspective is evidently of tremendous interest to modern religious studies, as demonstrated in Edward 
Slingerland’s masterful application of these theories to the classical Chinese doctrine of wu-wei (Effortless Action: 
Wu-wei as Conceptual Metaphor and Spiritual Ideal in Early China, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003)), I 
must admit that it was of slightly less utility in the present study, largely due to my own lack of confidence in my 
classical Chinese. As such, while I am more than willing to discuss large-scale, undisputable metaphors (e.g., “Mao 
as emperor”, “Mao as god”), my rudimentary skills in modern Chinese interfered with my ability to utilize this 
theory to its full potential. This being said, it certainly provides a fertile avenue for future research into this topic. 
46
 As per Boyer, 250-263.  
47
 See, for example, Roy Rappaport, Ritual and Religion in the Making of Humanity, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), 107-138. Similarly, Lawson and McCauley argue that the majority of religious rituals 
derive both their theoretical justifications and their epistemological interpretations from the symbolic-cultural 
system of the religion itself, 93-95. 
48
 Bell, 169. See also Rappaport, who argues that “[f]or one who performs a ritual, ‘to act’ is to take an action that 
affirms or even brings into being a significant order and also states his acceptance of it. It may even transform that 
order or himself” (136). 
49
 The notions of cultural continuity and cultural creativity are used extensively in the summary of the present 
research found in chapter five. 
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Westerners.50 This is, of course, not a desirable outcome. Conversely, it is also undesirable to 
follow the evolutionary reasoning of early sociologists and anthropologists51 and to assume that 
Chinese rationality is exactly like its Western counterparts, as under that assumption the 
continued existence of magical/ritualistic thought (as seen in religious interpretations of Mao) 
could then simply be interpreted as primitive (and ultimately fallacious) rationality. Instead, it 
seems advisable to take a middle path between these two extremes. 
 
Mary Douglas, in Natural Symbols, offers an approach that provides this type of 
intermediate perspective. Therein, she details a classification system whereby social groups can 
be categorized based on two axes – “group” and “grid” – where “[grid] is order, classification, 
the symbolic system” and group refers to “pressure, the experience of having no option but to 
consent to the overwhelming demands of other people.”52 She goes on to suggest that the role 
and function of ritual in societies will be determined by where they would be placed on these 
axes. For example, a society characterized by strong interpersonal bonds (“group”) will likely be 
“a ritualistic society,” with rituals focused on either expressing an “internal classification 
system” or reinforcing  “group boundaries.”53 In this way, if it can be demonstrated that Chinese 
social patterns or cultural psychology stress collectivism over individualism, Douglas’s theory 
suggests that both ritual and communal consensus will hold a more important place in their 
culture.  
 
The collectivist orientation of Chinese society, frequently taken as a given by social 
scientists, has been objectively demonstrated through a number of recent empirical studies. In 
one, an analysis of the motivations affecting Chinese primary-school students, the researchers 
proposed the following conclusions: 
Chinese students in Hong Kong are highly achievement oriented; compared to their 
western counterparts [and] they attach different values to achievement. Instead of 
worshiping individualism, collectivism is valued – family and group goals are considered 
more important than those of the individual.... In other words, the Chinese value was a 
                                                 
50
 A phrase that was coined and extrapolated upon in Edward Said’s Orientalism, (New York: Pantheon Books, 
1978). 
51
 Tylor, Frazer, et al. (discussed above). 
52
 Douglas, quoted in Bell, 43. 
53
 Ibid., 45. 
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reflection of Confucian philosophy that advocates self-constraint and interactive, 
relational context for social beings.54  
 
In another study, this one concerned with the manner in which workers respond to supervisor 
feedback, postulated that responses would differ in collectivist and individualist countries. As 
such, their methodology required an empirical test to determine the interpersonal orientation of 
various cultures (in this case, Chinese and Dutch), which they utilized as follows:  
[We] used Singelis’s (1994) scale of interdependent self-construal, extended from 12 to 
15 items, to measure collectivist orientation.... Examples of the items are, 'I would 
sacrifice my self interest for the benefit of the group I belong to'; 'If my brother or sister 
fails, I feel responsible'; 'I often have the feeling that my relationships with others are 
more important than my own accomplishments'; 'I would offer my seat in a bus to my 
professor'; and 'I would stay in a group if they needed me, even if I was not happy with 
the group.' The construct validity of the measure of collectivist orientation is apparent 
from the relatively high score of the Chinese and the relatively low score of the Dutch 
(M= .23 vs.M= –.56; t(428) = 17.12, p < .001).55  
 
Given the plausible results of both of these studies (each of which draws upon an additional body 
of material for verification and confirmation), it seems reasonable to accept the scholarly 
consensus that Chinese society is, indeed, collectivistically oriented.56 
 
Though it would be ridiculous to postulate that any society (or any individual, for that 
matter) could be unilaterally assigned to a particular orientation within Douglas’s framework 
(especially if such orientations are seen as binary, “is/is not” characteristics), it seems reasonable 
to suggest that cultural differences could manifest themselves by emphasizing certain modes of 
thought over others. Thus, the present study seeks to examine these cultural particularities, not as 
a means to highlighting divisions, but in the service of a broader, more nuanced perspective on 
specific cultural phenomena (such as a the “cult of Mao”) that have been characterized by some 
as foolish, incomprehensible or ironically bizarre. My efforts in this enterprise are aided by the 
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 Ping Liu, “Transition from elementary school to middle school and change in motivation: An examination of 
Chinese students,” Journal of Research in Childhood Education; Fall 2003; 18, 1, 71-83. 73.  
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 Evert van der Vliert, Kan Shi, et al., “Chinese and Dutch Interpretations of Supervisory Feedback,” Journal of 
Cross-Cultural Psychology 35:4 (July 2004), 417-435. 423. 
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 It should be noted, here as above, that this characterization is not meant to expostulate on irreconcilable 
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the collectivist nature of the Chinese culture(s) are contested notions, as outlined in Moskowitz’s “Magic Tricks, 
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accepted cultural differences. 
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fact that ritual and narrative scholarship, in addition to their particular utility in the Chinese 
context, have been gaining ground of late as broadly applicable means of exploring human 
realities from a cross-cultural perspective. 
   
Methodological Issues 
Following the theoretical perspectives introduced above, the present study will follow a 
five-fold methodological approach. First, it follows the standard phenomenological method of 
religious studies, attempting to bracket experiences in order to critically explore “the meaning 
that the religious phenomena have for the believers themselves”,57 and, when such bracketing is 
difficult or impossible, being aware of one’s own subjective emotional and conceptual baggage. 
It was such a perspective that motivated the sensitivity to Orientalist discourse discussed above. 
Second, the interaction between historical and modern Chinese realities will be explored using 
the comparative perspective detailed above, drawing upon such notable examples as Julia Ching, 
Mircea Eliade, Richard von Glahn, and others.58 Third, the ritualistic elements of the Mao cult 
will be approached through a modified perspective informed by the theories of Catherine Bell, 
Pascal Boyer, Adam Chau, Roy Rappaport, Thomas Lawson and Robert McCauley.59 Fourth, 
this study will utilize the instantiated, narratological approach to culture described at length 
above. Though my need to improve my competence in the source language has presented a slight 
impediment to the usage of this technique, the metaphorical and narratological domains in 
question have been extensively described and studied in previous works, which makes such an 
approach tenable. Finally, given my extra-disciplinary interest in the social sciences, I have 
attempted whenever possible to ground my speculations in current scientific perspectives on 
human minds and human societies, drawing inspiration from such fields as psychology, 
neuroscience, anthropology and sociology. 
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 William Brede Kristensen, as quoted in George James, Interpreting Religion: The Phenomenological Approaches 
of Pierre Daniël Chantepie de la Saussaye, W. Brede Kristensen, and Gerardus van der Leeuw, (Washington D.C.: 
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 This perspective will be explored and applied in chapter four. 
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Conclusions 
 
Cultural psychology, narrative and ritual each provide valuable insights into the puzzling 
phenomenon of Mao veneration in modern China. Though these cultic practices took (and 
continue to take) fairly standard forms (including the use of amulets, the talismanic application 
of holy texts, and the construction of temples), the fact that the nexus of these devotions is 
located in a recently deceased political leader is both etically and emically intriguing. The aim of 
the present study is to explore the cultural materials (including narratives, religious conceptual 
vocabularies, folk psychologies, and rituals) that make this phenomenon viable and meaningful. 
Some of the materials that will be of particular use in making this case include the traditional 
understanding of the continuity between god and emperor, the role of perceived efficacy in 
popular cults, the institution of Mao’s charisma through ritual, and the porosity of the traditional 
Chinese cosmology (which draws only limited distinctions between the realms of gods and 
humans). All of these elements played a part in the seemingly spontaneous generation of the oft-
mentioned religious devotions in the early 1990s, though I would argue that much of their 
perceived novelty can be attributed to a lack of attention to cultural precedents. 
 
 Finally (and in keeping with the valorization of narrative found above), I will conclude 
this introduction with a story that provides an anecdotal account of the continued symbolic 
power of Mao in modern China, as well as demonstrating the extent to which these issues remain 
consequential for Chinese people.  
 
In the weeks leading up to the Tiananmen Massacre, three working-class Chinese 
peasants embarked upon a cross-country voyage to express their support for the students 
gathered in protest of the current administration. After the government declared martial law, the 
three men decided that it was time to act: 
A few nights later, frustrated and worried they were missing a unique chance to push 
China toward democracy, the trio considered self-immolation in Tiananmen Square, but 
feared their suicides might be misinterpreted. Smoking and passionately debating what to 
do next, Mr. Lu’s childhood friend, Yu Zhijian, a primary school teacher, glanced at the 
iconic portrait of Chairman Mao. “It’s because his dark soul has never been vanquished!” 
Mr. Yu declared. “It’s all his fault.” 60 
                                                 
60
 Jan Wong, “This is China’s tragedy: Dissident reveals what drove him to deface Mao,” The Globe and Mail 
(Friday, June 2, 2006), A1 + A7. A7. 
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It was then that they concocted a plan to deface the Great Helmsman’s luminous, iconic image, 
though their desire “not to commit violence” caused them to enclose the paint in eggshells 
instead of glass bottles.61 
 
Their act of vandalism was not spontaneously or carelessly decided upon. In fact, once 
the men chose the form that their protest would take, they contacted their families and informed 
them that they would not be home again. Their assessment of the perils of their action was 
indeed accurate. After their brief moment of protest, the three rural men were arrested and 
imprisoned for over ten years (on average), where they were harassed, isolated and physically 
abused.62 
 
The scarred bodies and psyches of these protestors emphasize the fact that coming to 
terms with the disparate characterizations of Mao is not simply an intellectual exercise. Instead, 
it represents a deadly serious struggle for millions of Chinese citizens attempting to construct 
meaningful construals of their place within China (especially when “China” is understood as a 
historical, political and geographical entity). If the present work’s exploration of the posthumous 
cult of the Chairman helps to provide insight into this complex, existential process, I will 
consider it to have been a successful and worthwhile endeavour. 
                                                 
61
 Ibid. 
62
 Both the act of vandalism itself and the government’s response indicate the extent to which Mao (as leader) 
remains a metonym of China. 
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Chapter 2: Traditional Chinese Understandings of Gods, Emperors and 
the Relationship between Them 
 
 
 
While the previous chapter provides an introduction to the religious interpretations of 
Mao in modern China, this issue prompts a number of important questions: Why would such 
identifications and metaphors seem appropriate? Is there any historical precedent for ascribing 
divine status to a political leader? How were divinity and rulership construed in pre-modern 
China? Have these construals remained relevant into the modern day? The answers to some of 
these questions (in particular, those dealing with historical precedents) will be found in an 
exploration of the traditional understanding of gods and emperors – two categories that, by 
Western standards, seem utterly disparate. In contrast, I will argue that, within the largely 
efficacy-based tradition of Chinese popular religion, these two categories share certain profound 
similarities, particularly given their shared emphasis on spiritual potency (ling (靈) in the case of 
gods and de (德) in the case of political leaders). Once these parallels have been demonstrated, 
with especial attention paid to the Wittgensteinian “family resemblances” between these two 
powerful archetypes, these points of intersection will be used to shed light on the tropes and 
images drawn upon in religious descriptions of Mao.1 
 
In outlining the historical antecedents that will be utilized in the analysis of the Mao 
materials, my exploration will proceed as follows: first, I will outline the general character of 
Chinese popular religion, focusing particular attention on the roles of efficacy, narrative and 
pragmatism (elements that will be highlighted in the overview to follow); next, I will explore the 
means through which these foci characterize the traditional Chinese understanding of 
superhuman agents; finally, I will survey the traditional understanding of imperial power, noting 
the relevance of the previously developed efficacy framework, as well as other functional and 
metaphorical commonalities between gods and emperors. Once this survey is complete, it will 
then be possible to assess the meaning of these symbols when used in descriptions of Chairman 
Mao (as covered in chapter three), as well as to explore one of the primary means through which 
this efficacy is generated: namely, ritual (which will be discussed in chapter four). 
                                                 
1
 This topic provides the subject matter for chapter three. 
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Belief and Practice in Chinese Religiosity 
 
Chinese religious belief, in both its ancient and modern guises, is typically characterized 
by a complex, multimodal understanding of mortality, spirituality and the cosmos – all of which 
are informed by certain ubiquitous principles (such as the notion of qi, yin/yang metaphysics and 
the relational view of self). While one could argue that these doctrinal foundations represent the 
most distinctive elements of the tradition, such an approach evidences a particularly Western 
concern with creedal statements and dogmatic beliefs as the sine qua non of a religious system. 
As such, many scholars of Chinese religion caution that this avenue of research ignores the 
fundamentally divergent emphases of Western and Sinic religiosity, with the latter being 
predominantly characterized in terms of ritual participation and its concomitant social effects.2 
For this reason, it is often argued that any theory which uncritically assumes the centrality of 
religious belief (in the doctrinaire, “spiritually monogamous” sense of the term) is conditioned by 
Western assumptions, and that, as a result, it is potentially unsuitable for discussing Chinese 
religion.  
 
One means of avoiding this pitfall is to concentrate instead upon an economic approach 
to human religious activity: an understanding that was first posited by Adam Smith, which 
provides a valuable contrast to the more faith- or doctrine-based approaches often utilized in the 
academic study of religion. Unlike perspectives that tend to reify religions as logically discrete 
categories,3 the economic approach contends that the “costs and benefits of religious practice, 
like the costs and benefits of other forms of publicly observable behavior, can be at least 
identified and possibly measured.”4 This method dovetails nicely with sociological and 
                                                 
2
 These related topics will be addressed in considerable detail below and in the following chapter. The amorphous 
“many authors” mentioned above (who propound the notion of Chinese religion as defined by praxis, ritual 
participation and/or social utility) include Roger Ames, Catherine Bell, Adam Yuet Chau, Chad Hansen, Stevan 
Harrell, Jordan Paper, Mu-chou Poo, Henry Rosemont Jr., P. Steven Sangren, and Richard von Glahn – all of whom 
will be considered in more detail below. In compiling this brief list, it is intriguing to note the diversity of disciplines 
that have aided in the formation of this consensus on Chinese religiosity, as the scholars mentioned above have 
employed approaches as varied as anthropology, ethnography, textual analysis, archeology, sociology, philosophy 
and linguistics. 
3
 A tendency that is eloquently described in Jonathan Z. Smith’s “Religion, Religions, Religious,” in Critical Terms 
for Religious Studies, edited by Marc C. Taylor, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998). 269-284. 
4 Gary M. Anderson, “Mr. Smith and the Preachers: The Economics of Religion in the Wealth of Nations,” The 
Journal of Political Economy 96: 5 (October 1988), 1066-1088. 1068. See also: Carl L. Bankston III, "Rationality, 
Choice and the Religious Economy: The Problem of Belief," Review of Religious Research 43:4 (June 2002), 311-
325; Carl L. Bankston III, "Rationality, Choice, and the Religious Economy: Individual and Collective Rationality 
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anthropological approaches to religion, as all three concentrate their attention on the visible, 
phenomenological components of religious traditions, surveying them both categorically and 
within a broader social / cultural context. Despite the fact that these perspectives allow religious 
phenomena to be analyzed based on their function(s) in the lives of adherents, they nevertheless 
suggest a rather important question: if religion (as a category of human behavior) is not explicitly 
tied to doctrinal commitments, how else can it be construed? Intriguingly, the Chinese materials 
themselves provide the answer to this theoretical question: namely, that religions are cultural 
systems that implicate extra-human5 forces in the attainment of personal and social ends.6 
 
In examining current sociological, anthropological, and historical literature on popular 
religion in China, one is struck by the suggestion that faith and belief are secondary concerns, to 
the extent that an individual’s decision to patronize a cult (through participation in prayers, 
sacrifices and other rituals) is predominantly based on the perceived efficacy of the extra-human 
agent(s) at the movement’s core.7 This concern with efficacy means that the majority of 
traditional religious practices are focused on the attainment of harmony and prosperity for one’s 
self and one’s family, rather than professing faith in a deity (as is the case in many other theistic 
traditions). This approach to spiritual life is summarized in Mu-chou Poo’s In Search of Personal 
Welfare: A View of Ancient Chinese Religion – an exploration of ancient Chinese religiosity 
that outlines prominent beliefs and practices from prehistoric times to the Han dynasty. In it, Poo 
suggests that “the objective of all these [religious activities] was mainly personal welfare (that of 
the suppliant and/or his relatives), which was also a primary motivation for keeping worship and 
                                                                                                                                                             
in Supply and Demand," Review of Religious Research 45: 2 (December 2003), 155-171. These economic 
approaches are used extensively in the discussion of ritual found in Chapter 4. 
5
 Mu-chou Poo suggests that the term “extra-human” is an appropriate descriptor for the non-profane realm posited 
by Chinese religion (rather than the more common “superhuman” or “supernatural”). His reasoning is based upon 
the utter immanence of this spiritual realm: “[These powers] were not necessarily ‘super-natural’ – in the sense of 
‘above’ or ‘beyond’ the natural world. They were not necessarily ‘superhuman’ either – in the sense of having 
greater power than man. Some amounted to no more than minor irritations and were effectively checked with the 
performance of exorcistic acts. While both ‘supernatural’ and ‘superhuman’ entail the sense of ‘superior,’ ‘better,’ 
or ‘stronger,’ the term ‘extra-human’ only refers to the sphere of existence of the powers without reference to their 
quality, strength, or nature” (6). In Search of Personal Welfare: A View of Ancient Chinese Religion, (Albany, NY: 
State University of New York Press, 1998).  
6
 This active, performative understanding of religion can be seen as a corrective to the early modern views 
propounded by Tylor, Frazer and others, all of whom argued that religion consisted of belief in superhuman beings 
(rather than their function(s) in human lives). For a good summary of these early views, see Pals (1996). This 
praxical approach to defining religions is echoed in Lawson and McCauley, 5-6. 
7
 See, for example, Chau (2006); Harrell (1977); Poo (1998). 
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cults alive.”8 The continued relevance of this historical insight was confirmed by Willem 
Grootaers, Li Shih-Yü and Wang Fu-Shih’s fieldwork in Hebei province (ca. 1947), wherein 
they cataloged 640 rural and small-town temples. In their analysis, they discovered (in keeping 
with Poo’s statement) that the majority of religious activity involved importuning deities for aid 
in the achievement of this-worldly ends. In particular, they noted that approximately sixty 
percent of temple structures were explicitly devoted to prayers for worldly prosperity (a category 
that included agricultural productivity (38.3%), desire for wealth (10.5%), and desire for            
(/ protection of) offspring (10.5%)). Of the remaining temple structures, over fifteen percent 
were dedicated to providing protection against evil spirits, with another sixteen percent focused 
on protection from divine judgment:9  
Second only to [cults centered on agricultural fertility] comes the preoccupation with the 
judgment of the soul. Actually we have seen that even the temples dedicated to rain gods 
show many reminders of the god's power to chastize evil doers. These two are by all 
counts the basic tenets and practices of the Chinese popular religion, as we found it in the 
surveyed areas.10 
 
However, even the fear of supernatural punishment – a mainstay of many religious traditions – 
was approached in a largely “this-worldly” manner, with the vast majority of penalties meted out 
in the present (rather than in a hypothesized afterlife). Some of the most comment ailments 
interpreted as divine punishments included sickness, infertility (or lack of male progeny), and 
agricultural troubles (such as drought or disease). 
 
Though the ethno-geographical study summarized above is by no means a definitive 
proof of a particular tendency within Chinese religiosity, it represents a strong argument that the 
(efficacy-centric) character of traditional Chinese religion (as described by Poo, Sangren, Chau 
and others) persisted from the classical period into modernity. Additionally, it also provides a 
glimpse into the folk psychology of Chinese religion – a topic that will be addressed in more 
detail below. This digression is a necessary one, as it supports the present study’s focus on the 
perceived efficacy of extrahuman beings (and the means by which these conceptions generate 
religious goods) over the specifics of religious doctrine. 
                                                 
8
 Poo, 7, 13, and passim. 
9
 Willem A. Grootaers; 李世瑜; 王輔世, "Rural Temples around Hsüan-Hua (South Chahar): Their Iconography and 
Their History," Folklore Studies 10: 1 (1951), 1-116. 115.  
10
 Ibid. (Emphasis added). 
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In particular, many theorists argue that the related concepts of “belief” and “faith” are 
substantially less relevant to the practice of Chinese religions than they are in Western religious 
modalities. As Teiser suggests, individuals take part in Chinese religious ceremonies “without 
any necessary commitment to the existence of particular spirits.”11 Likewise, Adam Chau notes: 
During the course of my fieldwork in Shaanbei, however, I seldom encountered any 
explicit talk to “belief in deities.” Shaanbei people do have a word for the verb “believed” 
(xiangxin) as used in “I believe what you are saying,” but they do not say “I believe in the 
Black Dragon King” or “I believe in gods and goddesses.” Most important, they do not 
have the noun “belief” (as in “you have the right to hold your religious beliefs”) or 
“faith” to refer to the totality of their beliefs.12 
 
This lack of concern with “belief” (as an existential stance) is also noted by Stevan Harrell, 
whose research among Taiwanese peasants evidenced a similar concern with religious efficacy 
over doctrinal issues: 
I no longer consider the question of literal belief very important. What matters to the 
practical believers, the great majority of the informants questioned, is not whether the 
offerings they put out on deserted paths at night are actually eaten in some spiritual way 
by hungry ghosts, but whether by putting out such offerings, they can cure their children's 
lingering fevers. That more people are willing to profess belief in the efficacy of such 
offerings than will state that they believe ghosts exist is evidence that what people are 
looking for is not a true model but a workable model, a vision of reality which can serve 
as a useful guide to practical action. If diseases can be cured by acting as if ghosts exist, 
fine – no need to worry about whether they actually exist or not.13 
 
While it could be argued the argument quoted above is slightly sophistical,14 Harrell’s extensive 
research into Taiwanese folk religion does support the general contention that individuals within 
the Chinese religious context privilege perceived spiritual potency over particular doctrinal or 
theological belief concerning these deities.15 This conjecture is offered considerable support by 
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 Stephen F. Teiser, “Introduction: The Spirits of Chinese Religion” in Religions of China in Practice, edited by 
Donald S. Lopez, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 3-37. 23. See also: Arthur P. Wolf, “Gods, 
Ghosts, and Ancestors” in Religion and Ritual in Chinese Society, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1974). 
131-182. 160.  
12
 Adam Yuet Chau, Miraculous Response: Doing Popular Religion in Contemporary China, (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2006), 60-61. 
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 Harrell (1977), 64. 
14
 As Dr. Lorne Holyoak rightly pointed out, the above argument is based on a slightly untenable definition of 
“belief,” given that it describes individuals acting “as if” otherworldly phenomena existed. In this particular context, 
it is impossible to say that the participants in folk religion “lack belief” because their actions, if anything, denote a 
conviction that their ritual participation is in some way efficacious (as such participation would otherwise be largely 
meaningless) (personal communication). 
15
 Adam Chau explores this position in great detail in Miraculous Response, where he suggests that “the single most 
important concept in understanding the Shaanbei deity-worshiper relationship is ling (magical efficacy). It refers to 
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the following thought experiment. Imagine conducting a survey of North Americans (regardless 
of religious affiliation) that asked the following two questions: a) do you believe in god(s) and b) 
do you believe that prayer/ritual has a measurable effect on worldly existence. In this 
hypothetical survey, it is absurd to imagine that the second question would receive more positive 
replies than the first, though this seemingly counter-intuitive result was in fact demonstrated 
amongst Harrell’s Chinese respondents.16 While this does not prove that Chinese practitioners of 
folk religion do not “worry about whether [ghosts/gods] actually exist or not,” it does 
demonstrate that such questions are not of primary importance. 
 
 All of this is not to say that the practitioners of Chinese worship do not believe in the 
gods that they sacrifice to, but that these “beliefs” are couched in (and determined by) the 
profoundly interpersonal framework of indigenous religiosity. Within this context, religious 
participation plays out like an unimaginably complex poker game, where all players must 
contend not only with what they believe but also with what they think their fellow players 
believe and what they believe their fellow players believe that they believe (ad infinitum), such 
that it is impossible to determine the epistemological context of their religious participation.17 
Though this trait could be ascribed to all socially embedded belief systems, it is particularly 
relevant in the case of Chinese popular religion because of its central focus on spiritual potency, 
especially when one notes that this perceived potency is generated at the nexus point between 
personal experiences and shared narratives. 
  
                                                                                                                                                             
the ability of the deity to respond (ying) to the worshiper’s problems, for example, curing an ill family member, 
point to the right direction for conducting business, enlightening one on a knotty personal dilemma, bringing ample 
rain after a bad drought, and so forth. Therefore, we can characterize the Shaanbei popular religion as essentially a 
religion of efficacious response (lingying)” (emphasis original) (64). 
16
 In particular, Harrell’s 1977 study found that 67% of respondents agreed that “some illnesses [are] caused by 
malevolent spiritual beings” and that “gods will respond to requests for favors,” while 52% agreed that a “soul exists 
after death” and only 43% acknowledged the existence of ghosts (one of the most common types of “malevolent 
spiritual beings”) (61). As can be seen, these responses argue for a statistically significant emphasis on perceived 
efficacy (whether benevolent or malevolent) over theological/doctrinal beliefs. 
17
 The metaphorical encapsulation of interpersonal reasoning as a poker game is explicitly discussed in David 
Mamet’s “Six Hours of Perfect Poker” in Jafsie and John Henry: Essays, (New York: Free Press, 1999). A similar 
point is made in Roy Rappaport’s Ritual and Religion in the Making of Humanity, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999): “To say that in performing a canon the participant accepts whatever conventional 
understandings, principles, rules or procedures it encodes is simply to say that he has obligated himself to abide by 
its terms regardless of his private opinions and feelings about them” (134). 
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As such, in the context of Chinese popular religion, belief is not a religious good in and 
of itself. Instead, it is only meaningful (or perhaps only existent) when it is directed at a deity 
who has the capacity to effect change in the world – a capacity that is largely determined at the 
level of interpersonal consensus. As Adam Chau notes, this consensus is established primarily 
through narratives of efficacy:  
People’s experience of ling [spiritual potency] is real and is a social fact. A deity is ling 
because people experience his power and therefore say that he is ling. One deity is more 
popular and more ‘powerful’ than another because more people say that first one is more 
ling.  … An allegedly powerful deity whom a person has nonetheless never consulted is 
without significance to this particular person.18 
 
In this way, shared popular narratives concerning spiritual efficacy largely displace elite 
doctrines as devices for the comprehension, promotion, and legitimation of religious 
movements.19 20 Moreover, given the central role of narrative in the related processes of self-
creation (as defined by Bruner) and enculturation (as described by Swidler), the value of these 
experiences and anecdotes as religious goods increases exponentially. Intriguingly, just as these 
narratives of efficacy are central to the development and flourishing of popular cults, we will see 
a similar focus on this type of narrative in the posthumous assessments of Mao described in 
chapter three. 
 
Given the related emphases on ritual, communal consensus and narratives of efficacy, the 
question of whether the Chinese “have faith” might be a meaningless one when they themselves 
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 Chau, 65. To a similar end, Marc Moskowitz’s ethnographic exploration of religious belief in a Chinese village 
also notes the central position held by these narratives of efficacy: “Mrs. Li told me several accounts that led her to 
believe that Daoist Master Bob was legitimate. He had predicted that another couple would get pregnant and the 
exact day that the woman would give birth. … Mrs. Li [also] said that the fact that he had three thousand followers 
in such a small temple must have meant that he had great power. According to Mrs. Li, he had only lived in 
Gaoxiong for eight years. He used to live in Hualian, a smaller city on the East Coast, but moved because the gods 
told him there were many ghosts that needed taking care of in Gaoxing. … As we crossed a large bridge, they told 
me that there used to be many fatal car accidents there. Daoist Master Bob told them that he had begun protecting it 
and that if they did not believe him they could check the accident records to see how drastically reduced the 
accidents were on the bridge” (22). 
19
 Another important element in the promotion and legitimation of religious observances is ritual participation, as 
this modality generates non-discursive religious experiences that can, in turn, reinforce shared religious narratives. 
This phenomenon is discussed in detail in chapter four. 
20
 This is not to deny the role of elite doctrines entirely, as imperial promotion certainly lent an air of authority to 
one cult over another (as described at length in my paper “Gods, Saints and Hegemonies: 
The Hierocratic Control of Religious Observance in Medieval Catholic Europe and Song China” (currently 
unpublished)). However, I would argue that it was the reception and promulgation of popular narratives that 
ultimately determined whether a cult would ever develop the salience (and, hence, the popularity) necessary to 
warrant official attention. 
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(and those around them) are consistently participating in practices that define their social and 
cultural selves in light of the purported influence of the extra-human realm upon human affairs.21 
Thus, they could be said to “believe” in the pragmatic truth of these spiritual beings, in a 
Jamesian sense,22 without these beliefs ever taking on the definitional and categorical qualities 
required by monotheistic Western faiths. Intriguingly, this pragmatic perspective accords 
precisely with Wilfred Cantwell Smith’s discovery that even the “doctrinal” traditions of the 
West were, in historical terms, far more concerned with action and intention than the profession 
of particular dogmas.23 As such, I would suggest that it is this pragmatic understanding of belief 
(rather than the untenable position that the Chinese had “no beliefs”) that is implicitly or 
explicitly adopted by the authors quoted above.24  
 
 While the paragraphs above cannot be credited with unraveling the methodologically 
thorny (and philosophically multivalent) question of belief, they have nonetheless highlighted a 
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 For instance, Xunzi, a pre-Qin Confucian philosopher, espouses a perspicaciously “social scientific” 
understanding of (religious) ritual, noting that participation helps to praxically indoctrinate participants with 
appropriate responses for participation in civilized society: “If the plumb line is properly stretched, then there can be 
no doubt about crooked and straight; if the scales are properly hung, there can be no doubt about heavy and light; … 
and if the gentleman is well versed in ritual, then he cannot be fooled by deceit and artifice. The line is the acme of 
straightness, the scale is the acme of fairness, … and rites are the highest achievement of the Way (dao) of man. 
Therefore, those who do not follow and find satisfaction in rites may be called people without direction, but those 
who do follow and find satisfaction in them are called men of direction” (Section 19) in Burton Watson’s Basic 
Writings of Mo Tzu, Hsun Tzu, and Han Fei Tzu, (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1967). 95. 
See also: Paper, 10, 47-50, for a discussion of the role of ritual in defining and maintaining social roles. These 
insights will be discussed in detail in the present study’s chapter on ritual. 
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 In using this phrase, I am relying upon William James’ conception that the pragmatic utility of propositions 
(which is defined by their compatibility with lived experience) is the hallmark of truth, such that “the true is the 
name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief” and “the true ... is only the expedient in our way of 
thinking” (233). William James, quoted in Susan Haack's "The Pragmatist Theory of Truth," The British Journal for 
the Philosophy of Science 27:3 (September 1976), 231-249. Thus, if participation in rituals literally does achieve 
various social / cultural results (as will be demonstrated in chapter 4), it is ridiculous, in the Jamesian sense, to 
suggest that the participants would deny the truth or reality of these deities. As Dr. Lorne Holyoak noted, not 
explicitly positing a belief is not logically equivalent to positing a lack of belief (personal communication, 
November 15, 2007). This perspective is echoed in Ellen Kappy Suckiel, “A Pragmatic Approach to Folklore: 
Suggestions in a Jamesian Mode,” Western Folklore 44:4 (October 1985), 311-317. 
23
 In particular, Smith’s seminal Belief and History (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1977) argues that 
the Western understanding of belief, based as it is on the Enlightenment/scientific worldview, is a relatively recent 
development. In defending his central thesis, he summarizes it as follows: “But I have not said that religious people 
have not 'believed' things in this sense. What I have said is that until recent times no one affirmed that it was 
religiously important to believe them. ... Neither the creeds (surprisingly!) nor the Bible (surprisingly!) have 
anything to say about believing. Is it not significant to establish this? That those who wrote each believed 
something, I did not and do not deny. To make their believing central, however, and to mistranslate what  they did 
say as if they themselves thought believing important, is to misunderstand religious history” (249). Wilfred Cantwell 
Smith, "Belief: A Reply to a Response," Numen 27: Fascicle 2 (December 1980), 247-255. Emphasis added. 
24
 This is why Chau, for instance, stresses the necessity of exploring “belief” in a wider cultural context, rather than 
seeing it as a de facto analogue for general religious sentiment (59-61). 
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number of important elements of Chinese folk psychology, especially as it pertains to religious 
observance. In particular, the focus upon efficacy, ritual, narrative and communal consensus 
(over individualistic “faith”) discussed above have informed the following excursus by leading 
me to privilege the perceived cultural, social and economic functions of Chinese theologies over 
the specifics of their ontological or cosmological schemas.25 26 
 
The Role and Function of Extrahuman Beings in Chinese Religious Systems 
 
One of the most influential analyses of Chinese religiosity (in general) and folk theology 
(in specific) was performed by Arthur Wolf in his 1974 essay “Gods, Ghosts, and Ancestors” – 
an exhaustive study based upon his own fieldwork in Taiwan. In it, he exposits a typology of 
Chinese divinity whereby supernatural entities are broadly categorized into the three titular 
groups (ghosts, gods, or ancestors), with the notable proviso that membership in a given category 
is largely based upon a being’s perceived relationship with (and impact upon) its human 
constituents.27 Further, he notes that this multivalent tendency is appreciable on both the 
temporal and social axes, with some beings changing their identification over time (transforming 
from ghost to god, or vice-versa) and others simultaneously existing as gods to some and ghosts 
to others.28 This multivalency also extends to the differences between gods and ancestors, as the 
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 To this end, the present study accepts the Durkheimian notion of social functionalism (as described in Whitney 
Pope's "Durkheim as a Functionalist," Sociological Quarterly 16:3 (Summer 1975), 361-379), albeit with the 
proviso that societies provide multiple cultural solutions to any given problem (as per Swidler (1986)). 
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 The remainder of the present chapter outlines the role of spiritual efficacy (and the religious goods generated 
through it) in the popular understanding of gods and emperors. On the other hand, ritual, which is one of the primary 
means through which this efficacy is generated, will be considered at length in chapter four. This examination will 
explore classical perspectives and modern theories, and note their manifestations in the rituals performed by the 
modern cult of Mao. 
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 Arthur P. Wolf, “Introduction” to Religion and Ritual in Chinese Society, edited by Arthur Wolf, (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 1974), 1-17. 7. See also, “Gods, Ghosts, and Ancestors” (same volume), 131-182. In 
particular, he argues that while “ghosts are propitiated, gods and ancestors are honored; ancestors are worshiped 
‘because on owes them something’, gods and ghosts are worshiped ‘so they will help and not cause trouble’” (7). 
This point is also centrally important to Stevan Harrell’s “When a Ghost Becomes a God,” in Religion and Ritual in 
Chinese Society, edited by Arthur Wolf, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1974), 193-206, which argues for 
a similarly functionalistic stance: “the great majority… are concerned less with the logical coherence of their 
religion than with its practical efficacy… [If a spirit] answers requests and grants favours, then it matters little what 
his origin is or what a religious specialist might say about his position in the supernatural social order” (204). 
28
 Wolf, 172-174. This multivalency is also attested to in the categorization of the dead as ghosts or ancestors: 
“Whether a particular spirit is viewed as a ghost or as an ancestor depends on the point of view of a particular 
person. One man’s ancestor is another man’s ghost” (Wolf, 146). As such, the difference is understood in terms of 
familial and ritual obligations (the Confucian li): “The ancestor, though dead, is a person with rights and duties; … 
the ghost, also dead, is a person with neither rights nor duties. The one is usually a kinsman; the other is always a 
stranger” (ibid.). See also Harrell (1974), passim. 
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lineages of many deities can be traced to the lives of euhemerized worthies. Demonstrating this, 
Wolf calls upon the example of the City Wall God – a regional deity whose post is most often 
held by deceased individuals promoted to the position by temporal authorities: 
Although some tales of the god’s origin give him a specific identity, most people now 
treat Ch’eng Huang [the City God] as a position rather than a person. For example, 
deceased notables are often assigned the status of Ch’eng Huang. Ch’ü T’ung-tsu 
identifies the Ch’eng Huang of Lou hsien in Kiangsu as a former magistrate, Li Fu-
hsiang, who died there in 1669 (Chü 1962: 311), and, according to Florence Ayscough, 
the god governing Shanghai is a former member of the Hanlin Academy, Ch’in Yü-poi, 
who was assigned to his present position by the founder of the Ming Dynasty (Ayscough 
1924: 140-41).29 
 
Though Wolf’s research acknowledges the individual mythologies and hagiographies pertinent to 
each spiritual being, these pseudo-biographical narratives take a secondary position relative to 
accounts of the deity’s perceived efficacy30 – a revelation that supports the largely functionalistic 
theory of religious economy introduced above. 
 
Though Wolf’s conclusions have been expanded upon in the years since their publication, 
their fundamental insight that the perceived character of Chinese spirits (shen) is largely 
determined by their functional relationship with the various members of a human community 
(rather than explicitly doctrinal or mythological concerns) is of paramount significance to the 
present study. In order to utilize these conclusions, however, it is first necessary to acknowledge 
some lacunae in Wolf’s analysis. First, though he notes the indigenous distinction between “sage 
gods” (fu) and “official gods” (shi),31 his account considers the latter category to the virtual 
exclusion of the former.32 Likewise, he also fails to address those deities that are more explicitly 
associated with a specific religious tradition (such as the Buddhist Guanyin and the Three Pure 
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 Wolf, 140. 
30
 Wolf, 140 and passim. For an in-depth discussion of the ritual elements present in the cult of the City God 
(including the ritualized interactions between spiritual and human bureaucrats), see Angela Zito’s “City Gods and 
their Magistrates” in Religions of China in Practice, edited by Donald S. Lopez, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1996), 72-81. 
31
 The first of these categories corresponds to the notion of “unruly gods” (i.e., non-hierarchical beings who allow 
direct access to religious goods) described in Meir Shahar and Robert P. Weller’s “Introduction: Gods and Society 
in China” in Unruly Gods: Divinity and Society in China, edited by Meir Shahar and Robert P. Weller, (Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press, 1996). 1-36. 
32
 The only mention of this categorization can be found on the bottom of page 140, though he immediately dismisses 
the necessity of discussing it by stating that “most layman, though aware of this distinction, do not trouble much 
about it” (Wolf, 141). 
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Ones of institutionalized Daoism),33 as well as the difficult-to-classify zoomorphic deities of the 
popular and shamanic pantheons.34 As a result, it is necessary to ascertain that this same 
pragmatic concern with spiritual efficacy can be detected in the cults of various “god-types” not 
considered by Wolf before it would be justifiable to make use of his conclusions in the present 
project. 35 
 
Buddhist Deities 
 In the quest to demonstrate the ubiquity of the efficacy framework described above, we 
first turn to its role within Chinese Buddhism. While many influential studies have explored the 
complex interaction between Buddhism and indigenous Chinese religious thought,36 a 
considerable majority of them concentrate on the development of particular schools and 
doctrines rather than cataloguing the process of doctrinal and praxical cross-fertilization that 
occurred between these traditions and popular religious pantheons and practices. In addition to 
the well established Sinicization of Buddhist doctrines and deities,37 there is also considerable 
evidence for the contention that these Buddhist deities, much like their indigenous counterparts, 
came to be relied on for their provision of particular religious goods to their adherents. One 
example can be seen in the miracle tales of Guanshiyin, the “Bodhisattva who Observes the 
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 It should be noted that many of my conclusions on the functionalistic elements of Daoist and Chinese Buddhist 
practice were presaged by Jordan Paper, who notes that “popular practices understood to be related to Daoism 
usually have pragmatic ends” and that “the Buddhist goal of nirvana in China became amalgamated with rituals 
directed toward departed members of the family and toward material benefits in this life” (9-10). The Spirits are 
Drunk: Comparative Approaches to Chinese Religion, (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1995). 
34As described in Terry F. Kleeman’s “Expansion of the Wen-ch'ang Cult” in Religion and Society in T'ang and 
Sung China, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1993), 45-73. 49. 
35
 Though one could argue that the efficacy framework is sufficiently accounted for in Wolf’s research, I think that it 
is considerably more compelling to demonstrate its ubiquity through an analysis of sources from various traditions 
and time periods (i.e., using both ethnographies and historical sources). In this way, when similar factors can be seen 
in the interpretation of the Mao materials, they can be seen as manifestations of a prevalent cultural pattern. 
36
 Two of the most venerable of these studies are Erik Zürcher’s The Buddhist Conquest of China: The Spread and 
Adaptation of Buddhism in Early Medieval China (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1959) and Kenneth K. S. Ch'en’s The Chinese 
Transformation of Buddhism, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1973). During a personal conversation, 
Dr. Thomas Selover noted that the very titles of these two works encapsulate the terms of the debate: was China 
“conquered” by Buddhism or did Buddhism “transform” in China? As with virtually all such dichotomies, it seems 
likely that the reality was somewhere between these two extremes. 
37
 One notable development in this process was the “particularization” of salvation, which generally comes to be 
described in terms of family and community instead of country and cosmos. Likewise, the hagiographies of various 
bodhisattvas were also updated to highlight the exemplary filial piety of these beings prior to (or even following) 
their apotheoses – a process of formalization that is also evidenced in the earthly biographies of other Chinese 
deities. See Ch’en, 14-50, for an extensive discussion of the evolution of Buddhist thought and practice that allowed 
it to eventually incorporate traditional Chinese ethics (most particularly filial piety). 
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Sounds of the World” (an early Chinese characterization of Avalokitesvara). In these accounts, 
the earliest of which can reliably be dated to the late fourth century, Guanshiyin is credited with 
averting all forms of misfortune (e.g., saving the unjustly imprisoned, rescuing those lost at sea, 
and curing various illnesses).38 In all cases, all that is required from the individuals concerned is 
a sincere request for aid and a promise to perform a certain number of meritorious deeds in the 
future.39 Likewise, the bodhisattva Guanyin (the feminine characterization of the same deity) was 
similarly credited with the ability and inclination to intercede in the this-worldly troubles of her 
patrons, including the desire for male offspring. As in the Guanshiyin sutra described above, 
editions of the Sutra of White-Robed Guanyin were often book-ended by various accounts of the 
goddess’ miraculous powers, some examples of which are reproduced below: 
Zheng Zhili of Pujiang, Mao District (province unspecified), was forty years old and still 
had no heir. In 1207 he decided to print 5,048 copies of this sutra and distribute the 
copies for free. On the seventh day of the eighth month in 1208 a son was born to him. 
 
Yu Muzhai and his wife Wang of Danyang Village in Maoyuan County (province 
unspecified) decided to have one thousand copies of this sutra printed and distributed 
free. In the eighth month of 1250 when the work of distributing was only half completed, 
a son arrived. 
 
Fangyan and wife Wang of Yungfeng Village, She County (in present Anhui province) 
decided to chant this sutra 5,048 times and print one thousand copies for free distribution 
in the spring of 1254. They had a son in 1255 and named him Wanggu.40 
 
In addition to demonstrating the types of interventions that were typically requested of Guanyin, 
the above quotation also demonstrates the extent to which this spiritual economy was understood 
in reciprocal terms. In particular, it is notable that human devotions (such as sponsoring the 
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 Robert Ford Campany, “The Earliest Tales of the Bodhisattva Guanshiyin,” Religions of China in Practice, edited 
by Donald S. Lopez, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 82-96. In addition to an overview of the 
subject, Campany’s article also contains a translation of various miracle tales credited to the deity. In particular, see 
#1, #2 (86-87) for accounts of salvation from imprisonment, #6, #7 (89-90) for accounts of maritime rescues, and 
#8, #12, #13 (90, 93) for accounts of miraculous cures. 
39
 In fact, the vast majority of these miracle tales were compiled at the behest of grateful patrons, who often vowed 
to underwrite the monastic production of these texts. As Campany notes, “recording and spreading these tales was 
itself an act of merit, for it encouraged others to join in devotion of Guanshiyin.” Further, “the authors seem to have 
wanted to authenticate the fulfillment of the sutras’ promises in order to show that the sutras were true and that the 
practices they enjoined were efficacious. This is suggested most clearly by the fact that the authors sometimes 
directly quoted a passage from the Guanshiyin Sutra (or some other sutra concerning Guanshiyin) that seemed 
directly relevant to the particular miraculous event” (85). It should be noted that this genre of miracle account, 
whether expressed orally or textually, represents a central element in the promotion of Chinese cults, both in the 
classical milieu (as per Shahar and Weller (1996)) and in the modern day (Chau (2006)). 
40
 Chün-fang Yü, “A Sutra Promoting the White-robed Guanyin as Giver of Sons,” Religions of China in Practice, 
edited by Donald S. Lopez, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 97-105. 101. 
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production of religious texts) were often contingent upon the provision of particular religious 
goods. 
 
The cases of Guanshiyin and White Robed Guanyin described above provide ample 
evidence of the adaptation of Buddhist deities to the “spiritual economy” of indigenous Chinese 
religiosity, within which these (typically transcendent) figures are considered immediately 
present enough to be beseeched for progeny, miraculous cures, and the cessation of persecution. 
 
Daoist Deities 
 Unlike the Buddhist deities described above (a group whose incorporation into Chinese 
religious thought can be dated with considerable precision), the majority of the shen included in 
the Daoist pantheon cannot be easily distinguished from the mass of popular spirits.41  Indeed, it 
could be argued that such a distinction would be largely meaningless, as existing literature 
evidences both the incorporation of “folk” deities into Daoist ritual42 and the presence of 
explicitly “Daoist” deities in the pantheons of Chinese folk worship.43 However, it seems 
reasonable to characterize certain deities – such as the Three Pure Ones (San Qing) – as more 
explicitly Daoist, given that they are only infrequently venerated outside of explicitly Daoist 
liturgies.44  
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 In general, scholars of Chinese religion have proposed two disparate approaches to the issue of the Daoist 
pantheon. On one hand, certain scholars aver that virtually all deities not explicitly associated with other traditions 
(e.g., Buddhism) can be classified as Daoist – an approach that renders Daoism nearly synonymous with folk 
religion. This approach can be seen in Kristofer Schipper's The Taoist Body, translated by Karen C. Duval, 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). Conversely, others suggest that the pantheon is largely 
undifferentiated, such that the attempt to divide the various expressions of Chinese religiosity into sects is largely 
artificial. This second approach is adopted by Paper (1995) and Laurence Thompson (Chinese Religion: An 
Introduction (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1989)). The current study sides with the latter opinion, with the near-
universally accepted proviso that certain deities feature more prominently in the practices and liturgies of one school 
or another. One justification for this position is the ubiquity of the efficacy framework currently under discussion.  
42
 For example, Schipper (1993) provides an extended account of the ritual procedures utilized by a Daoist priest for 
the purpose of offering supplication to the Jade Emperor (the ruling deity of Chinese popular religion’s celestial 
bureaucracy), 87-88. 
43
 For instance, see Michael R. Saso’s description of a particular folk shrine where the place of honor (which 
typically houses the icons of Mazu, Tudi Gong, and the City God) was instead occupied by the Three Pure Ones, an 
austere trinity of idealized Daoist concepts that will be discussed in more detail below. “The Taoist Tradition in 
Taiwan,” The China Quarterly 41 (January-March 1970), 83-102. 88. However, it should not be assumed that this 
was a typical finding, as the author notes that it “was like no temple I had even seen before” (ibid.). 
44
 This characterization is supported by the paucity of temples dedicated to these overtly Daoist deities, as attested to 
by the fieldwork of Grootaers, et al. (quoted above). In their exhaustive inventory of the religious sites of the area, 
they examined 640 “independent temple buildings,” of which only one was dedicated to the Three Pure Ones. This 
singular devotional site was unsurprisingly located on the grounds of a Daoist monastery. Laozi, another 
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When examining the San Qing, we are confronted with the first group of shen that seem 
to violate the functionalistic model of divinity posited above. As Hymes notes, “the Three Pure 
are divine abstractions – hardly even gods in any very concrete sense – who hold the highest 
position in Taoist cosmology.”45 In his view, their exalted (transcendent) status, coupled with 
their nebulous characterizations,46 seems to “make any specific cult to them irrelevant.”47 In 
contrast to Hymes’ rather dismissive assessment,48 further exploration reveals that certain 
religious practices involve even these austere spiritual beings within the economy of Chinese 
religiosity. The difference however is that their aid typically depends upon the intercession of 
human intermediaries – in this case the Dao shi (Daoist priests). For instance, certain rituals 
intended to exorcise evil spirits and mitigate the spread of epidemics were predicated on the 
correct propitiation of these beings by religious professionals.49 Further, the efficacy of various 
other rituals was assumed to depend on their (implicit or explicit) participation, resulting from a 
                                                                                                                                                             
unequivocally Daoist deity, likewise had only two specific temples dedicated to him, though he was occasionally 
depicted as an attendant to other more popular deities, such as Ma-wang (the Lord of Horses) and Huo-shen (the 
God of Fire). 2, 3-4, 6, 98-99. Saso’s article also describes a single instance of the veneration of the Three Pure Ones 
(88-90).  
45
 Robert Hymes, Way and Byway: Taoism, Local Religion, and Models of Divinity in Sung and Modern China, 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002). 39. 
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 As summarized by Saso, the Three Pure Ones include the "Highest Pure One," "Jade Purity," and "Ultimate 
Purity" (88), each of whom are understood in both mythological/ideational and euhemeristic terms: “In the abstract 
they are a three-fold manifestation of the Tao, which cannot be expressed in one word, or in many words, for that 
matter. Thus the central figure, Yiian-shih r'ien-tsun or Primordial Heavenly Worthy is the Tao in its creative aspect; 
the second figure to the left of the Yiian-shih, named "Ling-pao Heavenly Worthy" means the Tao as governing the 
world. Ling has the significance of heaven and spirit, pao means the earth and its realm. The third figure is the Tao 
as in man, and therefore by concrete application is that very first of all Taoist immortals, Lao-tzu himself” (88-89 ff. 
15). In a more concrete sense, they are also associated with living personages, such that “the Jade Pure One is called 
Chang Hua-tzu; the Highest Pure One is named Liang Wei-tzu, and the Ultimate Pure One is named Lao-tan” 
(ibid.). Likewise, Schipper suggests that the San Qing, when interpreted metaphysically, are understood to be 
“hypostases of the Three ch’i [qi] of the Three Heavens” (362 ff. 33)."The Taoist Body," History of Religions 
17:3/4, Current Perspectives in the Study of Chinese Religions, (February - May 1978), 355-386. 
47
 Hymes, 39. 
48
 However, it should be noted that the cult of the Three Pure Ones (or the lack thereof) can be viewed as exceptions 
that prove the rule. As seen above, these deities do play an avowedly minimal role in traditional beliefs and 
practices. The above exceptions merely demonstrate that the functionalist/economic thesis proposed above holds, 
even in this atypical case. 
49
 See, for example, Ch'en Hsiang-ch'un’s description of an apotropaic talisman meant to ward off epidemic illnesses 
that calls upon the San Qing with the following invocation: “The Taoist Triad orders that the spirit be killed” (39). 
“Examples of Charm against Epidemics with Short Explanations," Folklore Studies 1 (1942), 37-54. In addition to 
the notable fact that this artifact evidences the Pure Ones being referred to directly, it also demonstrates the porous 
nature of the boundary between the human and extra-human realm (such that illness is seen as the activity of 
malevolent spirits). The ritualized particulars of these invocations were both exactingly specific and surprisingly 
corporeal, as seen in the (mythical) instructions on the correct performance of a rite to summon the divinized Laozi: 
“Concerning the bell, it represents the Three Pure Ones. Therefore, when holding the bell, one uses three fingers, the 
first one being the Jade Pure (Yii-ch'ing), the second the Most Pure (Shang-ch'ing), and the third one the Great Pure 
(T'ai-ch'ing). If one does not hold the bell properly, why, one might invoke up to ten Pure Ones!” (39). Kristofer 
Schipper, "Vernacular and Classical Ritual in Taoism," The Journal of Asian Studies 45:1 (November 1985), 21-57. 
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cosmological schema that placed them at the apex of the Daoist pantheon.50 In this way, even the 
most austere, transcendent deities of the Daoist pantheon can be seen to exist within the efficacy 
framework, albeit as spiritual beings that often required special sanction or training to supplicate. 
 
Zoomorphic (and Other Non-“Human”) Deities 
The final category of deities that I will assess for the presence of the efficacy framework 
are those zoomorphic (and otherwise non-(formerly) “human” beings) that exist in various 
Chinese pantheons. Fortunately, the postulated focus upon the provision of spiritual goods is 
remarkably ubiquitous, whether one examines the auspicious role of the snake in Chinese 
folklore,51 the historical propitiation of locust deities,52 or the prevalence of sacrifices to nature 
spirits evidenced in inscriptions from the Shang dynasty.53 In general, the characterization of 
these beings is indeed determined almost entirely by virtue of their perceived detrimental or 
beneficial interactions with human communities.54  
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 It should be noted that this bureaucratic role is often ceded to the more popular Jade Emperor. Chau, 72; Schipper 
(1993), 87. However, these two construals of the pantheon are not necessarily mutually exclusive, as some rituals 
are predicated on both the cosmology of the Three Pure Ones and the popular cosmos governed by the Jade 
Emperor. For instance, Saso observed a ritual that began with the lighting of lamps beneath the icons of the San 
Qing (commemorating the creation account in Chapter 42 of the Dao De Jing), and culminated in an invocation to 
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the noblest gods on the north wall included the Three Pure Ones (Sangqing), the Heavenly Emperor (Tianhuang), 
and the North, South, and East Poles (Beiji, Nanji, Dongi)” (13). “Summoning the Gods: Paintings of Three 
Officials of Heaven, Earth and Water and Their Association with Daoist Ritual Performance in the Southern Song 
Period (1127-1279),” Artibus Asiae 61:1 (2001), 5-52. 
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 See, for example, Denise Chao, “The Snake in Chinese Belief,” Folklore 90:2 (1979), 193-203: “In the Han 
Dynasty, the round tiles used to build the eaves of the palace were sculpted with two kinds of designs: that of a blue 
dragon and that of a serpent and a tortoise together. ... Both blue dragon and serpent together with tortoise were the 
mascots which would bring peace and prosperity to the people who believed in them” (200) (emphasis added). 
Indeed, these architectural emblems were indicative of their perceived efficacy. 
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 Shin-Yi Hsu, “The Cultural Ecology of the Locust Cult in Traditional China,” Annals of the Association of 
American Geographers 59:4 (December 1969), 731-752. “Since the Chinese people could not devise practical 
means to cope with the plagues, they turned to supernatural solutions. The worship of locusts or locust gods was 
their response to the prolonged and intense environmental stress. It was believed that by making sacrifices to locust 
gods or by performing specific rituals, locusts could be destroyed by supernatural power” (738). Though this 
author’s appraisal sounds rather reductionistic (e.g., “since the Chinese people could not devise practical means to 
cope with the plagues”), it nonetheless evidences the centrality of efficacious, magical thinking that was used to 
characterize locusts in their society. 
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 Eno’s translation of select Shang-era oracle bone inscriptions includes appeals to various elements of the natural 
world (including  “Cloud Di,” “Cloud,” “Snow,” “the Bird Star,” “the Yellow River,” and “Yue Peak”), all of which 
were propitiated in hopes that they would reward the supplicants. Robert Eno, “Deities and Ancestors in Early 
Oracle Inscriptions,” Religions of China in Practice, edited by Donald S. Lopez, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1996), 41-51. 48-49. 
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 This fact confirms the position put forward by both Wolf (1974) and Harrell (1974) (as outlined above). 
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One prevalent example can be seen in the case of the dragons and Dragon Kings, both of 
whom represent common religio-mythic tropes in Chinese culture.55 Qiguang Zhao, in his essay 
on the centrality of water-based (“hydraulic”) imagery in Chinese philosophy and religion, 
explores the correspondences between these two classes of supernatural beings in a manner that 
bears directly on the ontological/functionalistic dichotomy currently being investigated: 
For Chinese peasants, those dragons who occupy local rivers hardly possess the abstract 
implications of mythological dragons. Instead of symbolizing sky, emperorship, or good 
omen, they are merely local water-gods or Dragon Kings. … Coexisting with 
mythological dragons, the Dragon King attracted numerous worshippers for hundreds of 
years. Almost every Chinese village would have a temple in his honor.56 
 
However, Zhao notes a pertinent difference between these two conceptualizations of mythic 
serpents:  
[I]mportantly, the mythological dragon is a celestial supreme being; while the Dragon 
King is both a constructive rain-god and a destructive flood-devil. That is to say, the 
mythological dragon shows only positive implications; the Dragon King displays both 
positive and negative factors. We must bear in mind that the Chinese mythological 
dragon and the Dragon King are the same in appearance. The way to distinguish them is 
to find their different meanings through context [(i.e., their purported actions towards 
their human constituents)].57 
 
As such, it must be noted that the mythological dragon (of popular entertainment) differs from 
the Dragon King (of popular worship) based on the fact that the latter is interpreted by his 
constituents in a functionalistic manner, on the basis of his purported positive or negative 
impacts upon the community.58 As noted by Chau, the extent to which these impacts were felt 
was primarily determined by the cogency of various narratives of efficacy (or inefficacy) 
attached to these deities, as these accounts were largely responsible for determining the 
willingness of local people to participate in their cults.59 
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 See Chau (2006) for an excellent example of a particular Dragon King cult. See also: Qiguang Zhao, "Chinese 
Mythology in the Context of Hydraulic Society," Asian Folklore Studies 48:2 (1989), 231-246. 
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 Zhao, 237. 
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 Ibid., 238. This point is also made on page 240, where the author notes that “Chinese peasants take an 
ambivalent attitude towards the Dragon King, who may be a great helper, a hopeless spoiler, or at times, a lovable 
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 These impacts are considered in Alvin P. Cohen’s “Coercing the Rain Deities in Ancient China,” 
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recalcitrant dragon king. History of Religions 17:3/4, Current Perspectives in the Study of Chinese Religions, 
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In this way, zoomorphic deities, whose cults were/are popular in their orientation, are an 
excellent demonstration of the efficacy hypothesis described above. In particular, they represent 
an accessible source of religious goods (especially when compared to the most austere members 
of the Daoist pantheon), but they are simultaneously the most dependent upon narratives of 
perceived efficacy for the continued relevance of their cults. 
 
Summary 
As can be seen, the basic economic/functionalistic model of Chinese religiosity 
introduced above is evidenced both in the “ghosts, gods, and ancestors” typology proposed by 
Wolf and among the Buddhist, Daoist, and zoomorphic deities that fell outside of its purview. 
Though some scholars of Chinese religion have investigated the role of spiritual efficacy (ling) in 
the popular understanding of religion,60 the amount of attention that it has received is simply not 
proportional to its centrality in the lived experience of religious adherents. This being said, it 
would be a mistake to ascribe a simplistic, mercantile mindset to the bulk of Chinese religious 
expression and sentiment, as accounts of rituals as simple economic transactions61 are 
counterbalanced by accounts rife with emotionally- socially-, and spiritually-nuanced practices.62 
However, rather than indicating a flaw in the above theory, this dichotomy demonstrates both the 
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 See, for example, Chau (2006) and P. Steven Sangren, History and Magical Power in a Chinese Community, 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1987). 
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 This mercantile understanding of spiritual transactions has a long history in Chinese religiosity, as evidenced by 
surviving oracular inscriptions from the Shang dynasty. In these sources, the “purpose of the communication was 
mainly for worldly affairs–to solve various practical problems such as war, harvest, sickness, hunting, or to interpret 
natural disasters and portentous astronomical events that were thought to have grave consequences human society” 
(Poo, 28). These Shang dynasty patterns, which could be seen as a matrix of religious observances, narratives of 
efficacy and this-worldly concerns, became even more complex in later Chinese history when human social 
hierarchies came to applied to the celestial pantheon. One of the most notable manifestations of this tendency can be 
seen in situations where human officials were thought to outrank their immortal counterparts, which gave them the 
power to promote and demote deities based upon their perceived efficacy in serving their human constituents (as per 
Shahar and Weller, 5). Extending this economic understanding to its logical conclusion, Arthur Wolf describes an 
evocative legal case in modern Taiwan between a wronged human community and a shen: “A year or so ago ... 
during a drought, a god was publicly tried by the magistrate for neglect of duty, condemned, left in the hot sun to see 
how he liked it himself, and finally, after enduring every kind of insult, was broken to pieces” (144). All of these 
accounts provide an eloquent testimony to the reciprocal economy of popular Chinese religious observance. 
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 Various examples from the institutional and popular traditions can be offered to demonstrate the broader 
resonances of Chinese religious practices. Some of these include: the cult of ancestors, which was based on familial 
connections and respect rather than economic exchange (Wolf (1974)); cultivation practices involving the 
visualization and nourishment of microcosmic deities, which stress individual effort over divine benevolence 
(Schipper (1993)), and Buddhist funerary rites, which stress pain, loss and renewal as much as the specifics of 
“salvation” (Ch’en (1973) and Alan Cole's "Upside down/Right Side up: A Revisionist History of Buddhist Funerals 
in China," History of Religions 35:4. (May 1996), 307-338). 
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variety of perceived relationships between human beings and extra-human deities, and the 
various modes of communication considered appropriate for interacting with these beings.63 The 
multifarious corpus of religious behaviours utilized to commune with these beings will be 
discussed below, in the chapter on ritual. Before doing so, however, it is necessary to outline the 
resonances between “secular” (political) power and spiritual efficacy in the traditional Chinese 
worldview, as these cosmological, mythological and functional parallels are essential to the 
present project of shedding light on the popular conception of Mao. 
 
Political Power and Spiritual Potency 
 As detailed above, Chinese religiosity (classical and modern, popular and 
institutionalized) is often characterized by its focus on the efficacy of various extra-human 
beings in effecting change in the mortal world. By adopting this focus, the overall system can be 
seen to encourage a more “porous” worldview than is commonly accepted in the West, as it 
effectively demolishes the seemingly inviolable boundary between the realms of the secular and 
sacred (a typically unassailable dogma in the academic study of religion).64 Instead of occupying 
cleanly demarcated categories, the extra-human beings posited by the Chinese cosmology (a 
multifarious group outlined above) were understood to co-exist with human society in a 
symbiotic relationship65 – whereby services were provided (in the case of the gods) and 
relationships maintained (in the case of the ancestors) in exchange for worship and sacrifice.66 
Indeed, this cosmological porosity can be seen as utterly central to the lived experience of 
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Chinese religion, given its exhaustively demonstrated focus upon spiritual potency and reciprocal 
exchange. 
 
Moreover, the porosity of these boundaries is also definitively demonstrated by the fact 
that vast majority of Chinese deities were once living human beings, with hagiographies that 
acknowledge (rather than deny) their human provenance.67 This process (as well as its 
cosmological and praxical consequences) are eloquently summarized by Emily Chao: 
Powerful historical figures were thought to possess ling, magical power or efficacy, 
which supplicants could harness for their own needs through acts of ritual propitiation. In 
other words, ritual formulas allowed for both the local manipulation of deities for 
personal benefit and the expansion of the supernatural realm through the deification of 
historical figures.68 
 
While this process alone provides some insight into the means by which a human political leader 
could be elevated to divine status (especially with the advent of narratives demonstrating a level 
of supernatural efficacy), the next chapter’s exploration of the apotheosis of Mao also requires an 
excursion into the traditional Chinese understanding of political rulership – as this understanding 
centered on the metaphorical and praxical relationship between king, cosmos and pantheon. 
 
In general, this understanding of leadership can be subdivided into two related spheres, 
the cosmological and the sociological (defined broadly), both of which functioned as organizing 
metaphors in the folk psychology of traditional China. In the first case, the traditional worldview 
described the ruler as both a functional link between the natural world, the divine pantheon and 
human society, and as a microcosmic analogue of the forces of the cosmos instantiated in human 
form. The multifarious connections between the human sociopolitical order and the cosmos can 
also be seen in the fact that many traditional pantheons of gods were thought to possess the same 
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hierarchical and bureaucratic structure as their human analogues, with the popular pantheon 
headed by the Jade Emperor – a divine being whose image and characterization were obviously 
modeled on his human counterpart.69 On a sociological level, the position and function of the 
political leader were thought to be tied to the ruler’s embodiment of cultural virtues, which were 
seen by many as the fountainhead of his charismatic virtue (de 德). These cosmological and 
sociological positions will be summarized below, though their extensive coverage in Sinological 
scholarship obviates the necessity of presenting a morass of details. 
 
Cosmology and Rulership 
 From the earliest periods of recorded Chinese history, the ruler was understood to occupy 
an interstitial position, bridging the gap between humanity and the cosmos (defined broadly 
enough to encompass the wider world of ancestors, spirits, gods, and natural phenomena 
(including weather, epidemics, and astral bodies)). So prevalent was this understanding that it 
permeated all aspects of social and religious thought, from the most popular forms of folk 
religion to the elite formulations of the imperial cult and court Confucianism. Indeed, the 
Chinese ruler’s interstitial role is evidenced in the very language used to describe his position, 
including the archaic wang (王),70 the poetic/scholarly “Son of Heaven” (tianzi 天子),71 and the 
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term most frequently translated as “emperor” (Huangdi (皇帝)), which von Glahn suggests 
should most properly be rendered “Resplendent Thearch.”72 Moreover, it should be noted that 
this exalted understanding of the ruler’s position was already established in the centuries before 
the Common Era, as evidenced in the writings of Dong Zhongshu, a “second-century BCE 
‘political theologian,’” who explained the etymology of the term wang (王) by putting forward 
the following hypothesis about its historical origins: 
Those who in ancient times invented writing drew three lines and connected them 
through the middle, calling the word ‘king’. The three lines represent Heaven, earth and 
the human being, and that which passes through the middle joins the principles of all 
three…. Thus the king is but the executor of Heaven. He regulates its seasons and brings 
them to completion.73 
 
Though Dong spoke from within the Confucian tradition, the parallels between his approach and 
those of earlier periods74 evidences the ubiquity of this ritualized, multimodal understanding of 
political leadership. 
 
As can be seen, the Chinese conception of rulership was intimately correlated with a 
vision of a profoundly integrated cosmos, to the extent that this system coloured the etymologies 
and linguistic usages used to describe the holders of political power. Indeed, these terms provide 
evidence of the fact that the ruler, in some ways, served as a metonym for his nation (and, more 
broadly, for all of humanity).75 This being said, the relationship between imperial power and 
classical cosmological schemata was not simply metaphorical, as it actually defined many 
aspects of the Son of Heaven’s ritual and political responsibilities. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Ching notes that this term can be dated (at very latest) to the Zhou dynasty, as it is frequently attested to in the 
Shijing and the Shujing (36). See also: Stephen Bokenkamp, “Record of the Feng and Shan Sacrifices” in Religions 
of China in Practice, edited by Donald S. Lopez, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 251-260. 253.  
72
 More specifically, von Glahn notes that “the prosaic English translation as ‘emperor’ obviously fails to capture the 
implications of theocratic power imbedded in the Chinese word.” 39. 
73
 Ch’un-ch’iu fan-lu, quoted in Ching, 83. Demonstrating its continued prevalence, this etymology is quoted in 
Rick Harbaugh’s Chinese Characters: A Genealogy and Dictionary (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998). 
3. 
74
 As discussed at length in Ames (1983) and Ching (1997). 
75
 See, for instance, the Institutes of the Zhou, which describe the king’s role as follows: “The king alone constitutes 
the kingdom. He determines the four corners and fixes the principal position. He plans the capital and the 
countryside. He creates the ministries and separates their functions, thus offering norms for the people” (quoted in 
Ching, 48). 
 42 
This notion of the ruler as a cosmological functionary was central to the imperial cult, 
much of which was predicated on meteorological rituals intended to ensure the smooth operation 
of the cosmos. This role is discussed in some detail in Fitzgerald’s Short Cultural History of 
China: 
The king, the Son of Heaven, was the instrument by which this balance [between yin and 
yang, growing weather and harvesting weather] was maintained. His duty was to perform 
the sacrifices at appropriate times and establish a relationship between Man and Heaven. 
In his first beginnings the king was far more priest than soldier. His terrestrial duties of 
government could be delegated to lesser men, his ministers. He alone could perform the 
magical sacrifices which assured the harmony of the divine powers.... The Son of Heaven 
alone sacrificed to Heaven and Earth.76 
 
The ruler’s ritual duties, which could include the microcosmic replication of celestial 
progressions,77 the feng and shan sacrifices,78 and the veneration of imperial ancestors,79 all 
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depended on viewing the king/emperor as a man whose greatness80 resulted from his position as 
a microcosmic analogue to (and collaborator with) the celestial and extrahuman realms. As in the 
above cases, the ruler’s intermediary role in cosmic/spiritual realm was not dismissed as a poetic 
contrivance, but instead acted as a metaphorical guidepost for various elements in the social and 
cultural spheres. One example of this impact can be seen in the classical Chinese approach to the 
science of astronomy, which assumed that the heavens operated analogously to the functioning 
of the human political order:  
The heavenly geography … reveals strong concentric and axial imagery. The celestial 
capital was located in the “center” of the heavens, the area of the polar constellations, and 
the pole star itself, Polaris, has the name tianhuang dadi, “great emperor of the heavens.” 
“The pole star was thus the fundamental basis of Chinese astronomy. It was connected 
with a background of microcosmic-macrocosmic thinking. The celestial pole 
corresponded to the position of the emperor on earth, around whom the vast system of the 
bureaucratic state naturally and spontaneously revolved.” The stars and constellations in 
the area of this central enclosure have names that describe a celestial capital city, with its 
office buildings, palaces, temples, altars, walls, gates and other sites of importance. There 
are, for example, star groups that represent the imperial field plowed by the emperor in 
the spring rite, the site of the spring audience, the apartments of the imperial princes in 
the eastern part of the palace, the interior palace, the palace of the empress and the royal 
concubines, the imperial granaries, the altar of the land and grain, the ancestral temple. … 
                                                                                                                                                             
between the emperor, one of whose titles was ‘child of Heaven,’ and Heaven, also called the ‘Thearch on High.’ The 
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In certain accounts of the symbolism of Beijing’s Forbidden City, it is suggested that 
Taiyi, or Shangdi, the supreme emperor, rules from this heavenly enclosure just as the 
son of heaven rules from the Forbidden City.81 
 
This understanding of the cosmos also highlights the “concentric” and analogical vision of 
political power postulated by Chinese religious psychology – notions that are central to the 
sociological component of the classical understanding of political leadership. 
 
Just as the classical understanding of astronomy cited above indicates certain perceived 
parallels between the cosmos and political order, so too were many descriptions of celestial 
pantheons structured upon the model of human political bureaucracies. Within this framework, 
the Jade Emperor (an extra-human analogue of the human Huangdi) was often thought to rule 
over the gods, ghosts and ancestors, with various functional roles (City God, Stove God, etc.) 
played by deceased individuals “who have been assigned a rank in the supernatural 
bureaucracy.”82 This symbolic system structured various elements of religious practice, from the 
iconography in local temples (wherein many gods were depicted in official dress) to the proper 
modes of address for communicating with these deities (which were often based upon the literary 
forms used in corresponding with imperial bureaucrats).83 Moreover, just as the king/emperor 
was thought to have a measure of control over celestial and calendrical events, his power was 
also thought to extend to the members of this extra-human hierarchy, such that “state officials – 
most notably the emperor himself – could revoke deities’ titles, demote them, or even physically 
punish them if they failed to perform their duties.”84 In this way, the interstitial status of the ruler 
in the Chinese religio-cultural framework is once again brought to the fore, this time due to the 
symbolic affinities between the earthly and celestial bureaucracies and the assumption that 
imperial authority could be brought to bear against extra-human entities. 
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Rulership, Society and Virtue (德) 
In addition to the metaphorical connection between the emperor and the cosmos 
(including the world of nature and the extrahuman realm), the multimodal understanding of 
political leadership popular in classical China also differed from its Western counterparts 
through its emphasis on the tripartite relationship between ruler, moral charisma (de德), and 
social order. This notion was, fittingly enough (given the previous discussion of imperial 
metaphors in classical Chinese astronomy), described in the Analects using astral imagery:  
“Governing with excellence (de德) can be compared to being the North Star; the North Star 
dwells in its place, and the multitude of stars pay it tribute.”85 Speaking more broadly, it is 
notable that the vast majority of religio-philosophical traditions in Chinese history adopted some 
form of this fundamental premise, jointly suggesting that peace and social harmony depended 
upon the personal virtue of the monarch, from whom it would flow outward to the remainder of 
society.86 While this understanding has been interpreted by some Western scholars in a strictly 
literal fashion (as a process of teaching by example), historical sources seem to ascribe an 
affective (even osmotic) power to the sheer force of the ruler’s will. For instance, Graham notes 
that “in a state which has the Way the ruler wins the reverent submission of all by ceremony 
alone without the need of force, through the Potency [de] which emanates from his person.”87 In 
this way, the personal charisma of the ruler was seen as an efficacious force, transforming the 
lives of citizens throughout the realm – a fact which implies certain marked similarities to the 
notion of spiritual potency (ling) detailed above. 
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Though China’s last dynasty collapsed almost a century ago, the body of metaphors and 
images relating to imperial leadership remain a salient source of tropes and symbols up to the 
present. The resilience of such symbolism is, to some extent, unsurprising, especially given the 
continued presence of imperialistic imagery within Chinese culture (e.g., the bureaucratic 
organization of the celestial pantheon and the enduring popularity of fiction set in the imperial 
period). One example of a (relatively) modern, metaphorical use of this image can be found in 
Madsen’s Morality and Power in a Chinese Village, which sees some of the author’s respondents 
using the term to describe charismatic holders of local political power: 
When people called Longyong or Qingfa ‘local emperor,’ they were not referring to the 
benevolent majesty sometimes associated with emperorhood but rather to its fearsome 
power. Both Longyong and Qingfa were exceedingly powerful men by virtue of their 
physical prowess, personal drive, social status, and political position. Their power was 
fearsome, not because it was malevolent, but because it was raw, explosive, sometimes 
unchecked, and always very close at hand.88 
 
A more compelling account of the continued salience of this imagery can be seen in Ann 
Anagnost’s “The Beginning and End of an Emperor,” which details the exploits of a Chinese 
peasant who successfully managed to convince a number of his fellow citizens that he had been 
granted the Mandate of Heaven and that he would soon be inaugurating a new dynasty.89 This 
would not be that notable, given the similarity with the founding of numerous Chinese dynasties, 
save that it occurred in the early 1980s in the People’s Republic of China! His tale, one account 
of which is related in the Chinese Peasant Gazette (Zhonguo nongmin bao), contains numerous 
classical patterns, including claims that the prospective emperor would possess magical 
powers,90 that his ascendancy would be marked by natural calamities (including storms and 
earthquakes),91 that he was be identifiable by various physiognomic signs,92 that he would be a 
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scholar (capable of drawing knowledge from ancient texts),93 and that individuals were to 
demonstrate devotion to him via their adherence to Confucian virtues.94 In noting the appeal of 
these images (and the man who presented them), Anagnost presents an account that eloquently 
includes all of the themes introduced in this chapter (including mystical potency, narratives of 
efficacy and cultural continuity): 
Through his manipulating of the symbols of knowledge and power, Li became the 
personification of the emperor-hero. He presumed to be not only the channel of 
communication between heaven and earth, but also a conduit for those highly significant 
goods by which peasants in China measure their participation in the new society. … Li 
promised the establishment of a new moral order from which evil would be extirpated 
and in which his followers could take significant roles. This promise was already half-
fulfilled as he began to recruit and train a loyal band of future officials. … The emperor 
was the one from whom all blessing were to flow … eventually. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Li Laiyong was not only going to be the future 
emperor of China, he was going to be their emperor. Li was, in large part, a folk creation 
in which his followers actively participated. In the gifts that followed from them to him, 
they staked their claim on him.95 
 
In this way, the tale of Li Laiyong (and his abortive attempt to found a new state) provides 
evidence of the continued salience of traditional understandings of political power, spiritual 
potency, and the multiple intersections between these realms. 
 
Conclusions 
 As can be seen, the cosmological / metaphysical system posited by Chinese religion and 
philosophy allows for notable resonances between realms that, for a Western reader, may 
initially seem utterly disparate. Not only were the lines of demarcation between the human and 
extra-human realms relatively porous (allowing various types of interaction between gods and 
their human constituents), but so too was the mystical potency ascribed to a political leader 
similar to the spiritual efficacy of a powerful deity. In fact, it is arguable that the human faculty 
of de, when possessed by a king or emperor, was functionally identical to the spiritual faculty of 
ling – especially in terms of its effects upon the populace. 
                                                 
93
 Ibid, 165-166. 
94
 Ibid., 155. 
95
 Ibid., 165-167. 
 48 
Now that the porosity of the traditional Chinese worldview has been established, it 
remains to utilize these conclusions in exploring the modern religious understandings of Mao – a 
topic that provides the subject matter for the next chapter. 
 
 49 
Chapter 3: The Many Faces of Mao 
 
 After delving into the cosmological and metaphysical underpinnings of Chinese folk 
psychology, with specific reference to the culture’s pragmatic, efficacy-driven approach to 
political leaders and extrahuman beings, we are now prepared to tackle the more complicated 
issue of the public’s characterization of the Great Helmsman. While Mao seemed to whole-
heartedly adopt the May 4th critique of Chinese culture (which he most succinctly summarized in 
the Cultural Revolution rhetoric of “Smashing the Four Olds”),1 it seems an undeniable irony 
that many of the tropes used to characterize him were (and are) drawn, not from the theories of 
Marx, Lenin or Trotsky, but from the popular images of deities and emperors. In this chapter, we 
will outline these multifarious (yet strangely compatible) understandings, exploring their 
interrelationships and considering the manner in which such characterizations were both 
meaningful and appropriate. 
 
 While this overview will draw upon various sources (including ethnographies, newspaper 
articles, personal conversations, and academic disquisitions) in exploring these issues, it makes 
particular use of Geremie Barmé’s indispensable Shades of Mao – a diligently translated2 
sourcebook of modern Chinese perspectives on the Chairman Mao revival. Though it was 
released in the mid-90s, meaning that further research was obviously required (in order to 
confirm that the phenomena discussed therein continue to be relevant), it still provided a 
jumping-off point for my own reflections, as well as a comprehensive overview of the disparate 
(even polarized) approaches to Mao in Chinese popular culture. Despite its evident utility, it is 
                                                 
1
 Though a considerable body of Mao’s writings expostulate upon this apparent commitment to abandoning “feudal 
Chinese culture,” his actual relationship with tradition (in terms of his style of governance, his descriptions of 
himself, and his use of classical literary and philosophical techniques) is considerably less clear. This being said, an 
analysis of these issues, which would depend upon a detailed exegesis of Mao’s considerable literary corpus (not to 
mention a mountain of historical evidence), is beyond the scope of this paper (as discussed in the introduction), 
though they would certainly provide fruitful terrain for future exploration. 
2
 Though I would not consider myself to be sufficiently linguistically proficient to make this assessment, Lucian Pye 
and Susan Shuyu Kong’s reviews both comment upon Barmé’s ability to capture the nuances of the original texts 
while simultaneously providing readers with considerable insight into the context(s) within which these views were 
formulated. Indeed, Pye goes so far as to laud Barmé as “the foremost foreign expositor and critic of contemporary 
Chinese popular culture” (461). Lucian W. Pye, Review of Shades of Mao: The Posthumous Cult of the Great 
Leader by Geremie R. Barmé, The Journal of Asian Studies 56:2 (May 1997), 461-463. Susan Shuyu Kong, Review 
of Shades of Mao: The Posthumous Cult of the Great Leader by Geremie R. Barmé, Pacific Affairs 71:3 (Autumn 
1998), 410-411. 
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however necessary to acknowledge a difference between my own approach and that taken by 
Barmé, as our overall emphases differ. In particular, his article (which functions as an 
introduction to the materials presented in the book itself) concentrates upon the various 
functional contexts within which Mao was being posthumously evaluated. In it, he suggests that 
Mao has been “commercialized” (through memoirs, audio cassettes, and cultural tourism), 
“lampooned” (through literature and visual art) and “sanctified” (through the development of 
various Mao cults).3 While I acknowledge the validity of these categories, my own analysis seeks 
a more panoptic perspective, based largely upon the contention that the cultural constructs 
referred to by Chinese writers (whether utilized in an adulatory, recriminatory or caricaturizing 
manner) are significant in and of themselves. It is hoped that this approach will allow me to 
examine the role of Mao in the modern Chinese “cultural toolkit.” Indeed, when multiple 
authors, each striving for different ends, employ similar understandings of a cultural object, it 
would certainly seem to imply some form of cultural consensus (one that transcends rhetorical 
appropriations), as the symbols, metaphors and analogies utilized therein would obviously need 
to be shared to be mutually intelligible.4 
 
Mao as God 
 While the posthumous worship of Mao described in the introduction (and covered in 
more detail below) does indeed seem rather ironic (especially when considered in light of the 
PRC government’s ostensible commitment to Marxist atheism),5 it is certainly not without 
precedent. More specifically, it can be seen as a natural outgrowth of the public adulation 
directed at Mao during his lifetime and as a continuation of preexisting cultural patterns 
concerning the relationship between efficacy, social function, and the cosmological/theological 
visions of Chinese folk religion. In sketching out the “god-like” popular characterization of the 
                                                 
3
 Barmé (1995), 49. 
4
 This understanding follows from Bruner’s principle of “hermeneutic composability,” which details the manner in 
which these various construals of Mao could be assembled from a shared body of cultural materials. 
5
 This perspective can be noted in Jiping Zuo’s “Political Religion: The Case of the Cultural Revolution in China,” 
Sociological Analysis 52:1 (Spring 1991), 99-110: “the elimination of traditional religion did not lead China to 
atheism. On the contrary, a new religion was created. In the eyes of the masses, there still existed a ‘supernatural’ 
power (Yinger, 1970). The ‘manna’ proceeding from Mao prevented a man from believing himself to be the master 
of his own fate or that social progress could be achieved solely by human effort, as Marxism claims” (103). While I 
agree with the general thrust of Zuo’s argument, I think it understates the extent to which such beliefs empowered 
(certain segments of) the Chinese population. The culturally creative application of these beliefs (and the impact that 
they had upon the lives of Chinese citizens) will be discussed in greater detail in this chapter and in the conclusion 
of this study. 
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Great Helmsman, we will first attend to the popular veneration of the living Mao, a phenomenon 
that began soon after his rise to power during the Long March and achieved a feverish intensity 
during the chaos of the Cultural Revolution. This background information, which will also be 
called upon during the discussion of Mao-era rituals in chapter four, will also be useful in 
approaching the worship practices directed at the deceased Chairman. 
 
Venerating the Living Mao 
 During Mao’s lifetime, his considerable personal charisma, coupled with his seemingly 
miraculous achievements as a military and political leader, assured him a place of honour in the 
hearts and minds of the Chinese people. Nowhere was this truer than among the peasantry – a 
stereotypically disenfranchised segment of the population that was lauded as the cornerstone of 
Chinese society in Maoist rhetoric.6 Though some of the adulation directed at Mao was 
expressed in the newly imported language of Marxism/Maoism, much more of it was shaped by 
traditional metaphors and conceptual schemata. One of the most prevalent of these metaphors 
was the characterization of Mao as an extrahuman being, with the attendant ability to 
efficaciously transform the mortal world through the power of his will. 
 
 Though many foreign scholars have acknowledged the “pseudo-religious” character of 
Mao worship during this stage of Chinese history, they are often less prepared to note its 
parallels with traditional religious practices. One of the most overt of these parallels is described 
in Xing Lu’s Rhetoric of the Chinese Cultural Revolution – a text that provides an emic account 
of the Cultural Revolution (from the perspective of an expatriate survivor). In it, she outlines the 
(then common) practice of rededicating ancestor shrines to the worship of Mao: 
Traditional Chinese altars used for ancestor worship were converted into altars of loyalty 
to Mao. As observed by Hsia (1972), “Many Chinese villagers dedicated ‘rooms of 
loyalty’ to Chairman Mao and many peasant households have their own ‘tablets of 
loyalty.’ These are clearly derived from the ancestral temples and tablets of old China; 
                                                 
6
 Indeed, one of the characteristic features of Maoism is the valorization of peasants by stressing their “class purity” 
and their political clout (as described in Hsiung, 119-121). As Mao suggests in a 1927 report, the success of a (then 
prospective) revolution would depend upon “a revolutionary tidal wave in the countryside in order to mobilize tens 
of thousands of peasants and weld them into this great force” (quoted in Hsiung, 60). This being said, it should be 
noted that this inversion of traditional power relationships was not a Maoist innovation. Indeed, Chinese 
philosophers as early as Mencius have argued that rulers were only legitimate to the extent that they placed their 
citizens before themselves (as in Mencius 1B8). 
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mornings and evenings the villagers gather, either in their communal room, or in front of 
their family tablets, to pay homage to Mao Tse-tung [Mao Zedong]” (233).7 
 
The rituals carried out at these altars (which will be discussed in greater detail in the next 
chapter) were intended to re-orient the lives of individuals with regards to a postulated 
extrahuman presence, thus allowing them access to its spiritual potency.8 Describing this process 
of apotheosization in more general terms, Xin Yuan suggests that, during the Cultural 
Revolution, the Chairman became “the supreme and all-powerful super god, the ‘Sun that never 
sets.’”9 In this context, “Mao was invested with a type of power equal, if not superior, to all other 
religious systems, expressed in such beliefs that he was the Sun, ‘sustainer of all things,’ a being 
who turned the universe red.”10 The fact that Mao was, in this case, still a living human being 
was a secondary concern at best. 
 
 Mao’s alleged spiritual potency, which was certainly related to his personal charisma, 
was described by numerous commentators in terms that smack of Frazerian “sympathetic 
magic.”11 In particular, many Red Guards who met with him during his historic audiences in 
Tiananmen Square (1966-1967) became fanatical in their desire to directly experience the 
                                                 
7
 Lu, 134. The magical efficacy of Mao’s portrait is also attested to in state-produced propaganda from the period, as 
described in Urban, 144-150. One of the most notable of these accounts describes Mao’s image as a cure for 
blindness: “While treating members of a production brigade on a snow-capped mountain one day, they found a 
totally blind Lisu woman holding a portrait of our great leader Chairman Mao and wishing him long, long life. This 
old woman had been a landlord’s slave before liberation, and her family had been slaves for generations. Under the 
wise leadership of Chairman Mao, she had been emancipated after 1949 like the other people of China’s minority 
nationalities. Much as she wanted to see what the great leader Chairman Mao looked like, she was unable to do so 
because cataracts had caused total blindness. The woman’s profound proletarian feelings moved the members of the 
team and gave them a profound education. Although none had any experience in removing a cataract, they decided 
to operate so that she could see what Chairman Mao looked like. Before the operation they criticized their own 
selfish ideas in hesitating to take responsibility upon themselves. The operation was a success [!]” (149).  
This talismanic usage of Mao’s image will be discussed further in Chapter 4. 
8
 These practices present marked similarities to several ancestor veneration rituals advocated in both imperial edicts 
and Zhuxi’s Family Rituals – a correspondence that will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4. 
9
 Xin Yuan, quoted in Shades of Mao, 196-197. Similarly, Li Jie also discusses the Cultural Revolution as a spiritual 
phenomenon (Shades of Mao, 144).  
10
 Ibid.  
11
 James G. Frazer, “Sympathetic Magic: The Principles of Magic,” The Golden Bough (III.1): “If we analyse the 
principles of thought on which magic is based, they will probably be found to resolve themselves into two: first, that 
like produces like, or that an effect resembles its cause; and, second, that things which have once been in contact 
with each other continue to act on each other at a distance after the physical contact has been severed. … [F]rom the 
second [principle,] he infers that whatever he does to a material object will affect equally the person with whom the 
object was once in contact, whether it formed part of his body or not.” Accessed online at Project Gutenberg: 
http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/etext03/bough11h.htm 
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Chairman’s mystical power, as described by Liang Heng (a student who was present at one of 
these rallies):  
Those [hands] Chairman Mao had touched now became the focus of our fervor. Everyone 
surged toward them with outstretched arms in hopes of transferring the sacred touch to 
their own hands. If you couldn’t get close enough for that, then shaking the hand of 
someone who had shaken hands with our Great Saving Star would have to do. So it went, 
down the line, until sometimes handshakes were removed as many as one hundred times 
from the original one, spreading outward in a vast circle like waves in a lake when a 
meteor crashes into its center.12 
 
 Conversely, just as Mao was (in some respects) conflated with the traditional views of 
godhood, so too were his opponents demonized using the language of popular religion. For 
instance, class enemies were described in both formal and informal contexts as “monsters,” “cow 
ghosts and snake spirits”13 – baleful forces that were outside the purview of human society and 
moral codes. This denigratory discourse, as encapsulated in the revolutionary requirement to 
sweep away “all the monsters and demons,” “called for radical actions and left no room for 
sympathy or compassion for the accused.”14 The seemingly inevitable result of this process of 
dehumanization are harrowingly expressed by Xing Lu: 
In the field the children of the prisoners followed the example of the Rebels and began 
beating their own fathers. One of them, a fourteen-year-old boy, carried a metal rod in his 
hand. He ordered the prisoners to stretch out their hands. One by one he slapped their 
palms with the rod while accusing them of being bourgeois because their hands were so 
smooth. The boy’s father received his beating in turn. When I asked the boy later how he 
could strike his own father, he replied that he was only beating ‘cow ghosts and snake 
spirits.’”15 
 
                                                 
12
 Heng and Shapiro (1983), quoted in Lu, 137. See also Urban, 138-140, which draws various examples of this 
public adulation from the New China News Agency, Peking Radio, and Kiangsu Provincial Radio broadcasts (ca. 
1966-1969). 
13
 Lu, 15. The psychology of this process of demonization is eloquently described in Robert Lifton’s Revolutionary 
Immortality: “Maoists later called forth the picturesque idiom of Chinese folklore to place [their] critiques in the 
center of a demonology – referring to them as ‘demons,’ ‘devils,’ ‘monsters,’ ‘ogres,’ ‘ghosts,’ and ‘freaks.’ But 
demonology always addresses itself to the management of life and death, and includes an implicit theory of what 
might be called negative immortality: incarnations of evil which never die out, whatever one does to counter their 
nefarious influences. Groups like the Maoists who so boldly defy human limitation are inevitably plagued in turn by 
images of supernatural enemies” (25). Revolutionary Immortality: Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Cultural 
Revolution, (New York: Random House, 1968). 
14
 Lu, 61. 
15
 Wen (1995), quoted in Lu, 60. 
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The power attributed to Mao’s thought is forcefully demonstrated by the extent to which his 
ideological categories could trump millennia worth of teachings concerning filial piety and social 
propriety. 
 
In general, Mao’s exemplary character and personal charisma were so highly esteemed 
(especially by the time of the Cultural Revolution) that they became a sort of “totalizing 
discourse,”16 capable of imparting a nigh unquestionable aura of sanctity to any ideals, 
individuals or images that were associated with him: 
The deification of Mao as savior of the Chinese people and a living god through 
speeches, songs, and rituals promoted blind faith in Mao’s teachings that was applied to 
every aspect of Chinese life. His image was worshiped as that of an emperor, except with 
an even greater fervor and fanaticism. His Little Red Book became the bible of the entire 
nation. Ji Li Jiang (1997) says it well: “To us Chairman Mao was God. He controlled 
everything we read, everything we heard, and everything we learned in school. We 
believed everything he said. Naturally, we know only good things about Chairman Mao 
and the Cultural Revolution. Anything bad had to be the fault of others. Chairman Mao 
was blameless” (265).17 
 
As seen in some of the previous examples, this discourse conflated Mao’s exemplary (and 
spiritually potent) character with the purported miraculous efficacy of his teachings:  
The work team was going to make Mao into a sacred symbol of all the deep hopes and 
aspirations potentially uniting the villagers into a moral community. This sacred symbol 
could link the villagers’ hopes and aspirations to those of the great public community that 
was the Chinese nation…. The problem was that there were two inseparable parts to the 
Mao cult: a veneration of the person that Mao was and of his teachings. They were 
inseparable because Mao was presented as a great person precisely because of his great 
teachings; he was almost godlike because his teachings were the Truth itself.18 
 
While the process whereby Mao’s philosophical writings came to possess this talismanic efficacy 
will be considered in greater detail in the following chapter, at present it is sufficient to note that 
                                                 
16
 The tendency of societies to embrace this type of “totalizing discourse” during periods of instability is discussed 
at length in Swidler (1986) and Jensen (2007). 
17
 Lu, 193. 
18
 Madsen, 130. See also: Richard Baum, “Ideology Redivivus,” Problems of Communism 16:3 (1967), 1-11. It 
should be noted that this characterization of Mao’s teachings was far from simply being a popular construct. In fact, 
the Chinese government’s propaganda department actively encouraged this form of magical thinking. See, for 
example, the story of Zhao Ziching, reported in an Inner Mongolian radio broadcast (1969): “Poor herdsman Chao 
Tzu-ching eventually survived following a successful operation on his brain which was injured during an accident at 
this work site. Who enabled him to bring back his life from threatening death? It was our great leader Chairman 
Mao, the red sun in our hearts, the invincible though of Mao Tse-tung, and Chairman Mao’s revolutionary line. 
These brought him back to life again and gave those who fought for his life the inexhaustible strength and infinite 
wisdom needed to make such a miracle” (quoted in Urban, 157). 
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“at the peak of a [Cultural Revolution-era] campaign, Mao Tse-tung’s [Mao Zedong’s] Thought 
served not merely as a guide for action but as a source of quasi-religious inspiration,”19 such that 
“his theory was considered ‘invincible’, ‘infallible’ and of ‘boundless radiance’ in its potential to 
transform every aspect of life.”20 Further, I would argue that this conflation of Mao and his 
(miraculously effective) Thought was instrumental to his posthumous deification, as will be 
discussed presently. 
 
Mao Shen (毛神) 
 Given the establishment of the living Mao as a (quasi-superhuman) being of miraculous 
spiritual potency, it is perhaps unsurprising that the Chairman’s death (and posthumous political 
reevaluation) did little to quell the public perception of his magical efficacy, at least among the 
peasants who represented his core constituency.21 As a result, it is entirely understandable that 
the theme of his continued posthumous efficacy is attested to in writings of all styles (i.e. 
political, devotional, social scientific) and from all stances (laudatory to recriminatory). 
 
In outlining these views, the most unambiguous claims concerning Mao’s posthumous 
efficacy are certainly those that explicitly refer to his continued activity in the world. One of the 
most dramatic of these can be noted in the fact that, nearly twenty years after the Great 
Helmsman’s death, taxi drivers throughout the country began hanging Mao portraits in their 
vehicles.22 Ostensibly, they were motivated to do so in the aftermath of a widely discussed traffic 
accident in the south where a taxi driver claimed he avoided injury due to a Mao poster in his 
vehicle (the “portrait of Chairman Mao … is what protected him”).23 Other drivers explained 
their talismans with the suggestion that “they hung the Chairman because he could ward off 
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 Lu, 65. 
20
 Lu, 41-42. 
21
 This discussion of Mao’s posthumous efficacy does not contradict the hermeneutic of generosity proposed in the 
introduction (in spite of the fact that it seems to be built upon the conflation of Mao’s personal power with the power 
of his thought) due to the fact that these beliefs did, in fact, have notable social effects. These effects will be 
considered in more detail throughout the remainder of this chapter, as well as in chapters four and five. 
22
 This phenomenon is detailed in a New York Times articles from 1991, which describes the presence of these 
amulets in taxis in Beijing, Guang Zhou and Hebei. Nicholas D. Kristof, “China's Newest God: The Godless Mao,” 
The New York Times (Jun 2, 1992), A1/A8. See also: Chao (1999), 519. 
23
 Hou Dangshang, quoted in Shades of Mao, 212. See also Kristof: “‘I heard there was a convoy of 15 cars, and 
every one got in a bad accident except the two that had Chairman Mao's picture,’ said a 29-year-old taxi driver in 
Beijing. ‘And in some places, like Shandong province, I hear that for traffic safety reasons they don't even let you on 
the road unless you've got your Chairman Mao photo out’” (A1). 
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evil.”24 As Michael Dutton notes, the deification of Mao was largely based upon a growing body 
of popular narratives concerning the deceased Chairman’s miraculous powers (ling): 
It probably all began after a multicar pile-up on a Guangdong highway in 1989. Fatal for 
many, the only person to walk away unscathed from this horrific crash was the driver of 
the car with a Mao talisman. As word of this story spread, the image of the mystical Mao, 
who had powers to protect those who possessed a representation of him, was born. 
Transformed from revolutionary leader into god of good fortune, Mao became a 
soothsayer for troubled times. From then on, other ‘‘miracles’’ confirmed his 
beatification. His shadowy apparition appeared on the surface of a pebble drawn from the 
waters of the Yangtze River; it appeared as a ghostly apparition on the surface of a 
peasant’s wall where his portrait had once hung; and it even surfaced as nature’s own 
handiwork, etched onto the rock face of a mountainside on Hainan Island, which became 
known as Mao Mountain (Maogongshan).25 
 
Though Dutton provides one account of this “initial manifestation” of Mao’s posthumous 
efficacy in Guangdong, others situate it in the chaos of the Tiananmen Square incident: 
During the Tiananmen student movement in 1989, three protesters expressed their 
distaste for [Mao] by throwing paint at his enormous portrait overlooking Tiananmen 
Square. Just hours after the portrait had been defaced, the heavens opened up with a 
drenching rain. That storm, believers say, was the first clear indication of Mao's 
divinity.26 
 
Regardless of the exact tales being told, narratives of efficacy were certainly central to the 
popular reconceptualization of Mao in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
 
In an excursion to China in the summer of 2005 (more than fifteen years after the events 
described by Dutton), I observed the continued presence of such medallions in taxicabs in 
Beijing, Qufu and Shenyang – some of which were nigh indistinguishable from traditional good 
luck charms (which typically bear images of Guanyin or other popular deities). Using language 
similar to the individuals quoted by Barmé and Cohen, a cab driver in Qufu suggested that this 
amulet “provided good fortune and protected the vehicle.” When pressed to speculate about 
whether he thought Mao would object to these mystical objects, our guide replied that “when 
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 Liu Xiaoqing, quoted in Shades of Mao, 176. This tendency is also described in Cohen (1993), in Lu (2004), 147, 
and in Michael Dutton, “From Culture Industry to Mao Industry: A Greek Tragedy,” boundary 2 32:2 (2005), 152-
167. 
25
 Dutton, 157. 
26
 Kristof, A8. 
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Mao was alive, he saw himself as a saint… he had much respect for himself… [thus,] he 
probably wouldn’t mind.”27 
 
The taxi amulet phenomena can be seen as microcosm of Mao’s posthumous deification, 
with his perceived spiritual potency combining with narratives of efficacy to create a popular 
movement possessing many of the characteristics and foci of traditional cults. These tales of 
Mao’s posthumous efficacy can be seen as instances of both narrative accrual (as per Bruner) 
and of cultural congruence (as per Hsiung). In the first case, they represent the gradual evolution 
of the Mao-based canon in light of new narratives (in this case, narratives that argue for Mao’s 
continued efficacy in worldly matters), each of which expand the available canonical vocabulary 
for future “story-tellers”. In the second case, they can also be seen as an instance of unification 
between classical patterns (such as the notions of efficacy described in chapter two) and modern 
realities (such as the Mao veneration described above). 
 
 While the narratives of efficacy described previously are obviously the most dramatic 
evidence for the religious (re)interpretation of Mao, far more common were sources that 
described Mao’s words as miraculously active constituents of modern Chinese society. For 
example, when Zhongliu (a Chinese periodical) advertised a poetry contest whose topic was 
Mao, they (perhaps unsurprisingly) received a plethora of highly reverential offerings, many of 
which made specific mention of Mao’s mystically potent teachings. One amateur poet claimed 
that “now [, after Mao’s death,] his vast and deep Thought // has become the energy source for 
all of China.”28 Another opined that “His Thought is not only a weapon for revolution // for it 
holds out hope for the advancement of mankind.”29 More officially, a 1993 editorial in the 
People’s Daily stated that “Mao thought is a source of endless ideological strength…. [and that] 
the basic principles of Mao Thought still shine brilliant rays of light.”30 In stark contrast to the 
tone (though not the underlying metaphysical assumptions) of these plaudits, Shades of Mao also 
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 Personal communication (June 8, 2005). Our guide concluded his analysis by noting that “this [usage of Mao 
talismans] is the thinking of common people… it is Chinese culture.” Similarly, in an interview with Ms. Ouyang 
(the personal assistant to Professor Mou Dai) in Shenyang, I was informed that most “Chinese people, during the 
Cultural Revolution, saw Mao as a shen” and that this explained the prevalence of the taxi amulets. Personal 
communication (June 23, 2005). 
28
 Da Wei, quoted in Shades of Mao, 191. 
29
 Zhao Aimin, quoted in Shades of Mao, 255. 
30
 People’s Daily, quoted in Shades of Mao, 257. 
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features a verse by an embittered revolutionary poet who bemoans the fact that Mao’s shade 
continues to “prowl the land,” exerting a dire effect on all Chinese people, as he “dictates every 
action, [and] controls every thought.”31 In all cases, the unstated major premise of these 
statements is that, for better or worse, Mao’s teachings remain potent loci of power. This being 
said, the above assumption becomes more explicable when considered in light of the 
performative/ritualistic emphasis on Mao Thought during the Cultural Revolution (an issue that 
will be treated at length in chapter 4),32 as it is reasonable to assume that such a sweeping 
praxical development would continue to affect China’s cultural vocabulary for years to come. 
 
 In addition to the assumptions of posthumous efficacy described above, some sources 
cited by Barmé explicitly describe Mao as a god. For instance, his efficacy in protecting the 
vehicles of professional drivers has caused some to argue that “the Chairman’s like a guardian 
God.”33 Contrarily, but using similar concepts, Sun’s revolutionary dirge laments the fact that the 
now-deceased Mao had simply superceded the existing deities: “Had we overthrown the Three 
Great Mountains only to build a new Temple? // Had we toppled Wealth and Mercy only to build 
a new shrine?”34 Uniting the ideas of Mao as divinity and Mao’s words as continually 
efficacious, Sun Ya and Jia Lusheng argue that Mao has been “transmogrified into a spiritual 
force, a belief and ideal…. If you have faith in Mao Zedong, then He will live in your heart 
forever.”35  
 
Another popular means of idealizing the deceased Chairman is through the tendency to 
draw metaphorical parallels between him and the broader world of nature – a tendency that can 
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 Sun Jingxuan, quoted in Shades of Mao, 122. The term “specter” is also, in itself, significant, given the fairly 
narrow continuum between ghosts and gods in Chinese folk religion (as discussed at length in chapter 2). 
32
 For example, “one Party Secretary in a Shanxi commune issued the peasants with copies of the Three Standard 
Articles with the words: ‘We don’t need to rely on heaven and earth, all we need are these precious Red Booklets 
and we can dig through the mountains to irrigate our land” (Xin Yuan, quoted in Shades of Mao, 198). In a more 
modern context, a post-Cultural Revolution novelist (Li Jian) describes a Red Guard’s mental processes as she 
unhesitatingly performs Mao’s teachings in a decidedly unorthodox context (Shades of Mao, 223). 
33
 Hou Dangsheng, quoted in Shades of Mao, 213. Likewise, one of Cohen’s interviewees states that “Mao Zedong 
has become like a deity (shen)” (Cohen 1993, 129). 
34
 Sun Jingxuan, quoted in Shades of Mao, 126. Sun also describes Mao as a specter (a metaphor that is also used by 
Liu Xiaobo (276-281). Given the Wittgensteinian “family resemblance” between ghosts and gods in this system (see 
Wolf and Harrell (1974)), such a description cannot be simply written off as an instance of poetic language. Indeed, 
I would argue that describing Mao as a spirit still presupposes the same cultural approach to the supernatural and 
that such statements emerge from the same continuum as those discussed above. 
35
 Sun and Jia, quoted in Shades of Mao, 168.  
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also be seen in the depictions of both gods and emperors in the traditional folk pantheon. The 
most frequent of these is, of course, the description of Mao as the sun:36 symbolic language that 
becomes additionally poignant with the leader’s death. In a more extravagant manner, Mao is 
also described as a dynamo, powered by the plentiful energies of the natural world: “The raging 
torrents of the Yellow River and the Yangtze coursed through his veins. His massive chest rose 
like a great mountain…. He was the enactor of his own will; it was like lightning or a tempest, 
both majestic and terrifying.”37 Further, in a rhetorical move that would either delight or terrify 
Mircea Eliade, Mao is equated with a Great Tree: an “oak that grew in the soil by the Xiang 
River, imbued with the strength of its waters and its indomitable spirit.”38 While these statements 
on their own would simply seem anomalous (or perhaps ridiculously fawning), they are given a 
context by the religious belief/practice that has been seen (in some contexts) to surround 
depictions of Mao. 
 
The logical terminus of such beliefs, as alluded to in this study’s introduction, is that Mao 
has, in fact, become a deity revered in the folk religious tradition, such that for many “he has 
become the idol to which the revived worship of the God of Wealth, Guan Gong, Guanyin 
Bodhisattva, and other gods is married.”39 To that end, temples dedicated to the deceased 
Chairman have sprung up throughout the country40 in locations as diverse as Gushui (Shaanxi 
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 See, for examples, quoted in Shades of Mao, 166, 193, 197, 254, and passim. More specifically, You Zhi states 
that Mao’s voice, body and name are as lustrous as the sun and the moon (228). 
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 Xin Yuan, quoted in Shades of Mao, 199. In the same vein, Cohen (1993) reports that “some rural families burn 
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the end of the Cultural Revolution the cult of Mao has continued unabated in some quarters or has been resurrected 
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safety. According to Xiao Di (1993), peasants in a rural area still erected a temple to Chairman Mao, and thousands 
of people visit the temple every day burning incense and kowtowing to images of Mao, even years after the Cultural 
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 This phenomenon is noted in Stephan Feuchtwang’s “Religion as Resistance,” in Chinese Society: Change, 
Conflict and Resistance, edited by Elizabeth J. Perry and Mark Selden, (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), 
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Xiaoping along with Confucius and the Yellow emperor, founder of the Chinese nation” (165). 
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province),41 Shaoshan (Hunan province),42 Fujian,43 Guangdong44 and Yenan.45 While some of 
these sites downplay their similarities with overtly religious shrines (such as the complex in 
Gushui, where pilgrims “are not allowed to burn incense before the statue,” because that would 
be “too much like religion”),46 others are quite forthcoming in their characterizations of Mao as a 
deity, “depicting him as a halo-crowned Buddhist saint or a Chinese folk god bestowing 
wealth.”47 As in traditional popular religion, these beliefs generally center upon the prospective 
extrahuman being’s ability to provide this-worldly religious goods (including prosperity, 
progeny, and longevity)48 and are reinforced through public narratives of efficacy.49 Somewhat 
ironically, this reappraisal of the Great Helmsman has even been observed in the shamanic 
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come true after praying in front of statues of Mao are widely traded in the alleys of Shaoshan” (21). As a final 
example, Macartney’s article describes “Tian, 24, a civil servant of local government, [who] said she wouldn’t say 
anything unfavorable about Mao on any occasion. Besides her affection for the great leader, she has a fear of 
punishment from beyond the grave for offending Mao’s spirit” (Macartney (2006)). 
 61 
practices50 and zoomorphic pantheons51 of peasant religion – both of which were extensively 
persecuted as “feudal superstition” (mixin) under the living Mao.52 In keeping with his (nascent) 
introduction into the folk religious pantheon, the popular version of Mao’s biography has also 
been expanded to include accounts of miracles drawn from the Chinese hagiographical/ 
mythological corpora. These include beliefs that “at the time of his birth a flash of red light was 
seen in the sky” and that “a comet fell from the heavens when he died.”53 Though such beliefs 
and practices are not universal in modern China, their cultural currency is both undeniable and 
understandable, built as it is upon traditional metaphors, images and tropes, as well as the 
mythology and iconography of the revolutionary period. 
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didn’t see any of the animal spirits around here then.’ Several people told me that Mao’s formidable power 
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the four animal spirits. Mao was said to have known this himself, but he did not like to divulge this information” 
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 A corollary to these deific descriptions of Mao can be seen in accounts that describe 
popular responses to the apotheosized Chairman. In a modern survey of Chinese citizens, it was 
found that 57% of 25-35 year-olds described their emotional stance towards Mao as a 
“worshipful” one.54 Among the younger generation, historical knowledge was almost entirely 
absent, but was replaced by “blind worship.”55 This tendency to conflate the political with the 
religious is acidly criticized by Wang Shuo, who satirically portrays a lower-class character 
addressing a local cadre as “dear teacher leader helmsman … dad mum granddad grandma old 
ancestor primal ape Supreme Deity Jade Emperor Guanyin Bodhisattva commander-in-chief.”56 
In a similarly iconoclastic manner, Chinese political pop art, which often re-imagines the cultural 
legacy of Mao, is described as “vulgarizing” the “sacrosanct” – language that would seem more 
appropriate (to a Western listener) if used in the context of religious imagery.57 
 
 As can be seen, the apotheosis of Mao Zedong (incomplete and fragmented as it is) can 
be seen as a testament to the continued cogency of traditional construals of the relationship 
between the human and extrahuman realms – especially among rural Chinese. While hypotheses 
regarding the continued relevance of these symbols and tropes will be discussed below (both in 
the “analysis” portion of the present chapter and in the chapter to follow), it is first necessary to 
examine another common image used in descriptions of the departed Chairman: the imperial 
ruler. Given the numerous and notable corollaries between deities and rulers contained in the 
traditional Chinese worldview, the usage of such images can also be seen to draw upon the 
extrahuman efficacy framework described at length in chapter two. 
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Mao as Emperor 
Just as Mao was deified (in some quarters) in spite of his numerous attacks upon 
traditional religion, so too did he come to be (partially) understood through the lens of feudal 
Chinese society, regardless of his criticisms of it. The paragraphs below will summarize the 
application of an ancient cultural category to a modern political leader. 
 
 The first major instances of this tendency are found in those sources that explicitly 
describe Mao as an emperor. For instance, Li Jie pointedly argues that, with Mao, “Chinese 
feudalism had finally reached an apogee; in the Mao Cult a perfect symmetry was achieved 
between politics, ethics, morals, and psychology. If we take Qin Shihuang to be the progenitor of 
this style of feudal culture, then Mao Zedong is its historical conclusion.”58 Elsewhere, an article 
by a Chinese literary critic roundly criticizes this tendency to describe Mao as an emperor,59 
implicitly implying that it was a fairly common practice. Indeed, the identification of Mao as a 
ruler in the classical mode was undoubtedly exacerbated by his adherence to certain classical 
patterns, including his use of Tiananmen Square when addressing the public60 and the 
establishment of his personal dwelling within the former imperial compound.61 Xing Lu provides 
an excellent summary of this particular understanding of the revered Chinese leader – an 
understanding that was primarily defined during the chaotic years of the Cultural Revolution: 
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A central element of Chinese mythology is the notion that emperors are mandated by 
Heaven; thus, they are the ‘Sons of Heaven.’ Songs such as ‘The East is Red’ reinforced 
the myth that Mao was just such a deity sent by heaven to help the Chinese people lead 
better lives. In this way Mao was established as the legitimate leader of China, a living 
god who would surely bring happiness to people.62 
 
 
 
 As the above quotation suggests, one of the more potent (and popular) analogies between 
Mao’s rule and those of the dynastic emperors was that their perceived legitimacy depended 
upon the perception that they possessed the proverbial “Mandate of Heaven” – a fact that was 
demonstrated by their efficacy in effecting change in the world.63 As Schram notes, “the 
traditional ruler was expected to assure the wealth and power of the state,” which meant that 
Mao’s legitimacy was largely based upon “the success of the Communists in exercising the 
vocation of state power, and notably in shaping the material and moral order.”64 Similarly, 
Dorfman’s fieldwork in rural Hebei sees her rural informants ascribing an emperor’s osmotic 
moral de65 (德) to Mao:  
According to people in Wulin, Mao developed a model of the good person who would 
lead the transformation to communism, and he lived it. He called on all Chinese to serve 
the people and went to villages to learn from the masses. A retired production-team 
leader told me Mao never had servants, had never taken any amount of money over his 
Central Committee salary, and had forgone meat to eat the coarse grains nongmin 
[peasants] were making do with during the famines of the early 1960s. … It appears that 
it was not only the morality of Mao’s authority that legitimated his leadership; 
legitimation was effected in the moralizing influence Mao’s leadership had on the 
population as a whole.66 
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In a particularly explicit parallel with imperial precedents, many Chinese commentators 
interpreted a disastrous earthquake in 1976 as an omen of China’s loss of the Mandate, a process 
that was occasioned primarily by Mao’s demise: 
If things went awry in the political/moral sphere of the old empire, Heaven signaled 
disapproval in the dark language of heavenly portents, locust swarms, or earthquakes. 
The political crisis of 1976 – with the deaths of Chou En-lai, Chu Te, and Mao Tse-tung 
– was epitomized by nature’s coming out of joint. The devastating earthquake in August 
1976, which cost hundreds of thousands of lives and was centered close enough to the 
capital to collapse parts of the Peking Hotel near T’ien-an-men Square, was felt to be one 
such heavenly portent.67 
 
 
 In addition to the overtly imperial characterizations discussed above, it should be noted 
that Mao often was (and continues to be) described using such imagery in a less explicit fashion. 
For instance, Su and Jia's saccharine elegy to the departed Chairman suggests that he “possesses 
a charisma that surpasses that of Qin Shihuang, Emperor Wu of the Han, as well as the founders 
of the Tang, Song, Ming, and Yuan dynasties.”68 Similarly, a peasant interviewed by Chinese 
journalist Sang Ye drew a parallel between the humble origins of Mao and those of the 
“founding emperors of all China's dynasties.”69 In a like manner, a Shanghainese culture critic 
extended these observations by noting many ways that Mao’s leadership models and strategies 
are patterned upon the imperial system,70 going so far as to poetically describe the Great 
Helmsman as a “polestar” – language that hearkens back to the classical Confucian description 
of an ideal ruler.71 In direct opposition to the Maoist call to “Destroy the Four Olds,” Hai Feng 
suggests that Mao’s philosophy of government “has as one of its origins the rich world of 
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classical Chinese thought.”72 This type of symbolism can even be seen in the treatment of Mao’s 
remains, ensconced as they were within a memorial hall that the populace insists on referring to 
as an “imperial shrine” (ling mu)73 and resting upon an imposing slab of black granite from 
Mount Tai.74 In a similarly symbolic manner, the wreath prepared by Jiang Qing for her 
husband’s funeral service was constructed of the “five grains” traditionally sacrificed to Heaven 
by the emperor.75 Finally, the connection between the apotheosized Mao and nature (described 
above) bears some striking similarities to the traditional understanding of the connection between 
the ruler and the natural world.76 As can be seen, even those sources that do not directly equate 
Mao with imperial leadership still find meaningful resonances within those symbolic and 
metaphorical systems. 
 
Another linguistic/metaphorical connection between Mao and the imperial past is a 
tendency to characterize the leader as a metonym for either the country or the people as a whole. 
While this characterization has already been explored in the descriptions of Mao as (part of) the 
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natural order, it can also be seen in similarities between the popular view of the Chairman and 
the classical “One Man” paradigm, which described monarchs as unitary beings, single-handedly 
bridging the gap between humanity and Heaven.77 As Lu notes, such unitary approaches to Mao 
became all-too-common following the Cultural Revolution, for “once Mao was deified and his 
writings elevated to the level of scripture, there was no longer any clear line of demarcation 
between Mao, Mao Zedong’s Thought, the Communist Party, and the nation. Terms used in 
reference to the party, Chairman Mao, and China were often used synonymously.”78 This 
metonymical connection can also be seen in the construction and placement of the Mao 
Mausoleum, which situates the remains of the Chairman “along the imperial axis”79 in the 
absolute center of Beijing, which is the symbolic center of China (and, more broadly, the center 
of “all under Heaven” (天下 tianxia)).80 In this way, Mao, even in death, continues to 
symbolically serve as the locus of Chinese society. 
 
The continued cogency of this approach to the Great Helmsman can be seen in the 
writings of an anonymous Chinese contributor in a popular online forum, where he (or she) 
passionately avers: 
CHAIRMAN MAO 
is the 1.3 billion.. 
the 1.3 billion are CHAIRMAN MAO.. 
... 
the WEST tries to destroy the greatest heroe [sic].... the greatest Icon.. 
so that it can destroy all other Chinese... 
and... 
without CHAIRMAN MAO 
there would be no CHINA and there would be no heroes... 
CHINA is CHAIRMAN MAO 
and CHAIRMAN MAO is CHINA 
... 
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engendered by this linkage along the axis” (Cheater, 91). 
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and thank you always.. 
CHAIRMAN MAO 
for the one China…81 
 
Though this screed was obviously the work of a single devotee, its resonances with the affective 
responses to Mao explored above suggest that that many would echo its sentiments.  
 
One potential origin of this trend can be noted within Mao’s publicly expressed self-
understanding. In an early poem, he drops the names of China’s most famous emperors 
(including Qin Shihuang and Han Wudi), but suggests that he transcends them, stating: “For 
truly great men // Look to this age alone.”82 In this way, he interpolates himself into the historical 
discourse. In a published letter to Jiang Qing, Mao defends his style of leadership by 
unapologetically stating that, “[t]hat’s the type of king I am.”83 As such, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that the public seized upon the imperial mode of discourse as an appropriate one for 
the description of their (pseudo-)sacred leader. 
 
Analysis 
 As has been demonstrated in the previous sections, pre-modern “religious” 
understandings of the extrahuman world and imperial power were often utilized in popular 
descriptions of Mao Zedong (albeit in a partial or imprecise fashion). Indeed, the naturalness of 
the fit between these classical “religious” perspectives and the deification of the Great 
Helmsman is eloquently demonstrated by the claim that Mao would, after all, “be a god one 
day”84 – an off-hand statement that encapsulated my own findings to such an extent that I 
included it in the title of the present research project. While various explanations of the 
posthumous reassessment of Mao have been proposed in the literature (as will be outlined 
below), I would argue that these sources often fail to provide a sufficiently nuanced account of 
the phenomena – a failing that is largely occasioned by their lack of attention to relevant 
historical patterns. It is hoped that the present exploration aids in resolving this lacuna. 
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 These comments were made in the China Daily’s forums. Poster’s username: chairman, comment #358, message 
posted 2007-1-24 09:36 PM. 
http://bbs.chinadaily.com.cn/viewthread.php?gid=2&tid=280732&extra=page%3D5&page=18 
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 Mao Zedong, quoted in Li, Shades of Mao, 143. 
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 Mao Zedong, quoted in Zhang, Shades of Mao, 273. 
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 Macartney (2006). This quotation is discussed in more detail in the introduction. 
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One of the most prominent of these approaches tends to view the public’s redefinition of 
Mao as a form of “totalitarian nostalgia,”85 wherein the moral and social failings of the current 
administration are (implicitly) critiqued through the valorization of the Maoist social order (in 
general) and Mao’s character (in specific).86 On some levels, this construal of history should not 
be surprising. After all, for many Chinese, the Maoist period has been idealized in the popular 
imagination as the height of sincerity, equality and altruism,87 especially among the lower classes 
that were valorized by Mao and later disenfranchised by Deng’s corrupt, economically driven 
society.88 
 
This “totalitarian nostalgia” is strikingly apparent in a description of Chinese political 
Pop Art as characterized by “an obsession that combined both a nostalgia for the simpler, less 
corrupt, and more self-assured period of Mao's rule with a desire to appropriate Mao Zedong, the 
paramount God of the past, in ventures satirizing life and politics in contemporary China.”89 In 
fact, many commentators argue that the vast majority of the Mao Craze in the early nineties was 
dependent upon dissatisfaction with the present regime.90 Supporting this contention, implicit 
and explicit comparisons to Mao and the Maoist period are the primary means used by both the 
party and the general populace to critique Deng's modernizations.91 Some Chinese theorists even 
argue that the popular deification and worship of Mao are a direct result of dissatisfaction with 
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 The term “totalitarian nostalgia,” originally coined to describe the longing of Russian ex-proletarians for the 
relative simplicity and unambiguousness of the USSR, is usefully expropriated by Geremie Barmé to describe a 
similar process among Chinese peasants during the economic and social turmoil following the death of Mao. In The 
Red: On Contemporary Chinese Culture, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 316-344. 
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 This approach guides many of the indigenous contributors to Shades of Mao (many of which are summarized 
below). See also: Heilbrunn (1997); Kristof (1992); Wehrfritz (1996). While both Dorfman (2002) and Barmé 
(1999) make some similar claims, both of their analyses are sufficiently nuanced as to avoid the reductive tendency 
that characterizes many descriptions of the posthumous Mao cult as a simple instance of “totalitarian nostalgia.” 
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 Liu, Shades of Mao, 170. In a similar vein, Zhang argues that Mao, despite any errors that he might have made, 
has become an essential symbol for the proper Chinese attitude towards the world, and that remembering him is key 
to China's continued independence and selfhood (Shades of Mao, 274). In personal conversations with Chinese 
students (both urban and rural) in the summer of 2005, I discovered that many of them idealized Mao (and the 
Maoist period), and were often either unaware of or unwilling to talk about the problematic elements of Mao’s 
leadership (such as the Great Leap Forward). 
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 Note: though both of these characterizations are obvious stereotypes, they are indeed part of popular usage. See, 
for example, Wehrfritz, 44. As an ironic side-note, it is interesting that Deng himself (Shades of Mao, 118) and 
various Party supporters continually argue that the modern reforms are completely in accordance with Mao's 
doctrines (indeed, Hua “boldfacedly” states that Deng's modernizations are “the crystallization of the living essence 
of Mao Zedong Thought” (Shades of Mao, 150)). Likewise, the Central Department of Propaganda states that 
remembering and following Mao Thought is the key to the success of the modernizations (Shades of Mao, 235). 
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 Li Xianting, Shades of Mao, 216. 
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 Deng Liqun, Shades of Mao, 152. 
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 Liu Xiaobo, Shades of Mao, 276. 
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the present regime's policies.92 These conclusions are congruent with Dorfman's survey of 
peasant folk beliefs, where she suggests that the rise in attacks by animal spirits (spirits that were 
driven into hiding by Mao's spiritual potency) “stand as cosmic support for denunciation of Deng 
and may be read as empowering the dispossessed by affirming legitimate cosmological authority 
that they can claim supersedes Deng's corrupt regime.”93 Geremie Barmé’s In the Red provides a 
penetrating insight into the context underlying this indigenous approach to recent history: 
In China, the events of 1988 and 1989 – natural disasters and economic uncertainties 
followed by a fear of national collapse and mass protests against corruption, and the lack 
of freedoms followed by the ill-managed government suppression of the 1989 protests, 
the equivocal response of the Western democracies, and the fall of Communism in 
Eastern Europe – all served to encourage the nascent Mao cult. As is so often the case 
when people face economic uncertainty and social anomie, old cultural symbols, cults, 
practices, and beliefs are spontaneously revived to provide a framework of cohesion and 
meaning for a threatening world, To many, Mao was representative of an age of certainty 
and confidence, of cultural and political unity, and, above all, of economic equality and 
incorruptibility.94 
 
All of these cases described above are evidence of the “revolutionary nostalgia” approach to the 
posthumous apotheosization of Mao. 
 
 While certain insights can be garnered through this approach, the problem is that it is 
both insufficiently nuanced and somewhat reductionistic. Though it is undeniable that many 
Chinese commentators were indeed using the history/imagery of the Maoist period to critique 
present historical realities (and, as such, indulging in the prototypical form of Chinese 
historiography),95 it nevertheless seems unjustifiable to assume that such critiques were the sole 
(or even primary) motivation for the development of the beliefs and practices described above. In 
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 See Hou, Shades of Mao, 213. See also Liu Xiaobo, Shades of Mao: “Every time Reform suffers a setback, 
whenever social tensions are exacerbated, people from the highest echelons of the Party to the broad masses pay 
homage once more at the altar of Mao Zedong and seek to negate the policies of Deng Xiaoping.... [S]till they 
worship him” (280). 
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 Dorfman, 334. 
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 Barmé (1999), 321. 
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 K. C. Chang’s “Archaeology and Chinese Historiography,” World Archaeology 13:2 (October 1981), Regional 
Traditions of Archaeological Research I, pp. 156-169, provides a good summary of the moralistic paradigm of 
Chinese historiography: “Since history records the rights and wrongs of the past, it provides guidance for future 
behavior. As put by Sima Qian, the great Chinese historian of the late second century BC, ‘Events of the past, if not 
forgotten, are teachings about the future.’ The historian achieves this by appealing to people's (especially the rulers') 
vanity and concern for their own posterity. When Confucius was compiling the Chun Chiu, or Spring-and-Autumn 
Annals, ‘the usurping officials and the seditionists’ are said to have become highly apprehensive, for their misdeeds 
and moral turpitude were sure to be inscribed for posterity” (157). 
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particular, while the utilization of such imagery in a protest, an article or an editorial would have 
been a rhetorically sound strategy, it would have been utterly excessive to participate in the 
worship and adulation directed at Mao (especially after his death) in order to make a political 
statement. Instead, it seems more reasonable to assume that the seemingly religious elements of 
the posthumous Mao cult emerged from resonances between its tenets and practices and those of 
traditional Chinese religious observances, with the notable proviso that these responses were 
often predicated upon the creative interpretation of cultural materials. This contention will be 
explored below. 
 
 Rather than concentrating upon the reductionistic discourse of totalitarian nostalgia, it is 
more compelling to follow the examples of Geremie Barmé and Frederic Wakeman and to 
concentrate upon the process whereby the historical Mao came to be decoupled from his life as a 
political leader, becoming instead an ambiguous referent. As Barmé notes, by the late 1980s, 
“the image of Mao, long since freed from his stifling holy aura and the odium of his destructive 
policies, became a ‘floating sign,’ a vehicle for nostalgic reinterpretation, unstated opposition to 
the status quo, and even satire.”96 Wakeman makes a similar argument concerning the 
ambiguities inherent in the treatment of Mao’s material remains: 
The boundary between person and persona, between thinking and thought, is indistinct. 
The central tomb and the axial rooms awkwardly contain both parts of Mao, so that the 
personal shrine and the public memorial are mutually denatured. Like Chiang Kai-shek’s 
corpse, which is said to be only halfway home to its final resting place, Mao’s body is 
preserved in a kind of limbo, uneasily caught between individual transcendence and 
collective immortality. … Chairman Mao’s remains, in the end, survive, uncomfortably, 
vulnerable to public view.97 
 
In both cases, Mao remains a salient image and a potential source of power and legitimacy. What 
has changed, however, is that the totalizing discourse, which characterized the officially 
endorsed cult of Mao during the Cultural Revolution,98 largely collapsed, leaving the populace 
free to attend to those elements of the deceased Chairman’s character that were personally 
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 Daniel Leese describes the top-down, coercive nature of the Cultural Revolution in “The Mao Cult as 
Communicative Space,” Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions 8:3 (2007), 623-639. In particular, he 
argues that the religious elements that developed at the popular level were, at best, epiphenomenal. I disagree with 
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Further, it also fails to address the continued salience of these popular understandings of Mao, especially after their 
official denunciation by the State. 
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meaningful to them.99 As Lu notes, “Mao has become an integral part of [the] Chinese culture 
and psyche. Whether hated as a despotic leader or loved as a kind of god/saint, his ghost will 
continue to haunt Chinese people. Myths and legends about him will continue to loom large.”100 
In this decontextualized milieu, it is perhaps unsurprising that many Chinese citizens came to 
rely upon the images and conceptual structures of popular religion (as described in chapter two) 
to explain the continued emotional and social cogency of Mao in their society. The factors that 
made such an identification possible will now be explored. 
 
 The first important parallel between the reappropriated Mao and traditional belief 
systems is the centrality of efficacy, as demonstrated in various elements of these 
characterizations. Just as reverence of traditional deities was largely dependent upon their 
perceived ling (magical power) and their seeming willingness to act within this world,101 so too 
was the posthumous cult of Mao centered upon his ability to provide religious goods to those 
who propitiated him. This process can be explicated through the use of a chemical analogy. The 
popular tale of Mao’s protection of the nameless southern taxi-drivers can be seen as a sort of 
catalyst, as it was partially responsible for the crystallization of Mao veneration that followed. 
However, just as in any other chemical reaction, the ingredients for this process were already 
present (in this case, the powerful, mysterious “open signifier” of Mao and the language of 
traditional religious belief); they simply required an additional, external impetus. This impetus 
was amply provided in the popular narrative of Mao’s posthumous efficacy in protecting a 
devotee’s taxi, as this tale creatively reapplied existing cultural materials in a fashion that was 
both compelling and immediately meaningful to its auditors (via the process of narrative accrual). 
   
Further, it is notable that, once Mao was slotted into the category of shen, it was assumed 
that he would miraculously provide other benefits to the “faithful” (including wealth, longevity 
and (male) progeny) – all of which were central concerns of traditional popular religion.102 
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 With this development, Mao became a part of the canon of Chinese culture, after which point he (and the imagery 
surrounding him) became available for future narrative construction (following Bruner’s principle of narrative 
accrual). 
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 See: Chau (2006), chapter two (above). 
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 See: Poo (1998), Chapter 2 (above). This expansion of Mao’s perceived spheres of supernatural influence is of 
significant for its relevance insight it grants into the role of analogies in human (and particularly religious) thought. 
For example, once the Chairman was admitted (however provisionally) into the pantheon, it was naturally assumed 
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Finally, the manner in which Mao (an undeniably powerful but morally ambiguous despot) 
became reinterpreted as a deity also has powerful religious antecedents, as many popular Chinese 
deities (such as Guan Gong, Wenchang and many local Dragon Kings) were similarly ambiguous 
figures that were spiritually “defanged” through popular adulation.103 
 
 Even the descriptions of Mao as an emperor were at least tangentially dependent upon 
traditional religious concepts. As established previously, both the classical (elite)104 and 
popular105 understandings of imperial leadership were contingent upon a religiously mandated 
construal of the cosmos (and the role of human beings within it). In a similar manner, Wang Yi, 
a Chinese scholar represented in Barmé’s Shades of Mao, suggests that “the people tend to view 
divine providence and spiritual power in political terms.”106 Building upon the partial 
identification between the categories of emperor and god (as elaborated in chapter two), I would 
argue that the usage of both images to describe Mao is indicative of the power ascribed to him. 
Just as Arthur C. Clarke noted that “any sufficiently advanced technology will be 
indistinguishable from magic,” so too does the popular Chinese worldview characterize any 
sufficiently powerful form of efficacy as ling. Though it would be foolish to deny the simple 
structural analogy between Mao and his imperial precedents,107 I think that this imagery is only 
compelling because of the Chairman’s seemingly miraculous ability to effect change in the world 
(whether it is described as ling, de or possession of the Mandate of Heaven). 
 
 In this way, even when Chinese believers hearken back to the Maoist past as a form of 
“totalitarian nostalgia,” these reminiscences are often shaped by the redefinition of Mao within 
                                                                                                                                                             
that he would provide the same benefits as other revered extrahuman beings. Not only is this type of analogical 
thinking foundational to human thought in general (as noted in Pinker (1999) and Hofstadter (1985)), it is a 
particularly relevant characteristic of religious belief (as per Boyer (2001)). 
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 This phenomenon is also suggested by the lack of posited ontological distinctions between ghosts, gods and 
ancestors (as noted in Wolf (1974); Harrell (1974); and in Chapter 2 (above)). 
104
 Fitzgerald provides an excellent overview of the religious dimensions of the imperial office. For example, the 
rule of a Chinese monarch “was intimately bound up with the fate of the gods of soil and grain; indeed, the state or 
dynasty is often referred to as 'the gods of soil and grain,' and the ruin of a kingdom described in the formula 'the 
sacrifices were interrupted'” (38). 
105
 As can been seen in the hierarchical organization of the popular Chinese pantheon, governed, as it is, by the Jade 
Emperor. 
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 Xin, quoted in Shades of Mao, 196. 
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 This simplistic syllogism could most easily be phrased as follows:  
- The emperors ruled China.  
- Mao ruled China  
    Mao is an emperor. 
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traditional paradigms. Many of the themes and parallels discussed above can be seen in 
Dorfman’s ethnographic description of a peasant village’s response to Mao in the early 1990s: 
[Mao] is remade in the nongmin [peasant] image, his power translated into an alternative, 
localized language. He transcends the bounds of the official – moral or immoral – to 
inhabit the cosmic realm, but only because he can be identified with poor nongmin. Mao 
is situated in the most distant, loft realm from which power is imposed on mere nongmin 
mortals and brought into the villages as the most prosaic model for the moral masses’ 
transformation. Nongmin remade themselves in Mao’s image as revolutionary heroes and 
remade Mao in their image as a turtle [spirit]. The multivalency and ambivalence that is 
embodied in Mao is exemplified by Du’s memory of his maternal grandfather, a powerful 
healer who equated his powers with Mao’s. “The old man pointed to Mao’s portrait and 
said, ‘When I go, you go; we’re equal,’ and a few months after the old man died, Mao 
died. Mao was a shen [spirit],” said Du. Liu Ge’s belief that the nation’s leaders are 
masters of magical powers conveys a similar message that might be termed a projected 
articulation; people are saying not only that their beliefs are held by officials but that the 
latter’s power and authority in politics extends to the spiritual realm as well. … Mao’s 
power emanated, not from Mao himself, from his armies, or from his control of the press 
alone, but from diverse, complexly intersecting social relations. Mao must become a 
turtle to command the people of Wulin. They make him a turtle and thus their ruler. Deng 
is opposed by the spirits; as a mere mortal he will never command the total submission of 
nongmin, who will not produce his power.108 
 
In this way, Dorfman’s research highlights the complex interplay between traditional cultural 
patterns (such as cosmological theories and conceptions of the relationship between political and 
spiritual power) and the realities of life in modern China (such as peasant disenfranchisement in 
the post-Maoist period).109 
 
While the functional and developmental parallels between the posthumous Mao cult and 
traditional religious beliefs are instructive, they leave a central question unanswered: from 
whence did the public estimation of the deceased Chairman’s magical efficacy arise? I would 
suggest that, over and above his obvious political power, one of the primary means whereby 
Mao’s charisma was extended throughout the country was through ritual practice, which can 
function to inculcate non-discursive (yet socially functional) beliefs and attitudes. To explore 
these contentions, we must now turn our attention to ritual (in general) and Maoist practice (in 
particular). 
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Chapter 4: Ritual and Efficacy – Theoretical Perspectives and Their 
Application to the Mao Phenomenon 
 
 
As the previous chapters have demonstrated, classical Chinese cosmology (to the extent 
that it can be described as a discrete viewpoint) was characterized by its multivalency and 
porosity, blurring the distinctions between numerous (Western) analytical categories, such as as 
elite/popular, Daoist/Buddhist/Confucian/folk, and even secular/sacred. In particular, the human 
and extrahuman realms, rather than existing as two entirely disparate spheres, are often described 
(metaphorically or otherwise) as a single, mutually-interpenetrating totality, with ghosts, gods 
and ancestors sharing food, space and even organizational structures with the living. This 
“collapsed” cosmology is nowhere more apparent than in the case of those beings thought to 
possess magical efficacy (ling 靈 and/or de 德), as evidenced by the perceived power of 
extrahuman beings to influence the health, prosperity and happiness of the living, and the parallel 
power of emperors, officials, and religious professionals to consult, govern, and even punish the 
denizens of the invisible world. This multivalency was perhaps most pronounced in the particular 
case of the emperor, as he was not only seen as a metonym for the human social order and the 
natural order of the cosmos (Dao 道), but was also considered to be an intermediary between the 
human and extrahuman realms (in his role as the Son of Heaven (Tianzi 天子)). Further, once 
these connections are established, it becomes clear that the popular use of the language of gods 
and emperors in describing Chairman Mao is not only consistent with traditional Chinese usages, 
but is also a meaningful construal of the relationship(s) between charisma, efficacy, popular 
adulation, and political reality. 
 
 With all of this said, these (provisional) conclusions leave a number of central problems 
unaddressed. In particular, one is confronted by the question of why these beliefs are/were 
compelling, and what effect(s) they had (and continue to have) upon the lives of those holding 
them. Given that the answers to these questions are central to the present enterprise, we will now 
turn our attention to them.  
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To this end, the current chapter focuses on ritual, as I contend that ritual action provides a 
key to understanding the means by which both the religious goods and the 
metaphorical/cosmological relationships described in the previous chapter are created, reinforced 
and reified – a point that will be made with reference to both Chinese materials and modern 
theoretical perspectives.1 These conclusions will then be explicitly applied to the Mao-era 
materials, where the general features of Chinese ritual described below will be considered in 
light of their analogues within the cult of Mao. 
 
 
On Ritual: Introductory Materials 
 Unlike the Western intellectual world, where the analysis of ritual was relatively slow to 
develop (due, in large part, to the philosophical focus on the search for ontological truths over 
practical social realities),2 Chinese thought has, over many millennia, developed and honed 
complex and multifarious understandings of the nature and function of ritual in human society. 
Below I provide a brief overview of these understandings, with the aim of sketching out the 
continuum of Chinese ritual thought and practice. This exposition draws upon both theoretical 
materials, such as the writings of Confucius, Xunzi, and later Confucian thinkers,3 and practical 
accounts, as described in various popular ritual manuals and in the observations of modern-day 
ethnographers (including Adam Chau, P. Steven Sangren, and Richard Madsen). While some 
may discount the validity of bringing together these diachronically diverse materials, it is my 
considered opinion (following Paper and others) that cultural and social phenomena recurring in 
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 It should be noted that ritual remains a contentious topic in modern humanities and social science research, to the 
extent that various issues surrounding it (including definitions, perceived functions, and relationship(s) with 
ideology) remain hotly debated. While the following exposition will explore some of these understandings, it will 
necessarily remain but a partial overview due to the limitations of space. This being said, I am profoundly intrigued 
by the intersection(s) between Western theoretical approaches to ritual, classical and modern Chinese perspectives, 
and the lived practice of modern Chinese people, meaning that I will undoubtedly use the present chapter as a 
foundation for future research into these related topics. 
2
 In particular, this search for philosophical truth, which typically took place in the abstracted world of cosmology 
and metaphysics, and only gradually evolved into a search for empirical truths about the natural world, was 
relatively slow to apply these scientific methods to the study of human minds and human societies. As a result, the 
Western understanding of ritual was comparatively slow to develop, with many scholars characterizing ritual as 
empty formalism or archaic survival into the mid-twentieth century. It has only been in the last sixty years that the 
unique role of ritual in the formation of human psyches and social orders has begun to be addressed (Bell, 1-92). See 
below for an overview of this performative, constitutive approach to ritual studies. 
3
 It should be noted that all of the above thinkers and texts are generally grouped into the Confucian school. While 
this could be read as reflecting my own (admitted) bias towards Confucianism, it is more motivated by the fact that 
this school of thought was profoundly concerned with the role of ritual in the proper functioning of society – a 
position that makes them tremendously relevant to the current study. 
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one region throughout history can, barring evidence to the contrary, be assumed to exist as part 
of an unbroken, though undoubtedly evolving, continuum.4 It is under this assumption that I 
proceed.  
 
 As an additional methodological point, it should be noted that the following exploration 
makes use of a distinction between the understandings of ritual common in various strata of 
Chinese society (e.g., elite, popular, philosophical). While such distinctions are useful as a 
general organizational principle, it must be acknowledged that they bear (at best) a loose 
correspondence to the lived realities of historical Chinese people. In particular, these boundaries 
were porously defined at best, with elite levels of discourse diffused throughout society in both 
overt5 and subliminal6 manners, and with popular practice exerting considerable influence on the 
development of elite theories.7  As such, these differentiations must be seen as a form of 
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 It should be noted that neither I nor Paper would argue that the vicissitudes of Chinese history were unimportant or 
insignificant, but rather that the cultures of each historical period were gradually normalized by their shared 
practices, their relatively unchanging bureaucratic hierarchies, and their cultural valorization of continuity over 
change (as described in Ames, xii-xiii; James L. Watson, “The Structure of Chinese Funerary Rites: Elementary 
Forms, Ritual Sequence, and the Primacy of Performance” in Death Ritual in Late Imperial and Modern China, 
edited by James L. Watson and Evelyn S. Rawski, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988), 3-19). 
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Chinese religious practices are of considerable antiquity (as noted in Paper (1995), Poo (1998), Watson (1988)). The 
argument for acknowledging the continued importance of the Chinese historical context is also made in the first 
chapter of the present study. 
5
 One recurrent example of an overt attempt to influence the popular application of ritual can be seen in the ritual 
manuals published by reigning dynasties – tomes that outlined the correct means of conducting interpersonal affairs, 
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underlings were merely a question of degree (as an example from the Rites of the Great Ching demonstrates): 
“Various ceremonial and canonical works have been examined and combined, and thus compiled to make the Guest 
Ritual. Then the ceremonial usages for visits among the multitude of officials, the gentry, and the common people 
were appended afterward, each according to its correct category.” James L. Hevia, “Imperial Guest Ritual” in 
Religions of China in Practice, edited by Donald S. Lopez, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 471-
487, 476 and passim (emphasis added). However, the adoption of these systems (in an admittedly piecemeal 
fashion) was not simply motivated by the (pseudo-) mythological prestige accorded to the office of the emperor 
(described at length in chapter three), but also by the desire for this-worldly success, as many of those who wished 
to advance in the imperial bureaucracy studied and followed those ritual prescriptions assiduously. These manuals 
(and their role in literati society) are also discussed in the introduction to Ebrey’s translation of Zhu Xi’s Family 
Rituals, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), (xxi, xxvii-xxix). 
6
 The five phases/yin-yang cosmology (which was largely conflated with Daoism by the end of the Warring States 
Period) (see: Benjamin Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China, (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1985), 
350-382) provides the most pervasive instance of this process, whereby theories and practices traditionally 
associated with a particular tradition gradually came to percolate through fields as varied as aesthetics, cuisine and 
martial arts. 
7
 See, for example, the allowances made for popular practice in the ritual manuals prepared by Neo-Confucians, 
where, in many cases, all practices were deemed acceptable save those with an explicitly Buddhist provenance. 
Patricia Ebrey, “The Liturgies for Sacrifices to Ancestors in Successive Versions of the Family Rituals” in Ritual 
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academic shorthand – helpful for increasing clarity but representing an idealized picture of the 
relationship between various instantiated understandings. Further, such an approach tends to 
downplay the commonalities between the various spheres of discourse under discussion, which is 
contrary to the focus of the present study, given my attempt to outline broad, ubiquitous patterns 
in Chinese culture in general rather than becoming bogged down in minute details. 
 
 Finally, it should be noted that the present study’s approach to ritual is mandated by my 
attempt to avoid creating an “Orientalizing” discourse in my description of modern Chinese 
thought and practice (a concern addressed in the introduction to this work). One major issue with 
much ritual scholarship – especially in the writings of Western academics – is a tendency to 
approach the materials in a reductionistic (and even implicitly paternalistic) manner, often by 
assuming that rituals are simply coercive tools mandated by elites to control a credulous 
populace.8 James Laidlaw provides a cogent summary of this perspective:  
It can only apply if participants themselves do not subscribe to the theory. That is, ritual 
by [their] own account can only perform its function behind the backs of celebrants, 
whose own attention is gripped by ‘erroneous belief’ and faith in magical efficacy. No 
one could be committed to ritual performance in the required sense, and nor could 
participation in ritual have the required psychological impact, if it were regarded as mere 
mumbo-jumbo that happened to have beneficial side-effects.9 
 
Though he does not explicitly argue for the universal applicability of his conclusions, he goes on 
to argue that this understanding of ritual is certainly an inaccurate representation of its role in 
Chinese life: 
Scholar-officials who took up and elaborated theories such as Xunzi’s were not 
commenting on the benign effects that certain illusory and superstitious notions had on 
other people. They were reflecting on activities central to their own way of life. This was 
the scholarly elite of the empire describing what Janousch here calls ‘its most hallowed 
occupation.’ The theme of ritual as promoting social harmony was repeatedly emphasized 
                                                                                                                                                             
and Scripture in Chinese Popular Religion: Five Studies, edited by David Johnson, (Berkeley, CA: Chinese Popular 
Culture Project, 1995), 104-136. See, in particular, 121-126. 
8
 Such a perspective is presented in P. Steven Sangren’s “Orthodoxy, Heterodoxy, and the Structure of Value in 
Chinese Rituals,” Modern China, 13:1 (January 1987), 63-89, which argues that popular Chinese “epistemologies 
and the institutions in which they are embodied and reproduced depend on suppressing consciousness of their own 
genesis in social reproduction. This suppression is not consciously motivated, but is rather a necessary condition for 
the process of social reproduction itself” (63-64, emphasis added). This quotation, which eloquently summarizes the 
paternalistic discourse railed against by Laidlaw (as quoted above), was not chosen as a particular critique of 
Sangren, but rather as a representative sample of this approach to the study of ritual. 
9
 James Laidlaw, “On theatre and theory: reflections on ritual in imperial Chinese politics” in State and Court Ritual 
in China, edited by Jospeh P. McDermott, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 399-417, 412-413. 
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by officials with great personal commitment to ritual exactitude, and was at times 
accompanied by intense concern with as near as possible reconstruction of ancient – and 
therefore, they believed, authentic – ritual practice.10 
 
Thus, instead of adopting the type of reductionistic discourse Laidlaw cautions against, the 
following analysis makes use of a hermeneutic of generosity, which proceeds under the 
assumption that Chinese ritual participants were and are both creative and critical in their 
approach to the various ritual practices that are woven into the fabric of their society.11 Rather 
than assuming that they are simply uneducated or foolish, it is far more reasonable (and more 
compatible with indigenous theories and ethnographic evidence) to suggest that these practices 
are consciously utilized by the members of Chinese society who largely acknowledge their 
valuable social functions – a contention that will be explored in detail below.  
 
Ritual in Chinese Society – Practical and Theoretical Concerns 
The central role of ritual in Chinese society – elite and popular, past and present – is well-
established in contemporary scholarship, as supported by considerable evidence from both 
Western and indigenous sources. While many of these ritual practices (including divination, the 
propitiation of gods and the veneration of ancestors) have analogues in other cultures, a defining 
feature of Chinese ritualism is its multimodal character. This fact is evidenced in the etymology 
of the term itself, as li 禮 (the classical term for ritual) describes not only the overtly “religious” 
practices listed above, but also etiquette and social propriety. Indeed, the multifarious nature of li 
(in its indigenous context) is elegantly explored by Ames and Rosemont, in their introduction to 
the Analects: 
Li are those meaning-invested roles, relationships, and institutions which facilitate 
communication, and which foster a sense of community. The compass is broad: all 
formal conduct, from table manners to patterns of greeting and leave-taking, to 
graduations, weddings and funerals, from gestures of deference to ancestral sacrifices – 
                                                 
10
 Ibid., 414. 
11
 This assumption is made in light of a considerable body of modern scholarship on Chinese ritual, which 
emphasizes the role of popular custom and individual imagination in the (re)interpretation and transformation of 
ritual practice. For some examples, see Ellen Oxfeld’s “‘When You Drink Water, Think of Its Source’: Morality, 
Status, and Reinvention in Rural Chinese Funerals,” The Journal of Asian Studies 63:4 (November 2004), 961-990; 
Donald S. Sutton’s “Consuming Counterrevolution: The Ritual and Culture of Cannibalism in Wuxuan, Guangxi, 
China, May to July 1968,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 37:1 (January 1995), 136-175; Joseph P. 
McDermott’s “Emperor, élites, and commoners: the community pact ritual of the late Ming” in State and Court 
Ritual in China, edited by Jospeh P. McDermott, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 299-351. 
Examples from these studies will be drawn upon below. 
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all of these, and more, are li. They are a social grammar that provides each member with 
a defined place and status within the family, community, and polity. Li are life forms 
transmitted from generation to generation as repositories of meaning, enabling the youth 
to appropriate persisting values and to make them appropriate to their own situations.12 
 
As can be seen, the classical understanding of ritual – much like the Chinese cosmology 
described in the previous chapters – can also be characterized by its porosity, in this case due to 
the multiple modes within which ritualized behaviours were thought to be appropriate or 
desirable. 
 
Indigenous Approaches to Ritual 
 Though many schools of thought in Chinese history put forward positions on the topic, 
ritual (in the expanded sense described above by Ames and Rosemont) occupied the most central 
place in the theoretical and practical treatises of the Confucian school. This focus can be traced 
back at least as far as The Analects, within which the body of li served as a primary (if somewhat 
incipiently defined) means of regulating human behavior. Indeed, the text explicitly ties 
achievement of highest moral excellence (ren 仁) with the correct application of patterns of 
behaviour inculcated through ritual practice: 
Yan Hui said, “Could I ask what becoming authoritative [ren 仁] entails?” The Master 
replied, “Do not look at anything that violates the observance of ritual propriety; do not 
listen to anything that violates the observance of ritual propriety; do not speak about 
anything that violates the observance of ritual propriety; do not do anything that violates 
the observance of ritual propriety.”13 
 
                                                 
12
 Ames and Rosemont, 51. This perspective on ritual is also put forth in Herbert Fingarette’s Confucius: The 
Secular as Sacred, (New York: Harper and Row, 1972): “Characteristic of Confucius’s teaching is the use of the 
language and imagery of li as a medium within which to talk about the entire body of mores, or more precisely, of 
the authentic tradition and reasonable conventions of society…. Men become truly human as their raw impulse is 
shaped by li. And li is the fulfillment of human impulse, the civilized expression of it – not a formalistic 
dehumanization. Li is the specifically humanizing form of the dynamic relation of man-to-man” (6-7). For a more 
extreme description of the role of ritual and practice in Chinese society, see Chad Hansen’s A Daoist Theory of 
Chinese Thought, (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), which is entirely predicated upon a vision of 
early Chinese thought as praxical (as opposed to creedal or doctrinal). 
13
 Analects 12:1 (Ames and Rosemont’s translation). A similar point is also made in Analects 8:2, wherein 
Confucius argues that the rules (and practices) of li form a necessary corrective to various potentially problematic 
personality traits and social habits: “The Master said, ‘Deference unmediated by observing ritual propriety (li) is 
lethargy; caution unmediated by observing ritual propriety is timidity; boldness unmediated by observing ritual 
propriety is rowdiness; candor unmediated by observing ritual propriety is rudeness. Where exemplary people 
(junzi) are earnestly committed to their parents, the people will aspire to authoritative conduct (ren); where they do 
not neglect their old friends, the people will not be indifferent to each other.’” 
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In addition to this “social scientific” understanding of the role of ritual in interpersonal relations 
and moral cultivation (an angle that was more fully elaborated by Xunzi), the Analects also 
portray Confucius arguing for the osmotic efficacy of the rites in ordering human life, at least 
when executed by those in a position of power/authority: “Lead them with excellence [de] and 
keep them orderly through observing ritual propriety and they will develop a sense of shame, and 
moreover, will order themselves.”14 The same point is made more forcefully in Analects 9:14: 
The Master wanted to go and live amongst the nine clans of the Eastern Yi Barbarians. 
Someone said to him, “What would you do about their crudeness?” 
The Master replied, “Were an exemplary person (junzi) [i.e., an individual whose conduct 
had been disciplined by the rules of li] to live among them, what crudeness could there 
be?”15 
 
As can be seen, the Analects clearly assumed a framework within which ritual served to temper 
human behaviour. However, even after the elucidation of this general premise, it was not until 
the time of Xunzi that a precise theory was formulated concerning the means through which this 
transformational process occurred. 
 
In particular, Xunzi, a third-century BCE Confucian whose dense scholarly writings were 
influenced by his polymathic understanding of the current social and philosophical climates, 
considered ritual to be the key to orderly interpersonal relationships and (more broadly) to social 
stability. In his view, these rites provided those willing to learn them with universally applicable 
standards of behaviour: 
If the plumb line is properly stretched, then there can be no doubt about crooked and 
straight; if the scales are properly hung, there can be no doubt about heavy and light; … 
and if the gentleman is well versed in ritual, then he cannot be fooled by deceit and 
artifice. The line is the acme of straightness, the scale is the acme of fairness, … and rites 
are the highest achievement of the Way (dao) of man. Therefore, those who do not follow 
and find satisfaction in rites may be called people without direction, but those who do 
follow and find satisfaction in them are called men of direction.16 
 
                                                 
14
 Analects 2:3. See also Analects 14:41: “The Master said, ‘If those in high station cherish the observance of ritual 
propriety (li), the common people will be easy to deal with.’” As seen in Chapter Three, this traditional ascription of 
osmotic moral efficacy to political leaders was evidenced in the popular response to Mao. 
15
 Analects 9:14. The extrahuman potency that is ascribed to li in the Analects is acknowledged by Frederick W. 
Mote in his forward to Tu Wei-ming’s Way, Learning and Politics: “The other-than-human sanctions for and 
sponsorship of the civilization’s ethical norms and ritual practices seems to imply the existence of a guiding force 
somewhere beyond the realm of self-contained organismic process” (xvii). This claim is granted additional force by 
the fact that Mote is, by-and-large, a critic of the hypothesis that Confucianism possesses a “religious” dimension. 
16
 Xunzi 19 (Watson (1967) 95). 
 82 
Given that, in his view, individuals are both ruled by their passions17 and determined by their 
environments,18 Xunzi considers these ritual strictures to be an essential component of moral 
development, as they provide the practical training necessary to transcend these physical and 
environmental limitations: 
Now it is the nature of man that when he is hungry, he will desire satisfaction, when he is 
cold he will desire warmth, and when he is weary he will desire rest. This is his 
emotional nature. And yet a man, although he is hungry, will not dare to be the first to eat 
in the presence of his elders, because he knows that he should yield to them, and although 
he is weary, he will not dare to demand rest because he knows he should relieve others of 
the burden of labour. For a son to yield to his father or a younger brother yield to his 
elder brother – acts such as these are all contrary to man’s nature and run counter to his 
emotions. And yet they represent the way of filial piety and the proper forms enjoined by 
ritual principles. Hence, if men follow their emotional nature, there will be no courtesy or 
humility; courtesy and humility in fact run counter to man’s emotional nature.19  
 
Though his theory lacks the terminology of “performativity”, “canonical language” and 
“hegemonic discourse communities” that characterize the modern academic study of ritual (as 
outlined below), Xunzi’s theories are remarkable for the degree to which they are echoed in 
modern scholarship20 – an especially notable fact given that he was exploring li from an emic, 
participatory perspective. 
                                                 
17
 “Man is born with desires. If his desires are not satisfied for him, he cannot but seek some means to satisfy them 
himself. If there are no limits and degrees to his seeking, then he will inevitably fall to wrangling with other men. 
From wrangling comes disorder and from disorder comes exhaustion. The ancient kings hated such disorder, and 
therefore they established ritual principles in order to curb it, to train men’s desires and to provide for their 
satisfaction.” Xunzi 19 (Watson (1967) 89). 
18
 “In the same way a man, no matter how fine his nature or how keen his mind, must seek a worthy teacher to study 
under and good companions to associate with…. Then, although he is not aware of it, he will day by day progress in 
the practice of benevolence and righteousness, for the environment he is subjected to will cause him to progress. But 
if a man associates with men who are not good, then he will hear only deceit and lies and will see only conduct that 
is marked by wantonness, evil, and greed. Then, although he is not aware of it, he himself will soon be in danger of 
severe punishment, for the environment he is subject to will cause him to be in danger. An old text says, ‘If you do 
not know a man, look at his friends; if you do not know a ruler, look at his attendants.’ Environment is the important 
thing! Environment is the important thing!” Xunzi 23 (Watson (1967) 170-171). 
19
 Xunzi 23 (Watson (1967) 159-160). 
20
 The above statement should not be read as an assertion that Xunzi denied the extrahuman dimension of Confucian 
ritualism, only that his views of its transformative capacity are commensurate with the perspectives of many 
Western scholars. Benjamin Schwartz provides the following summary of Xunzi’s religious leanings: “We have 
already noted that the ‘objective’ order of society embodied in li and law is also on some level embedded in the 
order of Heaven and that in fashioning the human order the sages do not freely invent but actually make manifest a 
universal pattern somehow already rooted in the ultimate nature of things. Xunzi’s sage most definitely does not, 
like Nietzsche’s superman, freely ‘create values’” (316).  
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By the Neo-Confucian era, the centrality of ritual was downgraded (at least in theoretical 
texts) in favour of a syncretistic emphasis on metaphysical and cosmological speculation.21 This 
being said, these theoretical developments were not achieved at the expense of the practical 
Confucian focus on ritualism, as attested to by the ever-developing state cult of Confucius22 and 
the imperial promotion (and eventual standardization) of a (predominantly Confucian) ritual 
system throughout all strata of Chinese society.23 
 
 These rituals were an essential element of Chinese society and its religious discourse, as 
they provided a humanistic (or “anthropocosmic” 24) body of techniques that were thought to 
                                                 
21
 See John H. Berthrong, Transformations of the Confucian Way, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), 86-114, 
for an overview of this shift in emphasis. However, it should be noted that this change of focus did not result in the 
marginalization of ritual, a point that is persuasively argued in Kai-wing Chow’s “Ritual, Cosmology, and Ontology: 
Chang Tsai's Moral Philosophy and Neo-Confucian Ethics” Philosophy East and West, 43: 2 (April 1993), 201-228, 
wherein the author suggests that Chang Tsai (Zhang Zai), a philosopher primarily known in the west for his 
metaphysical theories, could equally be characterized by his “strong emphasis on moral education through ritual 
practice” (202). 
22
 As described in John K Shryock’s The Origin and Development of the State Cult of Confucius, (New York: 
Paragon Book Reprint Corp., 1966). For modern perspective that brings in some additional interpretive issues, see 
Thomas A. Wilson, “Ritualizing Confucius/Kongzi: The Family and State Cults of the Sage of Culture in Imperial 
China” in On Sacred Grounds: Culture, Society, Politics, and the Formation of the Cult of Confucius, edited by 
Thomas A. Wilson, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2002), 43-94. 
23
 This “ritual standardization hypothesis” is developed and cogently argued in Watson’s “The Structure of Chinese 
Funerary Rites: Elementary Forms, Ritual Sequence, and the Primacy of Performance”: “If anything is central to the 
creation and maintenance of a unified Chinese culture, it is the standardization of ritual. To be Chinese is to 
understand, and accept the view, that there is a correct way to perform rites associated with the life-cycle, the most 
important being weddings and funerals. By following accepted ritual routines ordinary citizens participated in the 
process of cultural unification” (3). More pertinent to the Confucian tradition is Evelyn S. Rawski’s suggestion that 
“[i]n the eleventh and twelfth centuries a newly vigorous Confucian officialdom began to look closely at and to 
correct popular mores through reform of marriage and mourning customs. The impact of the Neo-Confucian concern 
with social transformation of commoners and not merely the ruling elite was heightened by the many fundamental 
changes occurring in Sung society. The development of printing, for example, enabled wide dissemination of books, 
and Confucians were quick to seize on this medium to spread their ideas: indeed, a central impulse promoting the 
advance of printing was the urge to standardize Confucian texts.” “A Historian’s Approach to Chinese Death Ritual” 
in Death Ritual in Late Imperial and Modern China, edited by James L. Watson and Evelyn S. Rawski, (Berkeley, 
CA: University of California Press, 1988), 20-34, 30-31. One of the texts that achieved considerable influence 
through this newfound form of dissemination was Zhuxi’s Family Rituals, as discussed in Ebrey (1991) and Ebrey 
(1995). 
Though some scholars have raised questions concerning the universal applicability of this hypothesis (as argued by 
Paul R. Katz (see ff. 27 on the following page)), it nevertheless serves as strong testament to the centrality (if not 
universality) of Confucian ritualism in the Chinese consciousness. 
24
 Tu Weiming coins the evocative term “anthropocosmic” to describe the transcendental referent inherent in 
Confucian humanism, suggesting that “to Confucius, what had already been created, notably the “ritual and music” 
of the human community, was not merely of humans, [but] was also sanctioned and sponsored by the mandate of 
Heaven. … This awareness, predicated on a deep-rooted faith in the continuation of human culture not only as an 
historical fact but also as the unfolding of a transcendent reality, enabled Confucius to cultivate a sense of mission” 
(2). This conception extends to Confucianism the same type of ontologically- and cosmologically-porous worldview 
(with respect to the human and extra-human realms) described at length in chapter two. 
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facilitate the achievement of social harmony on both the microcosmic and macrocosmic levels.25 
These related aims – namely, the orderly regulation of individual families and the proper 
governance of the state – were seen as a broad class of practical problems that centered on 
aligning human nature with an overarching standard of behavior (the oft-discussed Dao 道). 
Though different schools of thought debated the correct means of achieving this end,26 ritual 
consistently stood out as an efficacious solution to the problem of ensuring social cohesion. 
 
This being said, the idea of “ritual as corrective” was not restricted to the debates of 
intellectual elites, but was instead prevalent throughout Chinese culture.27 One reason for this 
was the role of shame and status in traditional China, as these two factors defined a framework 
within which one’s social status was directly tied to one’s perceived successes or failures in the 
                                                 
25
 See, for example, D. W. Y. Kwok, “On the Rites and Rights of Being Human” in Confucianism and Human 
Rights, edited by Wm. Theodore de Bary and Tu Weiming, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 83-93; 
Randall Peerenboom, “Confucian Harmony and Freedom of Thought: Right to Think versus Right Thinking” in 
Confucianism and Human Rights, edited by Wm. Theodore de Bary and Tu Weiming, (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1998), 234-260. In both of these articles, the respective authors outline the historical role of rites in 
ensuring an orderly society, and then speculate upon the impact that this cultural inheritance will have on the human 
rights debate in China. 
26
 In particular, the early philosophical schools (e.g., Daoism, Confucianism, Moism) did not dispute whether such 
standards existed (as this was a universally accepted dictum), but rather the locus from which they could most 
appropriately be derived. For example, a major point of disjunction between early Confucians and Daoists is that the 
former group argued that (Chinese) culture provided these standards, while the latter ascribed this authoritative role 
to the natural world. A. C. Graham’s landmark Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China 
provides an extensive exploration of this search for standards of behavior in the early history of Chinese philosophy. 
In particular, he argues that the philosophical program of early Chinese intellectuals “is a response to the breakdown 
of the moral and political order which had claimed the authority of Heaven; and the crucial question for all of them 
is not the Western philosopher’s ‘What is the truth?’ but ‘Where is the Way?’, the way to order the state and conduct 
personal life. From the viewpoint of the rulers who listen at least to the more practical of them, they are men with 
new answers to the problem of how to run a state in these changing time; and this problem is indeed central to all of 
them, whether they have practical answers (the Legalists), or ponder the moral basis of social order and its relation 
to the ruling power of Heaven (Confucians, Mohists), or as defenders of private life think the proper business of the 
state is to leave everyone alone (Chuang-tzu)” (3).  
27
 Whether or not these rituals were effectively standardized by the later Imperial period (as argued by James 
Watson), it is an uncontested fact that such practices were ubiquitous throughout all strata of Chinese society during 
various historical periods. As a characteristic example of these assumptions in practice, we can turn to Paul R. 
Katz’s article “Orthopraxy and Heteropraxy Beyond the State,” which problematizes Watson’s notion of an elite-
mandated process of ritual standardization in the late imperial period, but never once questions the centrality of 
ritual systems themselves. Modern China 33:1 (2007), 72-90. The ubiquity of ritual, as described in chapter one and 
the present chapter, is thought by many Western scholars to be related (in part) to collectivistic orientation of 
Chinese society. Given the manner in which social realties are generated and reified by rituals (as discussed below), 
it follows that societies with an increased emphasis on social cohesion, hierarchy and harmony will be more likely to 
contain well-established ritual systems. See Tambiah, 72-73; Liu (2003); Vliert, Shi, et al. (2004); Douglas (1982) 
for some theoretical perspectives on this issue. 
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fulfillment of social (read: ritual) obligations.28 Within this framework, rituals provided a 
structured, efficacious means of demonstrating an understanding of one’s roles and 
responsibilities,29 regardless of whether one was a peasant farmer giving obeisance to a parent or 
an imperial bureaucrat respectfully critiquing the actions of the emperor. In this way, ritual was 
woven into the warp and woof of Chinese society, as its processes helped to define and reify an 
idealized, harmonious social order. 
 
Intriguingly, the social prominence of ritual also provides eloquent testimony to the 
hypothesized rapprochement between the mortal and extrahuman realms in Chinese society 
(described at length in chapter two). Specifically, just as the fulfillment of ritualized 
responsibilities could be used to indicate comprehension of an individual’s social role (with 
regards to others), so too could it demonstrate (or, perhaps more fittingly, “enact”) the perceived 
interpenetration of the human world and the extrahuman realm of ghosts, gods, and ancestors. 
Indeed, participation in many of these rituals (which included practices as varied as ancestor 
veneration,30 divinatory rituals,31 and sacrifices to wandering ghosts32) was predicated upon the 
                                                 
28
 As described by Kwok, “an ‘individual,’ then, from birth heads into a network of clan and kin relations guided by 
the spirit of interpersonal and interhuman regard (ren). … Although under such Confucian exhortations as ‘cultivate 
the self’ (xiushen) and ‘restrain the self to restore the rites’ (keji fuli), there is an awareness of the ‘self’; this self-
awareness is occasioned by the need to ‘behave as a human being’ (zuoren), which in turn means to fulfill the five 
Confucian cardinal relationships: parent and child, ruler and minister, husband and wife, elder and younger, and 
friend and friend. … The only way to be a ‘good person’ (haoren) is within this network of behavioral rites” (85). 
Though this article examines the issue of rites from a predominantly Confucian perspective, it approaches them 
using the framework of “attenuated Confucianism” (namely, the well-documented assertion that certain core 
Confucian precepts were so common as to be considered universal values in Chinese society).  
While this depiction of social roles and responsibilities is certainly appropriate in the Chinese context, Edmund 
Leach suggests that it is, in fact, central to all human relationships: “All person-to-person relationships entail 
reciprocity. Individual ‘A’, by virtue of his position in society, has rights and duties vis-à-vis individual ‘B’. But 
individual ‘B’ in turn, by virtue of his position, has complimentary rights and duties vis-à-vis individual ‘A’. The 
reciprocal/complimentary behaviours of the two individuals ‘A’ and ‘B’, in their interactions with one another, may 
be said to symbolize or express the relationship between them. … As far as the actors themselves are concerned their 
mutual relationship is their mutually interactive behaviour” (150, emphasis original). Edmund Leach, Social 
Anthropology, (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982). Throughout the remainder of the chapter from 
whence the previous quotation was drawn, Leach argues that one’s status as a member of these dyadic relationships 
is largely determined by one’s proper fulfilling of contextually-defined social responsibilities. In particular, Leach’s 
perspective on reciprocity in social situations, when interpreted in light of Kwok’s contention that ritual helps define 
the bounds of interactive behaviours, demonstrates one means through which ritualized action functions in human 
society. This possiblity will be considered in more detail in the discussion of modern academic theories of ritual to 
follow. 
29
 This communicative aspect of ritual is discussed extensively in Bell (73), drawing upon the theories of 
philosophers, linguists and anthropologists alike.  
30
 The earliest origins of these beliefs are discussed in Paper, 47-50; Poo, 36, 67. Later understandings are explored 
in Zhu Xi’s Family Rituals, Ebrey (1995), and H. G. H. Nelson’s “Ancestor Worship and Burial Practices,” in 
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view that the extrahuman and human realms were conterminous and mutually interpenetrating. 
One of the most pertinent examples of this perceived synchrony can be seen in the ritual of 
“looking in,” which is detailed in Zhu Xi’s Family Rituals33 and described at length in an article 
by Patricia Ebrey. In this rite, the celebrant (usually the eldest male of a household) would visit 
the ancestral tablets on a daily basis, bowing respectfully and informing them about the 
happenings in the household during the last twenty-four hours, thus reinforcing belief in the 
continued presence of the extrahuman ancestors in the social hierarchy of the family.34 More 
                                                                                                                                                             
Religion and Ritual in Chinese Society, edited by Arthur Wolf, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1974), 
251-277. 
31
 See: Poo, 41-68. See also: Richard J. Smith, “Divination in Ch’ing Dynasty China,” in Cosmology, Ontology, and 
Human Efficacy: Essays in Chinese Thought, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1993), 141-178. “Virtually 
everyone in traditional China believed in divination. The problem was not whether to believe in it, but whom to 
believe. In the words of a popular proverb: ‘Do not say that King Wen’s hexagrams are ineffective [buling]; fear 
only that the fortune-teller’s reading is untrue [buzhen].’” (143). 
32
 These apotropaic rituals have been particularly common throughout Chinese history, with examples being found 
in Zhou dynasty literature (von Glahn, 31-33), popular ritual manuals from the Han Dynasty (Poo, 69-98), and later 
Buddhist practices (as described in Charles Orzech’s translation of “The Buddha’s Discourse on the Scripture of the 
Spell for Saving the Burning-Mouth Hungry Ghost,” in Religions of China in Practice, edited by Donald S. Lopez, 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 278-283. 
33
 While Zhu Xi is, without a doubt, firmly entrenched in the Neo-Confucian tradition, it should be noted that this 
particular text (the Family Rituals) existed as a sort of fusion between classical Confucian ritual manuals, Neo-
Confucian standards of scholarship, and conscious, syncretic adoption of popular practices (with the notable 
exception of any rites with an explicitly Buddhist provenance). This breadth of focus (with its emphasis on lived 
ritual practice) has guaranteed the continued applicability of the work, such that it has remained consistently in print 
since its composition in the twelfth century. In spite of its Neo-Confucian heritage, the text’s hermeneutic focus on 
reconceptualizing popular practice (albeit within a Confucian framework) makes it reasonable to use it in this 
general section on ritual in Chinese culture. Describing the text’s multivalent role, Ebrey suggests that Zhu Xi “tried 
to revive some practices described in the classics that seemed of particular moral significance, vehemently rejected 
customary practices of Buddhist origin, and was willing to accept customs he judged harmless as an expedient to 
encourage wider practice of Confucian rites” (Ebrey (1995), 128). Given the extent to which the Family Rituals 
became the definitive ritual manual for the centuries to follow, it can be seen to have exerted considerable influence 
on the practice of rituals in all strata of society (127-131).  
34
 In particular, the Family Rituals stipulate the following requirements for the appropriate fulfillment of one’s filial 
responsibilities towards the ancestors: “early each morning [one must enter] the outer gate to look in,” “all comings 
and goings must be reported,” and “when an event occurs, [it is necessary to] make a report.” Family Rituals 11, 17. 
These reports would describe such life events as marriages, births, deaths, and cappings, as well as lesser 
occurrences (such as promotions and demotions, receipt of a title, or the awarding of a raise) (17-20). Commenting 
on the necessity of making reports, Ebrey (1991) notes that “making reports of these sorts in an offering hall does 
not seem to have been the common practice in Chu Hsi’s time. He is quoted as saying that most people made reports 
at the ancestor’s graves” (17 ff. 62). While this distinction was no doubt important for participants in these rituals, it 
is not relevant to the demonstration of the present point – namely the incorporation of extrahuman beings into the 
social framework of individuals and families.  
This integration of ancestors into the social framework of a household (which is utterly compatible with the porous 
worldview described in chapter two) is also visible in the ritual prescriptions that were to be followed when 
departing on a voyage. For instance, “when the presiding man expected to be away ten days or longer, before 
departing he was to open the outer door of the shrine, bow twice, burn incense, report his plan, and bow twice again. 
When he was to be away a month or longer, he was to open the inner door, bow twice while still in the outer area, 
ascend the stair, burn incense, report his plan, bow twice, go down the stairs, face the shrine again, and bow twice 
more.” Ebrey (1995), 117. 
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broadly, a similar point is made in Jordan Paper’s The Spirits are Drunk, which argues that the 
vast majority of Chinese rituals are predicated on sharing table fellowship with extrahuman 
beings.35 While the majority of rituals were less intimate than the previous examples, their 
underlying worldviews were relatively consistent – namely that humans shared their physical 
space with extrahuman beings and that ritual practices were the most expeditious means of 
earning the approbation (or avoiding the consternation) of non-human forces. 
 
In summation, Chinese culture (elite and popular, past and present) has consistently 
valorized ritual for its role in promoting social solidarity, encouraging group cohesion, providing 
performative experiences of proper social roles (with “social roles” interpreted broadly enough to 
include relationships between humans and extrahuman beings), and expressing ritually 
appropriate sentiments towards ghosts, gods and ancestors. As suggested in the introduction to 
this chapter, this nuanced assessment of the functional utility of ritual in human society contains 
numerous resonances with the theoretical perspectives on ritual proposed by modern 
anthropologists, sociologists and psychologists. These resonances will be explored presently. 
 
 
Theoretical Perspectives 
 As noted above, indigenous Chinese perspectives on the efficacy and utility of ritual 
share some marked similarities with modern scholarship on this topic. In the pages to follow, I 
will briefly outline the approaches of Catherine Bell, Roy Rappaport, Pascal Boyer, and E. 
Thomas Lawson and Robert McCauley, and, in so doing, explore the means through which their 
theories will help explicate the continued viability of ritual in modern China. In particular, these 
theorists will help delineate the relationship(s) between ritual and community, and the role of 
ritual in the generation of socio-religious goods (such as perceived efficacy, shared participation 
in religious systems, and acceptance of religiously mandated social roles). 
                                                 
35
 More specifically, Paper’s central postulate is that the praxis-based elements of ritual meals far outweighed any 
mythological/“theological” underpinning, allowing these practices to remain relevant throughout Chinese history (in 
spite of various changes in elite and popular approaches to religion). As he suggests, “the early ruling clans traced 
their descent from mythic beings or deities, and their deceased clan chiefs became powerful spirits, but family 
sacrificial meals involved ancestors ranging from legendary figures to those of immediate memory, according to the 
family’s status. Clearly the pattern of activity was essential and mythic origin inconsequential, or the ritual meal 
could not have become the basic religious pattern of all families, including those in areas into which Chinese culture 
had spread” (31). 
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The first argument for the social function of ritual in modern Chinese society can be seen 
in Adam Chau’s Miraculous Response, which argues that these rituals betoken common 
participation in a network of religious economy shared by others in their communities. In 
particular, he argues that the number of individuals participating in rites dedicated to a given 
extrahuman agent, coupled with their level of dedication to these rites, provides a fairly robust 
heuristic assessment of a given cult’s relevance within its socio-cultural milieu.36 Moreover, 
Chau also notes that these ritually defined cults become the nexus of a system of discourse for all 
participants – a point that is in keeping with the discussion of belief found in chapter two: 
Belief in deities is as much a personal psychological state as a public discourse. When the 
majority of a close-knit village community believe in the village deity, it is extremely 
difficult to publicly present dissenting views, much less knock down the deity’s statue. 
Members of the community who believe in the deity thus form a discourse community as 
well, enforcing a more or less uniform view on the efficacy of the deity, even if allowing 
different individual experience with the deity. If a person states that he doesn’t believe in 
the deity and something terrible happens to him or his family, believers will say that the 
person suffers because the deity is punishing him for his blasphemy and impropriety. 
Normally, very few people have the nerve or resolve to counter such a strong communal 
hegemonic force.37 
 
As can be seen, Chau’s experience highlights the role of shared narratives and canonical cultural 
materials in the construction of a normative understanding of extrahuman efficacy. 
 
This view, which suggests that ritual creates social affect by generating religious goods, 
is borne out in the theoretical treatises of Catherine Bell and Roy Rappaport. Pursuant to this 
general thesis, Bell argues that ritual generates and undergirds social realities through its ability 
to mediate between the mundane world and (postulated) super-mundane realities: 
The degree to which activities are ritualized – for instance, how much communality, how 
much appeal to deities and other familiar rites, how much formality or attention to rules, 
and how much emphasis on performance or appeal to traditional precedents – is the 
degree to which the participants suggest that the authoritative values and forces shaping 
                                                 
36
 As per Chau: “On the other hand, ling inheres in concrete relationships, between the deity and an individual 
worshiper or between the deity and a community. It is meaningful to worshipers mostly in the second sense because 
ling in the abstract is only latent power, not manifest power, and the only meaningful way a deity manifests his or 
her power is through aiding a worshiper who is in trouble or who needs the blessing to weather life’s many trials and 
tribulations. An allegedly powerful deity whom a person has nonetheless never consulted is without significance to 
this particular person” (65). A longer excerpt of this quotation was also utilized in chapter two’s discussion of 
narratives of effiacacy. 
37
 Chau, 71. This particular observation, drawn from fieldwork in a Chinese village, confirms Pascal Boyer’s general 
contention concerning the role of rituals in generating community solidarity (as discussed below). 
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the occasion lie beyond the immediate control or inventiveness of those involved. It may 
be assumed that these values and forces are lodged in divine beings, in historical models, 
or even in the natural superiority of some people over others. Fundamental to all the 
strategies of ritualization examined previously is the appeal to a more embracing 
authoritative order that lies beyond the immediate situation. Ritualization is generally a 
way of engaging some wide consensus that those acting are doing so as a type of natural 
response to a world conceived and interpreted as affected by forces that transcend it – 
transcend it in time, influence, and meaning, if not in ontological status. Ritualization 
tends to posit the existence of a type of authoritative reality that is seen to dictate to the 
immediate situation. In many sociological analyses, this is one of the most basic social 
acts in the construction of reality.38 
 
In this way, Bell notes that ritual functions in tandem with cultural canons, by suggesting that it 
provides a praxical means of aligning individual existences with authoritative realities. 
  
Likewise, Rappaport makes a similar point concerning the nature of the relationship 
between ritual, posited extrahuman realities and social affect: 
[T]he conception of the non-material as efficacious, i.e., as capable of causing effects, 
may contribute to [the transformation between concept and Being], for humans generally 
realize that effects are not directly caused by concepts alone (any more than, let us say, 
houses are built by plans alone). The efficacy of the non-material may imply the being of 
the non-material. The notion of the efficacy of divine beings, in turn, might well be 
founded upon the performativeness and meta-performativeness of language as expressed 
in ritual. The very invariance of ritual proposes, as Bloch has suggested, an agent to 
whom the efficacy of performativeness intrinsic to ritual’s language can be attributed.39 
 
In his view, ritual generates these meanings by linking canonical accounts (e.g., texts and folk 
narratives) with indexical realities (the lived experience of ritual participants), thus experientially 
embodying cultural axioms that had previously existed solely as thoughts and memories. Once 
these axioms are thus reified, they acquire the potential to influence (and even direct) 
interpersonal interactions – a contention that is entirely compatible with Swidler’s description of 
culture as a “toolbox” of beliefs and practices that can be marshaled in response to the challenges 
of everyday life.40 
                                                 
38
 Bell, 169 (emphasis added). 
39
 Rappaport, 398. 
40
 Rappaport, 107-138. This perspective is echoed by Peter Stromberg, who suggests that religious rituals allow 
individuals to redefine themselves based on a group’s canonical language, whereby “a previously referential term 
may come to have a special significance for the believer, probably manifesting itself on an inarticulate level as 
feeling. This profound feeling of significance is likely to strengthen the believer’s commitment to the canonical 
language” (30). Language and Self-Transformation: A Study of the Christian Conversion Narrative, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993). Likewise, this description of the reification of cultural constructs provides an 
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 In a manner compatible with the theories explored above, Pascal Boyer extensively 
explores the role of ritual in creating social goods and providing plausible explanations for social 
realities in his book, Religion Explained. Therein, he suggests that rituals are useful in human 
societies for their ability to provide an experiential grounding for interpersonal realities (such as 
social roles and implicit ethical assumptions) whose origins/functions are not intuitively obvious: 
[R]ituals are not necessary to social processes but they are certainly relevant to people’s 
thoughts about these processes. That is, once you see your cultural elders associating a 
given set of prescribed actions with social effects that would otherwise appear magical, 
this association has some staying power because it is both easily acquired and constitutes 
a rich source of inferences. ... For instance, attending a wedding may well give you the 
intuition that your relations with the newlyweds will now be different and that this may 
be the case for other participants too; but having a ritual may give you a simple 
representation of why these changes are so clearly coordinated in all participants, since 
the event is itself a salient and mutually manifest reference point.41 
 
The “inference systems” referred to above are the innate mental capacities that undergird 
everyday cognition (with some examples including our intuitive understandings of physics 
(which underlies the perception of physical causality), biology (which allows for the practical 
categorization of plants and animals based on meaningful similarities), and psychology (which 
helps explicate the actions and motives of sentient agents)).42 Boyer’s argument, in brief, is that 
these inference systems, which are entirely adequate for describing the relationships and 
interactions between individuals, are somewhat lacking when it comes to explaining the actions 
of social groups. This issue can be demonstrated intuitively by noting the tendency of referring to 
such groups metonymically (“Canada’s position on global warming,” “state interference,” 
“Exxon’s environmental policy”), as if they were single, sentient agents rather than aggregates of 
individuals. According to Boyer (and a considerable body of psychological and sociological 
research), rituals fulfill a vital social function by providing a shared, implicitly agreed-upon 
means of short-circuiting these inference system, allowing the relationships between individuals 
and collectives to become more “understandable” (albeit in a performative, non-discursive 
manner).  
                                                                                                                                                             
insight into the formation of the “cultural toolbox” described by Ann Swidler (273-274), as it documents a plausible 
means by which social mores and cultural systems could be learned and internalized.  
41
 Boyer, 254-255. 
42
 These “inference systems” (and the mental modules that house them) are the subject of considerable research in 
modern cognitive science. For a good overview, see Pinker, 316-333; Boyer, 17-19, 99-118. 
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Given their central role in making social life more meaningful, Boyer also posits that 
rituals can serve to delineate communities, as decisions about whether or not to participate are 
often seen as definitive statements about group membership: 
[The illusion of ritual efficacy] is strengthened by the fact that not performing a particular 
ceremony, when others do, very often amounts to defecting from social cooperation. For 
instance, once you attach a particular ritual (initiation) to full cooperation between men, 
or another one (wedding) to mate-choice, then not performing the ritual amounts to a 
refusal to enter into the same social arrangements as other people. … So the illusion that 
the ritual is actually indispensable to its effects, although untrue if you consider human 
societies in general, becomes quite real for the people concerned, as their choice is 
between going through the actions prescribed – which seems to confirm that the rituals 
are a sine qua non – or defecting from cooperation with other members of the group, 
which is not really an option in most human groups.43 
 
In this way, in addition to providing socially meaningful insights into interpersonal roles and 
responsibilities, rituals also help define community boundaries by mandating standard 
behaviours (and responses) relevant to particular situations. 
 
 Finally, the discussion of Mao-related rituals that follows will utilize the typology of 
ritual proposed by E. Thomas Lawson and Robert N. McCauley in their fantastically dense and 
theoretically rigorous Rethinking Religion. Before exploring the typology itself, however, it is 
necessary to recapitulate certain central elements from their overall theory of ritual in order for 
the typology to be understood. The first (and most important) of these elements is the notion of 
religion ritual as a “symbolic cultural system” – a notion that they rather precisely define as 
follows: 
Not only are symbolic-cultural systems responsible for organizing the behaviors of 
individuals and groups, but they are also socio-cultural systems (1) which involve 
symbolic phenomena; (2) which, unlike civil law, are usually not explicitly codified (and 
in those few cases when they are, they are usually not completely codified); (3) which are 
relatively restricted both in their use and in their transmission (hence, individual 
participants’ idiosyncrasies usually affect the fate of their forms hardly at all); (4) which, 
typically, are not explicitly taught; and (5) which, therefore, require that participants must 
have some form of implicit knowledge which their successful participation in these 
systems which their judgments about the well-formedness of real and possible symbolic 
behaviors within the systems reveals.44 
 
                                                 
43
 Boyer, 255. 
44
 Lawson and McCauley, 2-3. 
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Interpreting religious ritual as a symbolic cultural system allows the authors to approach the 
topic from a cognitivistic perspective. In brief, this approach (borrowed from linguistics and 
other social sciences) involves the assumption that the relatively consistent forms (and functions) 
taken by ritual in human societies are predicated upon certain innate mental faculties,45 which 
means that it is possible to analyze ritual from the standpoint of an idealized, hypothetical 
participant who is “fluent” in the system in question. A basic advantage of this type of approach 
is that it produces empirically testable hypotheses, which can then be validated by comparing 
them to the intuitions of actual members of the tradition(s) in question.46 
  
Developing from these foundations (and drawing upon neuroscientific research into the 
mental systems used to interpret action), Lawson and McCauley constructed an elaborate 
typology of religious ritual based on the following premises: 1) all actions require an actor (i.e., a 
being capable of agential action); 2) all actions can be represented as interactions between actors, 
actions, and objects; 3) religious rituals are actions; 4) religious rituals are differentiated from the 
broader category of human actions by the fact that superhuman beings (postulated in the 
religion’s conceptual schema) can serve as either actors or objects of action; 5) religious rituals, 
grounded as they are within these schemata, must always have objects (meaning that religious 
ritual actions will always be represented by transitive verbs); 6) rituals can be recursive, in that 
they may depend upon the prior performance of (real or hypothetical) rituals; 7) this process of 
recursion terminates with the action of a superhuman being, as within the conceptual schemata of 
religion it is meaningless to seek any prior causes (“beyond the gods, there is not only no need 
but no possibility for appeal”);47 8) these previous rituals can invest certain culturally-mandated, 
non-human objects (e.g., animals, plants, natural and constructed objects) with “agency,” despite 
the literally counter-intuitive nature of such an attribution.48 Based upon these premises, they 
suggest that all religious rituals can be divided into four central categories: 1) rituals in which a 
                                                 
45
 As they suggest, innate human capacities determine “not cultural variance but cultural variability” (74). This 
being said, they acknowledge that ritual cognition is not as “nativistic” as linguistic cognition, suggesting that “in 
contrast to the development of linguistic competence, competence with a religious ritual system is clearly not a 
necessary condition for participation in culture. This too indicates that our genetic makeup probably has fewer and 
less direct connections with the system of knowledge underlying participants’ activities in religious ritual systems” 
(79-80). 
46
 Lawson and McCauley, 3, 64-68. 
47
 Lawson and McCauley, 95. 
48
 Lawson and McCauley, 84-86, 87-89, 92-93, 94-95, 98-99, 108. 
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superhuman agent is the actor (“examples include rituals such as Jesus instituting the church or 
Medicine [a Zulu god] instituting the line of herbalists”); 2) rituals that directly implicate a 
superhuman agent in any role other than actor (“examples include the Catholic Eucharist [and] 
Zulu sacrifices to ancestors”); 3) rituals wherein the actors are indirectly connected (via a 
previous, more central ritual) to a superhuman agent (“examples include the ordination of priests 
[and] baptism”); 4) rituals wherein either the objects or the actions are indirectly connected (via 
a previous, more central ritual) to a superhuman agent (“examples include [a] parishioner’s 
blessing, sacrifices employing ritually established substitutes for the superhuman agents, forms 
of Christian communion not subscribing to transubstantiation”).49 In their conclusion, Lawson 
and McCauley suggest that all of these types of rituals function to reorder (or otherwise modify) 
the place of objects and agents within the logic of the symbolic cultural system – a perspective 
that is entirely commensurate with the views elucidated by Bell, Rappaport and Boyer (as 
discussed above): 
[R]itual is an important means for insuring semantic flexibility in religious models of the 
world. Symbolic actions like religious rituals establish new relationships between things 
within the world of symbols. … In religious rituals participants rearrange the furniture in 
their religious world. For example, as the result of an initiation, the new members of the 
ingroup are now no longer members of the outgroup. They are now potential exemplars 
of the religious categories they instantiate. This changes many of their social positions 
and relations as well as their eligibility for many others. It gives them access to new 
places and new forms of behavior in addition to sometimes prohibiting access to old 
places and old forms of behavior.50 
 
As can be seen, Lawson and McCauley concur that religious rituals provide an experiential, 
performative means of interacting with the phenomenal world, while simultaneously shaping the 
individual’s understanding of themselves and their place within that world. 
 
In summation, the theorists discussed above present a nuanced, multifaceted approach to 
ritual that proves invaluable for exploring the phenomenon within its Chinese context (in a 
culturally-sensitive manner). When combining their theories, two primary elements come to the 
fore: the relationship between ritual and community, and the role of ritual in the generation of 
socio-religious goods (such as perceived efficacy, shared participation in religious systems, and 
                                                 
49
 Lawson and McCauley, 128-129. It should be noted that their framework also allows for an additional form of 
ritual, but it was omitted due to its irrelevance to the present study. 
50
 Lawson and McCauley, 161. 
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acceptance of religiously mandated social roles). More specifically, we see that rituals are 
efficacious techniques for transforming social relationships while simultaneously drawing upon 
and reifying popular theologies and cosmologies. In accomplishing their transformative work, 
these practices utilize revered texts, performative utterances, physiological techniques and 
appeals to canonical authorities, all of which tend to follow culturally constructed, seemingly 
immutable scripts. An interesting corollary of this understanding is that the literal existence of 
superhuman beings is of secondary importance, because the rituals themselves (and the 
worldviews that they engender) are seen to have the power to motivate individuals and transform 
social relationships.51 This perspective is entirely commensurate with the pragmatic approach to 
deities seen as characteristic of Chinese cultural psychology (as described in chapters two and 
three). 
 
In the context postulated by this theory, the attribution of efficacy to a ritual system often 
depends upon the creation of a “hegemonic discourse” (to use a term from Chau),52 as its 
perceived power is largely determined by the development and transmission of shared narratives 
concerning its efficacy (and the efficacy of the (extra-human) beings that it references). When 
coupled with the role of ritual participation in determining community membership, this 
hegemonic discourse helps to construct a powerful communal consensus. This relationship is 
especially powerful when, as in Chau’s experience, the consensus opinion of believers is used to 
discredit or downplay the experience of non-believers (as will be seen in the discussion of Mao-
era rituals below). 
 
                                                 
51
 While this corollary is supported by the quotations from Bell and Rappaport above, Boyer also makes a similar 
point with the suggestion that “whether rituals are thought to have long-lasting social effects (changing people and 
their relations) or transient ones (curing the sick, guaranteeing good crops), in both cases the participation of 
supernatural agents adds relevant elements to the mental representation of the ceremonies, but it is not 
indispensable. Indeed, in many places the hidden ‘something’ that explains the ritual effect is ‘Society’ or ‘The 
Lineage’ or ‘The Community’” (261). 
52
 While the term “hegemony” is often used imprecisely, I think Chau’s usage is quite specific in that he is explicitly 
using the term to address the role of shared communal narratives in minimizing or marginalizing dissenting voices.  
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The multimodal relationship between ritual, religious goods, canonical language, 
hegemonic discourse, and community membership will be considered at length below, in the 
application of this theory in the modern Chinese context.53  
                                                 
53
 As an extended aside, the mutually reinforcing, multi-disciplinary perspective on ritual detailed above is also 
supported by some conclusions from modern social science research, such as the theories concerning cognitive 
dissonance and the “focal point effect.”  
The first of these theories, which was proposed by Leon Festinger in the late 1950s and given extensive validation 
through fifty years of subsequent experimentation, suggests that human beings, when confronted with situations that 
confound their expectations, will tend to unconsciously alter their circumstances in order to resolve the “cognitive 
dissonance” created by these discombobulating situations. In the case of ritual (especially religious ritual), cognitive 
dissonance research helps explain why rituals remain compelling even when they do not consistently produce the 
desired (or expected) results – namely, individuals will tend to marginalize those instances when the ritual proved 
ineffectual (in terms of their perceived cogency), while more forcefully attending to instances where the desired 
results were obtained, especially when they are emotionally or psychologically invested in the ritual system (a 
phenomenon sometimes described as a “confirmation bias”). See Carol Tavris and Eliot Aronson, Mistakes Were 
Made (But Not By Me), (Orlando, FL: Harcourt, 2007) for a general, accessible overview of cognitive dissonance 
theory. For a particularly compelling account of the relationship between cognitive dissonance and ritual, we can 
also turn to Susan J. Palmer and Natalie Finn’s “Coping with Apocalypse in Canada: Experiences of Endtime in la 
Mission de l'Esprit Saint and the Institute of Applied Metaphysics,” in which the authors suggest that effective use 
of ritual is central to the ability of a millenarian group to survive the (potentially intense) cognitive dissonance that 
could arise when apocalyptic predictions become demonstrably false: “While some millenarians might strike a 
sceptical audience as ‘sitting ducks’ for cognitive dissonance, others might be more correctly perceived as actively 
seeking ‘noncognitive consonance.’ … The process of rationalization-reinterpretation, however, must commence 
immediately within the first few moments following prophetic disconfirmation, as part of the ritual. The necessity 
for promptness is that reinterpretation must occur within the ritual process, that is, before sacred time fades into 
profane time” (411). Sociological Analysis 53: 4, The Unique and the Shared in Religion and Society, (Winter 
1992), 397-415. 
The second theory describes the manner in which individuals, when attempting to make socially meaningful 
decisions, will often attempt to coordinate their actions with their peers, even in the absence of any overt form of 
communication. The “focal point effect” emerges in these so-called “coordination games” (a term referring to any 
social situation wherein decisions have to be made without explicit consultation), with the “focal points” being 
culturally-conditioned beliefs and actions that individuals assume will be equally compelling for all members of 
their social/cultural group. Thomas Schelling, one of the pioneers in this field, describes the situation as follows: 
“the co-ordination game probably lies behind the stability of institutions and traditions and perhaps the phenomenon 
of leadership itself. Among the possible sets of rules that might govern a conflict, tradition points to the particular 
set that everyone can expect everyone else to be conscious of as a conspicuous candidate for adoption; it wins by 
default over those that cannot readily be identified by tacit consent. The force of many rules of etiquette and social 
restraint, including some (like the rule against ending a sentence with a preposition) that have been divested of their 
relevance or authority, seems to depend on their having become ‘solutions’ to a co-ordination game: everyone 
expects everyone to expect everyone to expect observance, so that non-observance carries the pain of 
conspicuousness” (209). Thomas C. Schelling, “The Strategy of Conflict Prospectus for a Reorientation of Game 
Theory,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 2:3 (September 1958), 203-264. This focal point effect provides an 
additional justification for the understanding of ritual discussed above, as it helps explain the utility of ritual 
practices. Specifically, if ritual does provide a non-discursive means of inculcating and reifying cultural values (as 
discussed above), it then becomes one of the primary means through which these “focal points” are generated. In 
this way, cultural constructs can become part of a self-stroking cycle, as the more prevalent they become, the more 
likely they will serve as a focal point in future coordination games between members of the social group. See also: 
Tom Slee’s No One Makes You Shop at Wal-Mart, (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2006), for an application of 
Schelling’s theories to numerous group behaviours. 
These two theories help explain the responses of Chau’s interviewees concerning the persuasive power of ritual. As 
quoted above, Chau notes that “[i]f a person states that he doesn’t believe in the deity and something terrible 
happens to him or his family, believers will say that the person suffers because the deity is punishing him for his 
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In some ways, these modern perspectives can be seen as extensions of Malinowski’s 
then-controversial suggestion that magical reasoning, far from simply being “superstition” or 
“bad science,” is a socially functional mode of discourse that can preserve social norms, mobilize 
manpower, and “performatively” indoctrinate the populace with proper emotions and attitudes.54 
Building upon this conception, the perspectives of Chau, Rappaport, Bell and others allow us to 
explore the means through which rituals provide phenomenological validity to the religious 
experiences of individuals, as they create a shared social context within which efficacy of 
extrahuman agents can be described, discussed, experienced and (resultantly) reified. Such 
perspectives are especially relevant to a discussion of Chinese religiosity, given the central role 
of perceived efficacy in their understanding of extrahuman agents.55 
 
 Though the role of ritual in society and the means by which it operates remain somewhat 
contentious issues,56 the perspectives detailed above provide a means of approaching the 
                                                                                                                                                             
blasphemy and impropriety. Normally, very few people have the nerve or resolve to counter such a strong 
communal hegemonic force” (71). With these two theories in hand, we note that this “hegemonic force” is a perfect 
example of Schelling’s focal point effect, with the members of the community independently arriving at a 
coordinated explanation of events due to the intersection of their own beliefs with their beliefs about the beliefs of 
their fellow citizens – even in the absence of any overt discussion. Likewise, cognitive dissonance theory explains 
why the instances of a “non-cooperator” being punished seem more cogent to a believer than the (undoubtedly more 
numerous) instances wherein a believer’s prayers and supplications were seemingly ignored.  
In summation, both cognitive dissonance theory and the focal-point hypothesis provide additional credence to the 
theoretical perspectives outlined above, given that their insights into human nature (which were developed following 
years of experimentation) are commensurate with the theories of Chau, Bell, Boyer and Rappaport. 
54
 As described in Tambiah, 72-73. 
55
 See Chapter Two. 
56
 In particular, scholars remain divided on the level of discursive meaning that it is appropriate to ascribe to ritual 
practice. On the “meaningless” end of the dichotomy, one finds perspectives such as the one elucidated by Frits 
Staal, who argues that rituals are entirely lacking in mythic/symbolic referents, and that they are instead constituted 
of a detailed system of syntactical rules, ordained by tradition and practiced without understanding. Moreover, he 
goes so far as to suggest that rituals are “perfect activities” entirely lacking in both meaning and utility: “To say that 
ritual is for its own sake is to say that it is meaningless, without function, aim or goal, or also that it constitutes its 
own aim or goal. It does not follow that is has no value: but whatever value it has is intrinsic value” (9). Frits Staal, 
"The Meaninglessness of Ritual," Numen 26:Fasc. 1 (June 1979), 2-22. While this perspective is intriguing, it 
needlessly circumscribes the apparatuses of human cognition by assuming that they only operate in a rational, 
discursive context and that all other forms of activity are somehow “pre-linguistic” and, resultantly, pre-rational (20-
21). This perspective allows him to conflate mantras with birdsongs, arguing that both lack any linguistic “meaning” 
or behavioral “utility” outside of the ritual context (279-294). Frits Staal, Rules Without Meaning: Ritual, Mantras, 
and the Human Sciences, (New York: Peter Lang, 1989). A cogent critique of this perspective can also be found in 
Lawson and McCauley’s Rethinking Religion, where they argue that his view overstates the role of doctrine in 
religion and simultaneously denies the role of semantics in ritual – both of which are untenable positions (167-169). 
On the opposite end of the dichotomy, one finds scholars such as Robertson Smith, E. B. Tylor, James G. Frazer and 
others who argue for the utter commensurability of ritual and myth by suggesting that rituals simply represent the 
physical enacting of discursive mythological, theological and cosmological truths (as described in Bell, 3-16). As 
Bell notes, such an approach remains relatively common, especially in popular accounts of religion and mythology: 
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continued relevance and applicability of ritual in Chinese society. As will be seen below, these 
ritually-shaped modes of cognition and social behaviour are, in fact, one of the primary points of 
continuity between the imperial past and the (post-)communist present, for just as certain 
metaphorically-resonant images (such as the emperor and the deity) remain persuasive and 
meaningful in modern China, so too do the (often ritualistic) means by which such images are 
inculcated. One large exception, however, is that many of these practices have been “retrofitted” 
for use in less-than-traditional contexts – as will be seen in the context of Mao-related ritual. 
 
Mao and Ritual 
As discussed above, anthropologists, psychologists and social scientists have (in the last 
fifty years) begun to recognize the importance of ritual (and, more generally, of non-discursive 
modalities of knowing) in the formation of human societies and worldviews – a perspective that 
has been explicitly promoted in Chinese thought for over two thousand years. Given this 
perspective’s cultural currency within the Chinese context, it is not surprising that such 
modalities were utilized (both officially and spontaneously) in the state-sponsored 
apotheosization of Mao Zedong during the Cultural Revolution. While it is outside the scope of 
this paper to explore the specifics of this period of turmoil in any great detail,57 the (often 
ritually-mandated) process through which Mao was deified is entirely relevant, as I would argue 
that it laid the groundwork of emotions, images, and mental associations that made the 
Chairman’s transition into a posthumously efficacious being possible. As such, the following 
section will explore some rituals (both state-sponsored and spontaneous) that were utilized 
                                                                                                                                                             
“The views of the myth and ritual school, as well as their underlying model of primitive society, have remained 
popular long after the accumulation of a great deal of discrediting evidence. Herbert Weisinger has suggested that 
the school represented by Frazer has been so popular because it created one of the great ‘myths’ of the modern age! 
… [T]he patterns that Darwin saw in nature, that Marx saw in history, and that Freud saw in the psychology of the 
individual are the same pattern of birth, struggle, defeat, and resurrection that Frazer projected as central to the 
religious lives of peoples everywhere since the beginning of time” (21). This organizing narrative is indeed central 
to virtually all perennialist approaches to myth and ritual. 
Given the difficulties in adapting such theories to the Chinese context (not to mention the potent critiques composed 
by Lawson and McCauley, Laidlaw and others), I have decided instead to focus my attention upon the theorists 
introduced in the previous pages, as their own approaches (which cleave the Gordian knot of ritual and meaning by 
postulating a different type of ritualistic cognition) seem more compatible with the materials upon which the present 
study is based.  
57
 For a some contrasting perspectives on the period, one can consult Chang and Halliday (2006); Lu (2004); 
Madsen (1984); Maurice Meisner, “The Cult of Mao Tse-tung” in Maoism, Marxism and Utopianism, (Madison, 
WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1982), 155-83, as well as the (still definitive) study of the psychology of the 
Cultural Revolution found in Robert J. Lifton’s Revolutionary Immortality: Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Cultural 
Revolution. 
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during the promotion of the Mao Cult during the Cultural Revolution, offering comments upon 
their social functions (following the theories outlined above), as well as their similarities to pre-
existing traditional practices. In doing so, the typology proposed by Lawson and McCauley will 
prove invaluable, as it helps to demonstrate that, in this ritual context, Mao played the role that 
extrahuman beings typically serve in religious systems. It should be noted that the rituals 
outlined below should not be seen as an exhaustive list. Rather, they represent a spectrum of 
practices that are covered in considerable detail in the literature, which makes them suitable 
targets for the type of analysis employed below. 
 
Mao Study Sessions and “Everyday Reading” (Tiantian Du 天天读) 
 One important ritual popularized during the Cultural Revolution was the institutionalized 
study of Mao’s teachings – a practice that was foisted upon rural Chinese by the armies of “sent-
down youth” dispatched from the nation’s urban centers. These teaching sessions, which were 
often convened daily (or even multiple times daily), generally consisted of the singing of Mao-
praising songs, the memorization/recitation of Mao’s writings (most typically from the Little Red 
Book and/or the Constantly Read Articles) and the homiletic application of these teachings to 
immediate issues facing individuals or communities.58 While these rites were initially less-than-
popular,59 they eventually came to profoundly influence the moral and metaphorical discourse of 
the communities within which they were enacted.60 However, this influence depended more upon 
Mao’s perceived (superhuman?) efficacy than on the particulars of his doctrines (a fact that will 
be considered in more detail below):  
In the beginning of the Mao Study campaign the peasants … saw only the halo of 
revolutionary accomplishment surrounding the person of Mao. Most of the peasants, 
however, were illiterate. They could not learn much more than a few slogans of Mao’s 
doctrines. When they participated in solemn rituals to study Mao’s teaching, they were 
really focusing their attention on the person of Mao himself and on a few of Mao’s more 
                                                 
58
 See Madsen, 131-141, 145-149. Lu also provides a broad description of this phenomenon: The ritual entitled 
“Sharing Experience in Applying Mao’s Teachings” “took the form of a small-group meeting, a seminar, or an 
assembly where one person or a group of people shared the ways in which they had applied Mao’s teachings to their 
lives. They described how they and society as a whole had benefited from the application of Mao’s teachings” (138). 
59
 For instance, Madsen notes that the initial sessions in Chen village (the site of his in-depth diachronic analysis) 
were only attended by approximately one fifth of the population (133-134). 
60
 As per Madsen, “One knew what it meant to be a good person by listening to the voice of approved political 
authority – authority canonized by the approval of Chairman Mao. The young people’s moral discourse thus 
centered around exegesis of official government moral imperatives and their application to the details of daily life” 
(112). 
 99 
noble-minded ideas. As we shall see, this could and did lead to a heightened sense of 
unity and common purpose, at least for a time. And it promoted the loose integration 
between traditional moral discourse and the basic principles of Maoist teaching.61 
 
In this way, Mao’s thought came to be inculcated as a canon of belief (to use Delwin Brown’s 
terminology),62 an open and polysemous collection of tenets, anecdotes and practices that could 
be drawn upon (with varying interpretations) in response to the challenges of daily life.63 A side 
effect of the canonical status of Mao’s writings, however, was the (implicit) promotion of the 
sent-down youth (as well as any peasants who could effectively utilize this discourse) as a form 
of “priestly class”: 
The Maoist paradigm for moral discourse can lead to coherent moral discussion  
only if all members of a group are intimately familiar with the details of the authoritative 
teaching [e.g., the intelligentsia, the youth and/or certain peasants who actively studied 
these teachings]…. The way is then open for such people to claim that they form a moral 
aristocracy within communities of illiterates…. [Furthermore,] to lead to coherent moral 
discussion, the authoritative mode of moral discourse also requires that the voice of 
authority be clear. If the words of the teaching are not clear, an infallible authority is 
needed to evaluate canonical interpretations of the teachings. In the mid-1960s, the 
highest officials of the government were supposed to provide such authority. But when 
the Cultural Revolution began in 1966, the moral authority of the central government was 
demolished, and it suddenly became possible for different groups to advance their own 
interpretation of Mao’s writings, causing tremendous political and moral chaos.64 
 
 
 
 As can be seen, these study rituals served many of the purposes traditionally ascribed to 
religious rituals (as described above): they postulated an authoritative reality (in the 
writings/personal charisma of Mao) and provided a means of aligning oneself with it, they 
redefined social roles and responsibilities, and they created “religious” goods (in this case, the 
social prestige accorded to those thought to possess a purer understanding of Mao’s teachings, as 
well as an increased commitment to the supernatural efficacy of Mao). As Madsen notes,  
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 Madsen, 131. 
62
 Conversely, it could also be seen as a Swidlerian “cultural toolbox.” 
63
 As Madsen notes, “When [the sent-down youths] returned to Chen village, they helped the work team organize a 
series of political rituals to begin the process of transforming peasant consciousness. These meetings, Mao Zedong 
Thought Training Sessions, had primarily a kerygmatic rather than a didactic purpose. Like religious revival 
meetings in the United States, they aimed not to teach a rationally coherent system of abstract doctrines but to 
proclaim a few fundamental ideas, to endow them with compelling moral and emotional power, and to call for 
personal and communal conversion to a life structured around them. These ideas were not the clearly defined 
concepts of the philosopher or scientist but the multivocal symbols of the prophet and the poet” (133). 
64
 Madsen, 16. 
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[T]he training session rituals imbued the parables containing Mao’s moral teachings with 
an aura of holy goodness and made Mao himself a symbol of salvation. Expressed in 
richly vague compact sayings, the Maoist teachings came to represent a wide range of 
profound human experiences for those hearing them: the peasants’ memories of 
deliverance from fear and oppression and their hopes for making their ancestral home a 
prosperous and proud community, the dreams of the sent-down youth for revolutionary 
glory, the desires of the work team to accomplish a job well done. In the training session 
rituals, all of these memories, wishes, dreams, and hopes were fused into a common set 
of symbols – the vaguely presented teachings of Mao and the person of Mao. These 
symbols became the emblems of a single moral community uniting the peasants, the sent-
down youth, and the work team. All of these different groups felt that they were part of a 
common holy enterprise, even though they might think about the meaning of that 
enterprise in somewhat different ways. Their differences remained, but because of this 
fundamental unity around Maoist symbols, their different streams of moral discourse 
flowed into, influenced, and adapted themselves to one another.65 
 
 
Within the framework defined by Lawson and McCauley, these practices would be 
characterized as type three rituals, given that these study sessions (which could be described as 
rites of passage into a Maoist community)66 were predicated upon the instructors’ “ordination” 
by Mao’s edict (an embedded ritual).67 The typology posits two general, corollary assumptions 
about this type of ritual, both of which are borne out in the context of the Mao-centered rituals 
described above: first, that the moral authority of the practices in question would be entirely 
derived from the embedded ritual;68 and, second, that the ritual would be reversible.69 In the first 
case, it has already been demonstrated that the moral authority granted to these youths (and, by 
association, to those peasants who most effectively utilized their Mao-inspired teachings) 
terminated with Mao (and his efficacious writings) – it was both meaningless and treasonous to 
seek justification for these practices beyond their (divinized) point of origin. Second, given that 
these rites provided a change of status within the community, Lawson and McCauley’s research 
implies that a parallel ritual would likely exist to reverse these changes (and the status effects 
emanating from them). This is in fact the case, as will be discussed below in the section on (self-) 
criticism rituals. 
 
                                                 
65
 Madsen, 136. 
66
 For a more dramatic instance of a Maoist rite of passage, see the discussion on Struggle Sessions below. 
67
 Lawson and McCauley, 129. 
68
 Lawson and McCauley, 95. 
69
 Lawson and McCauley, 131-133. 
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 One result of these sessions was to transform Mao’s teachings into talismans – 
miraculous words that could be used to solve any problem,70 cure any malady,71 and provide 
universal ethical guidance. While such “magical” applications were most often seen among the 
peasants,72 they can actually be traced back to official edicts, as when Lin Biao averred that the 
people should let “Mao Zedong’s Thought control everything” and that Mao’s directives “must 
be carried out whether one understands them or not.”73 This perspective was potently 
demonstrated in the rhetoric adopted by the writers of Big Character Posters (large, 
inexpensively produced missives that were used by revolutionaries to express political/social 
points): 
Nearly every wall poster used Mao’s quotations, poems and new directives as 
justification for their accusations and action. . … In all posters of the time Mao’s words 
were worshiped as absolute truth and infallible guidance in every aspect of life.74 
 
In all of these contexts, Mao’s words were accorded the status of talismans – sacred sources of 
efficacy whose (near) universal acceptance actually did grant them a measure of power over 
social relations. 
 
 This talismanic use of Mao’s writings bears a strong resemblance to application of 
revered texts in traditional Chinese culture.75 In particular, these teachings came to serve the 
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 Zuo, 102-104: “the fanatical attitude that the masses held toward Mao’s “Little Red Book” resembled people’s 
attitude towards animistic magic in the past. As people in traditional Chinese society believed in the power of magic, 
the masses in the Cultural Revolution believed that the “Little Red Book” would save them from all trouble” (104). 
71
 Urban (1971) contains numerous accounts, each drawn from Chinese print and broadcast media, of Mao’s 
teachings aiding in the miraculous healing of afflicted individuals. See, for example, 1-9, 9-13, 21-23, 23-24, 45-46, 
120-122, 144-150, for various descriptions of doctors (and non-medical personal) curing disease, restoring sight, and 
even bringing people back from the dead by applying the efficacious words of Mao to the problems at hand. 
72
 See, for example, Lu, 80-81. Liu Xiaoqing provides another revealing example: “If I ever had any problems I 
would search Chairman Mao’s writings for an answer. When we lost one of our chicks I looked for help in his 
works. When, not long after, the chick reappeared, I knew it was due to the intercession of our Great, Wise, and 
Correct Chairman Mao” (Shades of Mao, 171).  
However, it should be noted that such applications actually continued in the years after Mao’s death. For instance, 
Hua Ming argues that “university students have found the answers to China’s problems in the treasury of Mao 
Zedong Thought” (Hua Ming, quoted in Shades of Mao, 150) and Jiang Shui and Tie Zhu suggest that Mao’s 
thought can provide an efficacious foundation for a volume on successful business practices (Shades of Mao, 183-
185). 
73
 Lu, 66. 
74
 Lu, 80-81. 
75
 As Madsen notes, “In traditional Chinese pedagogy (a type of pedagogy that continues in the schools and colleges 
of contemporary China), a student is first expected to memorize an important text and only after that to begin the 
lengthy process of trying to understand it. Similarly, the first stage of the political pedagogy of the Social Education 
Movement was to burn a dramatic social ‘text’ into the memory of villagers and then slowly to help them understand 
it” (80). 
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same function that the Four Books and Five Classics did for the literati and imperial bureaucracy, 
becoming all-encompassing compendia of human knowledge that were capable of providing 
meaningful responses to whatever issues confronted their adherents. This parallel is explored in 
C. P. Fitzgerald’s Mao Tsetung and China:  
The thoughts of Mao Tsetung [Mao Zedong] have become to his own people in his own 
age what the Sayings of Confucius were to the Chinese people for the past two thousand 
years: the source of inspiration and guidance in matters social, political, and moral.76 
 
While some may argue that it is not relevant to compare the use of Mao-era texts to traditional 
scholarship (given the fact that the classical Confucian texts were not considered to be 
“scriptural” or divine), Tu Wei-ming suggests that the Confucian viewpoint characterized “the 
continuation of human culture not only as an historical fact but also as the unfolding of a 
transcendent reality.”77 In this way, the universalistic use of canonical texts by Confucians can 
also be seen as a type three ritual! In a more unambiguously religious context, similarities can 
also be seen between the talismanic use of Mao’s writings and the use of written texts in 
liturgical Daoism. Isabelle Robinet provides an excellent overview of this tradition’s use of 
textual talismans: 
The holy texts themselves act as talismans; … Revealed by gods who retained half the 
talismans and the original forms of the texts, they are the guarantee of the divine compact 
with human beings, who receive them from their masters in the course of a consecration 
rite accompanied by a sworn oath the gods are summoned to witness. The talismans and 
often the texts consist of incantatory sounds and pictures that must be written down and 
recited. They bring the adept the divine help he needs to carry out religious practices 
effectively.78 
 
In addition to the structural and metaphorical similarities between Maoist and Daoist talismans 
evidenced by previous quotation, it also should be noted that textual talismans also played a 
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 Fitzgerald (1976), quoted in Lu, 106. This point, about the internalization (and subsequent performance) of texts, 
can also be persuasively made regarding the famous Three Character Classic (san zi jing), a Confucian document 
that served as the initial primer for hundreds of generations of Chinese students. James T. C. Liu, describing his own 
schooling, outlines this pedagogical process as follows: “In the 1920s, many children still studied under old- 
fashioned tutors, instead of going to modern schools. They learned to recite loudly the Three-character Classic by 
chanting. They did it so often at home and in the neighborhood that the womenfolk, though mostly illiterate, learned 
by ear a kind of second-hand audio-literacy and even to quote in their conversation the values in the primer; much 
the same as the Lord's Prayer was repeated in medieval times by illiterate Europeans” (193). James T. C. Liu, “The 
Classical Chinese Primer: Its Three-Character Style and Authorship,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 
105:2 (April-June 1985), 191-196. 
77
 Tu, 2. In this way, the idea of “this culture” (斯文) is “laden with cosmological significance” (ibid.). 
78
 Isabelle Robinet, Taoism: Growth of a Religion, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997), 99. These 
similarities obviously require further elaboration and analysis. 
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similar functional role in both traditions – namely, the identification of a certain subset of society 
as individuals with privileged access to an external, authoritative reality. 
 
Asking Instructions in the Morning and Reporting in the Evening  
(Zao Qingshi 早 請示 / Wan Huibao 晚 彙報) 
 
 The second set of “Mao-centered rituals” to be considered is a constellation of Cultural 
Revolution-era practices centered around the incorporation of Mao into everyday life – namely 
the zao qingshi (“asking instructions in the morning”) and wan huibao (“reporting in the 
evening”). These rituals basically consisted of obeisances (including presenting oneself and/or 
one’s family to a portrait of Mao, performing Maoist songs and loyalty dances, and wishing good 
fortune upon him), and “incorporative” actions (such as asking for the Great Chairman’s council 
and confessing one’s failures to live up to his example).79 As Lu notes,  
After the wishes and singing in front of Mao’s portrait, a group leader would ask for 
guidance. This process was known as zao qingshi (asking instructions in the morning). At 
the end of the day people gathered again in front of Mao’s portrait to report what they 
had accomplished during the day and what problems they had solved through studying 
Mao’s pronouncements, confessing their selfish thoughts, and struggling to overcome 
them. This ritual was known as wan huibao (reporting in the evening).80 
 
Moreover, these rites were part of a large complex of daily Mao-veneration practices, many of 
which also incorporated the talismanic application of Mao’s teachings described above: 
After arriving at work or school the day typically began with san jing san zhu (three 
respects and three wishes to Chairman Mao). Everyone lined up before the portrait of 
Mao Zedong and waved the Little Red Book, wishing Chairman Mao three times 
longevity and Lin Biao three times eternal health. The same ritual could also take place 
immediately after waking up, before the start of a meeting, and before every meal. It was 
then followed by singing, “The East is Red” and reciting Mao’s quotations.81 
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 Zuo, 101-102. 
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 Lu, 133. Similar practices are also described in Fox Butterfield’s China: Alive in the Bitter Sea, (Bantam Books: 
Toronto; New York, 1982): “‘During those days, Mao was really like a god in my mind,’ [Bing (one of the author’s 
sources)] went on. During the Cultural Revolution, there had been a ritual everyone had to follow. Every household 
had a white plaster bust of Mao, and each day all the family members had to bow before it twice. ‘The saying was, 
“In the morning ask for instructions; in the evening report back what you have done.”’ It was an imitation of an old 
imperial practice, Bing noted” (223). 
81
 Lu, 132-133. 
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In Lawson and McCauley’s typology, these related rituals would be of the second type, as 
Mao obviously serves as a passive object of veneration, albeit being beseeched for instruction 
and approbation. Based upon this classification, their research suggests that these rituals would 
possess two additional characteristics: first, they would likely be of secondary importance within 
the religious framework under investigation (when compared to practices that feature an 
extrahuman force as an actor (either directly or indirectly));82 and, second, given the passive role 
of extrahuman beings in these rituals, they would likely require repetition to maintain their 
efficacy.83 As it turns out, the zao qingshi / wan huibao rituals confirm both of these corollary 
assumptions. Speaking to the requirement of repetition, it should be noted that each of these 
daily rituals sees Mao in a predominantly inactive role (save perhaps through the efficacious 
power of his miraculous words), meaning that his perceived presence would have largely been 
generated (or reified) through repetition. Moreover, it could be argued that these rituals would 
have indeed been of secondary importance (within the symbolic cultural system in question) due 
to their relative small number of overt social functions (i.e., they did not explicitly change the 
status of any participants nor imbue them with any particular authority or sanction).  This being 
said, these practices nonetheless exhibit many of the broad characteristics of religious ritual 
described above, including their aim of aligning participants with an authoritative reality, their 
prescriptive function in defining social roles/responsibilities, and their symbolic function as an 
overt, visible indication of one’s acceptance of Mao (and his revolutionary ideology). This last 
aspect would have been particularly salient within the climate of suspicion and recrimination that 
characterized the Cultural Revolution (as distressingly demonstrated in the “struggle sessions” 
described below). 
 
In addition to these functional characteristics, the rituals outlined above also bore 
considerable parallels with certain traditional practices, including those dedicated to ancestors 
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 Lawson and McCauley, 125-127. 
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 Lawson and McCauley, 127, 133-134. They argue that these types of rituals require repetition because, unlike 
rituals that postulate direct divine actions, their results are less apparent: “Sacrifices, prime examples of Type 2 
[rituals], are probably the most common irreversible ritual acts. … Certain peculiar characteristics distinguish 
sacrifices from religious rituals of the odd-numbered types (institutions, initiations, investitures, baptisms, 
marriages, etc.). The effects of a sacrifice are temporally limited, whereas the effects of the religious rituals listed 
under the odd-numbered types are normally sufficient for a human lifetime at least and are often super-permanent. 
Consequently, these ritual acts typically do not need to be repeated. Sacrifices and offerings, on the other hand, must 
be repeatedly performed” (134). 
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and the Kitchen God. In particular, these rites are virtually identical to the rituals of “looking in” 
on the ancestors described above, wherein devoted family patriarchs would punctuate their days 
by regularly consulting (or simply paying their respects to) their departed antecedents. Even the 
social functions of this ritual (namely the reification of a social order which includes extrahuman 
ancestors as actors, and the performative expression of commitment to cultural values (such as 
filial piety)) are shared with its Mao-era counterpart – save the fact that the ancestor’s role is 
usurped by the Great Helmsman.84 In a less direct manner, this “immediacized” Mao also comes 
to play the role of Stove God, observing the behaviour of the family from afar and adjudicating it 
based upon an externally established standard.85 As such, these related rites not only bear 
functional similarities to many other religious rituals, but also contain echoes of traditional 
religious practices (a fact that would have certainly enhanced their cogency among participants). 
These parallels become all the more salient when considering the veneration directed at the 
deceased Mao (described at length in chapter three), as in that context the explicitly political 
import of these practices is drastically reduced, which, in turn, would have increased their 
symbolic and affective resonances with traditional worship practices. 
 
Affective Performance:  Maoist “Hymns” and Loyalty Dances 
As a slight aside, it should be noted that both of the rituals detailed above made use of 
what could be described as “performative Cultural Revolutionary practices” – namely, Maoist 
hymns and loyalty dances.  
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 Xing Lu offers additional insight into Mao’s popular usurpation of the role of ancestor during the Cultural 
Revolution: “In addition traditional Chinese altars used for ancestor worship were converted into altars of loyalty to 
Mao. As observed by Hsia (1972), ‘Many Chinese villages have dedicated “rooms of loyalty” to Chairman Mao and 
many peasant households have their own “tablets of loyalty.” These are clearly derived from the ancestral temples 
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 While the daily supplications to Mao certainly bear some similarities to the popular cult of the Stove God, certain 
salient differences should be noted: first, the Stove God was most often seen as a servant of the Jade Emperor, who 
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Mao-era rites described above. See Robert L. Chard, “Ritual and Scriptures of the Stove Cult,” in Ritual and 
Scripture in Chinese Popular Religion: Five Studies, edited by David Johnson, (Berkeley, CA: Chinese Popular 
Culture Project, 1995), 3-55, 13-21; Anne Goodrich, Peking Paper Gods: A Look at Home Worship, (Nettal: Steyler 
Verlag, 1991), 31-42. 
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The first of these devotional observances consisted of a corpus of lofty paeans that often 
described the Chairman in superhuman terms. Some examples can be seen in the ubiquitous The 
East is Red, (“The East is red // the sun rises // China has produced a Mao Tse-tung // He seeks 
happiness for the people // He is the people’s great savior”),86 as well as in similarly 
propagandist compositions: 
Heaven and earth are great, but greater still is the kindness of the Party. 
 Father and mother are dear, but dearer still is Chairman Mao. 
 Nothing is as good as socialism. 
 Rivers and oceans are deep, but still deeper is the comradeship of the  
  Proletarian class. 
 Mao Zedong’s Thoughts are the revolutionary treasure; 
 Whoever is against those is our enemy.87 
The success of these “hymns” in indoctrinating the populace with a superhuman image of their 
leader should not only be credited to their extensive use in popular ritual and public gatherings, 
but also to their compatibility with certain preexisting cultural tropes (a statement that is in 
keeping with the contentions of chapters two and three). Lu expands upon this suggestion: 
A central element of Chinese mythology is the notion that emperors are mandated by 
heaven; thus, they are the ‘Sons of Heaven.’ Songs such as ‘The East is Red’ reinforced 
the myth that Mao was just such a deity sent by heaven to help the Chinese people lead 
better lives. In this way Mao was established as the legitimate leader of China, a living 
god who would surely bring happiness to people.88 
 
Though some individuals would have rejected such characterizations of Mao (at least 
privately),89 these hymns were nonetheless instrumental in indoctrinating a large subset of the 
population with an apotheosized image of Mao (providing an experiential groundwork for the 
types of images covered in chapter three). One of Xing Lu’s interviewees described his own 
experiences with these hymns as follows: “after repeated exposure to the same slogans and 
images, I began to be convinced that Mao was the greatest and would live forever. I considered 
myself very lucky to be alive at this time in history.”90 In a similar manner, Liu Xiaoqing, a 
Sichuanese film star, describes the enduring power of these hymns in her 1992 memoir:  
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88
 Lu, 101-102. 
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 For instance, one of the Chinese peasant interviewed by Xing Lu expressed his (private) incredulity at these public 
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The first song I learned to sing was ‘The East is Red.’ … Even now the songs I most 
often sing, the songs I am most familiar with, that I can sing from beginning to end, are 
ones written in praise of Chairman Mao. The words I can still recite by heart are 
Chairman Mao’s poems. And I still quote Chairman Mao at the drop of a hat. I know and 
hold it to be true that Mao Zedong will live on in my heart forever.91 
 
Intriguingly, the persistent ability of these songs to indoctrinate the populace was not only 
presaged by Mao himself,92 but was also utterly compatible with the traditional Chinese 
understanding of music’s efficacy in the development of moral individuals and orderly 
societies.93 
 
 Another type of performative adulation directed at Mao was the oft-discussed loyalty 
dance (忠字舞), which consisted of a rhythmic series of bodily postures symbolizing one’s 
wholehearted devotion to the Great Helmsman. Xing Lu describes this practice as follows: 
The ritual worshiping of Mao was often accompanied by zhong zi wu忠字舞 (the loyalty 
dance), which involved the simple movement of stretching one’s arms from one’s heart to 
Mao’s portrait, symbolizing again absolute loyalty and boundless love for Mao. … The 
loyalty dance was performed in classrooms, in workplaces, and on the streets throughout 
the country. At times passion for the loyalty dance rose to absurd levels. For example, 
Xiao Di (1993) recorded that a local official sang revolutionary songs and danced the 
loyalty dance, in utter devotion to Mao, all the way from the airport to his office after 
returning from a conference in Beijing (165). An interviewee recalled how a shop 
assistant had gathered all the customers together to do a loyalty dance at the start of the 
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business day. Huang (1996) witnessed a grand performance of the loyalty dance by 
thousands of workers in the city of Xian.94 
 
Once again, this practice can also be seen to parallel the traditional Chinese perspective on the 
embodied, procedural character of human nature, under which it was assumed that sequences of 
bodily postures and physical exercises could beneficially modify one’s character.95 As such, it 
seems that (once again) Mao-era ritual drew upon pre-existing cultural patterns in creating a 
system of practices that were both internally consistent and personally meaningful for 
participants. Moreover, this cogency would not have simply been based upon historical and 
personal analogues, but would have also derived considerable cultural currency from the fact that 
they also served as public (socially functional) testaments of one’s devotion to the Chairman and 
his revolutionary programme. 
 
“Recalling Past Suffering and Thinking of Present Happiness” (忆苦思甜) and Struggle 
Sessions (批斗) 
 
 The final Mao-related practices to be discussed, the ritual of “Recalling Past Suffering 
and Thinking of Present Happiness”96 and denunciation/struggle sessions, are also the most 
dramatic, both in terms of their emotional impact and their transformative effects upon Chinese 
communities. Often held in conjunction with Mao study sessions, the first of these rites consisted 
of the analysis of current social realties in light of Maoist ideals and was often book-ended by 
performance of Maoist hymns and recitations. Madsen proffers the following description of a 
Recalling Past Suffering ritual:  
In the small discussion groups, people poured over the bitterness of the past and 
expressed their deep-felt sorrow for their ingratitude to Chairman Mao. The group leaders 
helped the discussants catalogue all of the little ways in which they shirked their 
responsibility to the collective and failed to advance along the glorious road to socialism. 
At the end of the training sessions, a special meal to remember the bitterness of the past 
was presented: the bitter wild herbs that poor peasants often ate in the old days when they 
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could not afford better food. Some of the old people actually wept as they ate the bitter 
food.97 
 
 
Broadly speaking, both types of rituals were unified by their use of “holy” texts and 
canonical discourse, by their stress on evaluating one’s adherence to Maoist principles, and by 
their functions in demonstrating one’s membership in the newly realized socialist utopia. They 
did, however, feature a single dramatic difference: namely, Recalling Past Suffering rituals 
involved the personal acknowledgement of one’s failures to properly embody Maoist principles 
while denunciation/struggle sessions involved being publicly accused of a failure to enact your 
social duties. As can be imagined, this single variation led to profoundly different consequences. 
  
As suggested above, denunciation/struggle sessions consisted of a public accusation of 
one’s failures to correctly manifest proper socialist values, though it could also be motivated by 
one’s (hereditary) membership in a “revisionist” social class. The denunciation ritual, which was 
the less severe of these practices, involved a public confession of wrongdoing (based upon the 
presumed universal acceptance and knowledge of Maoist theory), verbal critiques offered by 
one’s fellows, and public acceptance of these critiques and acknowledgement by the accused that 
they will be more forthright in their future praxical applications of Mao’s thought.98 While such 
critiques were undoubtedly unpleasant, they did not ultimately deny the personhood or moral 
potentiality of the individual in question – a point that is thrown into sharp relief when compared 
to the public demonization that occurred during a struggle session. The truly distressing nature of 
this harsher category of rites is eloquently captured by Richard Madsen: 
In a struggle session, the guilty person is defined as an enemy of the people. His 
wrongdoing is so evil that he must be totally vilified, his reputation utterly destroyed. To 
open the session, the “master of ceremonies” whips the crowd into an emotional frenzy 
by portraying the person’s crimes in as lurid a light as possible. From the crowd, 
carefully prepared activists scream out cursing cries of rage. Others get caught up in the 
enthusiasm and start yelling out as well. Then the accused is led out by the local armed 
militia; he does not come out under his own volition but is brought before the enraged 
people by representatives of the public order. He is often made to wear a heavy placard, 
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branding him a traitor, class enemy and so on. He cannot look at the people but must bow 
his head in abject shame. (If he does not bow deeply enough, his militia guardians will 
push his head lower.) He makes a self-confession. … People from the crowd 
“spontaneously” bring forth evidence that amplifies his misdeeds and shows that these 
are part of a whole despicable pattern of wrongdoing. Shouted curses fill the air. 
Sometimes strong young militiamen rise from their seats and beat the enemy of the 
people. This is not officially permitted, but depending on the purposes of the session it is 
sometimes informally encouraged and tacitly condoned. The guilty person stands facing 
the people during this whole ordeal (which can last several hours); he is an object of 
struggle by the people, not one of the people. When the session is over, he is dragged 
away in total disgrace. He has been symbolically destroyed.99 
  
As can be seen, struggle sessions actively involved denying the personhood of those 
accused, based upon their alleged failure to embody the principles set forth in Mao Zedong’s 
speeches and writings. This forceful separation from the community was established both 
metaphorically (by describing accused individuals as “ghosts,” “monsters,” or “demons”)100 and 
physically (by forcibly separating the accused from the community, painting their faces black 
and cutting their hair to make them resemble iconographic images of ghosts, placing “dunce 
caps” on their heads and placards describing their sins around their necks, and forcing them to 
adopt painful bodily postures).101 As can be imagined, these rituals – which radically redefined 
the bounds of communities and reversed traditional understandings of social responsibilities – 
had a dramatic effect upon the Chinese populace, especially given the prevalence of concern for 
“face” and reputation, with many of the accused committing suicide instead of facing the public 
disapprobation of their peers.102 The most dramatic evidence of the utter depersonalization of the 
accused in these rites can be seen in the occurrence of ritualized cannibalism in southern 
China103 during the height of the Cultural Revolution – a horrifying reality that often occurred 
immediately following the denunciation of individuals at a struggle session! Donald Sutton, in 
                                                 
99
 Madsen, 81-82. See also: Butterfield, 345-347; Lu, 140-142. 
100
 Lu, 60. See also Sutton, who notes that the accused “may be allowed to go filthy, and symbolic use is made of 
‘huts and tunnels that are at once tombs and wombs’ (the victim languished in what is called the oxshed), of snakes 
because they appear to die but are reborn with a new skin (a standard term for those under attack is snake spirits). 
The costumes used are monstrous and exaggerated to abstract them into an object of reflection about the values of 
society (the dance caps may be as high as five or six feet and bear legends referring to the crimes of the victim)” 
(164). 
101
 Lu, 60, 141. 
102
 Zuo, 103; Butterfield, 347-349; Lu, 19-20, 60, passim. 
103
 As Sutton notes, there is considerable evidence for cannibalism not only in Wuxuan but also in the Qinzhou 
region in general. In all, it is estimated that approximately seventy people were consumed by their friends and 
neighbors (138-140). 
 111 
attempting to comprehend these atrocities, notes their congruence with the struggle sessions 
themselves (not to mention the ideological commitments that underscored them):  
The Chinese taboos on cannibalism are equally implicit and powerful but, rather than 
depending on logical categories, are above all social, that is to say, moral. Since classical 
times humanity was seen to be separated from animals not at creation but by the 
successive acts of the sages in inventing the arts of constructing houses, cart and boats, 
making clothes and cooking, and in perfecting the arts of humane government. … In the 
atmosphere of the Cultural Revolution, a single set of political criteria was elevated 
above all others, polarizing good and bad under a special morality that could not be 
questioned and indeed had to be acted upon. The usual restraints on violence broke down, 
and the result in Wuxuan was the ritualized eating of men whose civilized humanity was 
denied, indeed negated in the act of eating.104 
 
 
 
Both the Recalling Past Suffering ritual and the denunciation/struggle sessions can be 
seen as type three rituals, given that they were predicated upon actors following Mao’s fiat (the 
original promulgation of which would have constituted an embedded ritual).105 As in the case of 
the Mao-study rituals, the moral/social sanction of those participating was also based entirely 
upon their connection to the unquestionable moral authority of Mao, and, in an additional point 
of congruence, the effects of these rituals in defining community membership (either 
introspectively or proscriptively) were also ritually reversible (except when the rituals 
themselves led to the demise of a participant). As in many of the cases above, these rites also 
served many of the social functions of ritual defined in the first half of this chapter: embodying 
key cultural axioms, defining the relationship of participants to each other and to a realm of 
authoritative reality, and generating religious goods (in this case, continued success (or even 
survival) within the community, which was predicated upon one’s perceived acceptance of 
Maoist doctrine). 
 
While these rituals are certainly emblematic of (and thankfully unique to) the chaos of the 
Cultural Revolution, even they have some antecedents within Chinese culture. First, popular 
Chinese religion (in the late Imperial context) also contained a means of publicly airing one’s 
grievances with others for their failures to adhere to the moral standards of the community. 
These “public indictment rituals” consisted of addressing accusations to a tutelary or judicial 
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deity in hopes of achieving restitution.106 As one could imagine, the social results of such an 
accusation would have likely borne many similarities with the denunciation/struggle rituals 
described above. Further, historical evidence also describes an expiatory practice requiring 
penitent individuals to dress “as ‘criminals’ (fanren 犯人) and ‘sinners’ (zuiren 罪人) during the 
processions which accompanied many festivals”107 – a practice that is comparable to the means 
utilized to publicly shame those accused during struggle sessions. In a broader context, Sutton 
offers the following cogent comparison between the Confucian notion of li and struggle sessions:  
The rites of struggle did share many characteristic features of the li – of Chinese ritual in 
its classical, Confucian form. Like li, as the physical realization of ideological labels, 
these rituals were not purely oral and performative but served to link written knowledge 
and instruction from above with individual behavior, the former being intoned and 
actually prescribing the latter. Like the li, they have in principle an emotional basis. Like 
the li, the rites of struggle … began with proper naming, names defining status in a sense 
at once moral and social. Like the li, they used bodily action to reinforce status hierarchy, 
in this case class status, and their performance contained implicitly its own justification, 
for it was conducted with a sense of unquestioned moral superiority. … Most strangely of 
all, like the li these cruel and hideous rites, in the eyes of their organizers and 
participants, represented and produced order.108 
 
As can be seen, the various rituals of struggle, dehumanizing as they may be, share some 
common features with more coercive applications of ritual that existed in the Chinese cultural 
tradition, especially in their ability to redefine social roles and responsibilities. 
 
Conclusions 
As described in the theoretical materials that began this chapter, rituals allow for the 
generation of social truths, which in turn can invest venerated targets with tangible symbolic 
power (as discussed in Chau, Bell, Rappaport, and Lawson and McCauley). Those who act as 
conduits to this power gain genuine social benefits from it, as long as the efficacious source 
maintains its place in the hearts and minds of one’s fellow citizens. The utilization of such 
techniques in the promotion of a living political figure – even one as idealized (and idolized) as 
Mao – provides a fascinating insight into the Chinese perspective on politics, the extrahuman 
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world and the interpenetration of these two realms. Moreover, they provide meaningful clues 
into the means whereby Mao’s personal charisma was channeled into popular practice, which 
then reinforced the narratives of his efficacy in a sort of charismatic feedback loop. When 
interpreted in this context, the rituals described above help explicate the compelling nature of the 
posthumous Mao cult, as virtually all Chinese people above a certain age (especially those living 
in rural areas) had direct, personal experiences of his ritually-inculcated power. 
 
 This being said, the findings discussed above, concerning the relationship between the 
apotheosis of Mao and the ritualized modes whereby his charisma was reified, are provisional for 
a number of significant reasons: first, the manifestations of the Mao phenomenon in modern 
China are both regionally-situated and idiosyncratically observed, and as such they would 
optimally be explored via a set of geographically-diverse, diachronic studies; second, the 
correlations between past and present practices discussed above (in chapters two and four) are 
suggestive, but (as is the case in all correlative studies) they would be strengthened by including 
additional materials; third, the theoretical approach to ritual outlined above, though built upon a 
foundation of established, well-respected scholarship, is unique to this project, meaning that its 
broader utility (as a general framework) is not yet proven. Regardless of these provisos, it is still 
the case that these conclusions offer a valuable (albeit provisional) insight into an underexplored 
topic in the academic exploration of modern Chinese culture. Some potential ramifications of 
this study will be surveyed in the conclusion.
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Chapter 5: Concluding Reflections 
 
  
 Thus ends the present exploration into the popular veneration of the deceased Mao in 
modern China, meaning that, as in the conclusion of all things, it now remains to ask what has 
been accomplished and what impact these developments will have upon future endeavors. Given 
that these two matters are intimately related, they shall be discussed in parallel as they relate to 
(what I consider to be) the three major findings of the present research: 1) the role of cultural 
continuity in the religious reappropriation of Mao, 2) the (equally important) role of cultural 
creativity/adaptability evidenced by the same process, and, 3) the broader theoretical utility of a 
cognitivistic approach to culture and ritual in comparative religious studies. Before addressing 
each of these issues, however, it is first necessary to emphasize the temporally constrained (and 
thus provisional) nature of these conclusions. In particular and given that many of the 
phenomena detailed above1 continue to be extant in modern China, the present study can be seen 
as something of an artifact, as it is intimately tied to the time of its composition – a time 
characterized by uncertainty concerning the ultimate form (if any) that the veneration of the 
deceased Mao will take. Some speculations upon these hypothetical future developments will be 
proffered below. 
 
Cultural Continuity in Religious Interpretations of Mao 
 The first achievement of the present research was demonstrating the continued viability 
of certain classical patterns within the newly defined context of Maoist (and post-Maoist) China. 
In particular, I contended that religious interpretations of Chairman Mao were commensurate 
with traditional religious expression, especially when one takes into account the phenomenon of 
ling (spiritual potency) and its centrality in popular religion. Demonstrating the viability of this 
premise required an extensive exploration of the role of spiritual potency in popular Daoism, 
Buddhism and folk religion (drawing upon the works of Chau, Paper, Poo, Sangren and many 
others), which highlighted the pragmatic importance of perceived efficacy in determining the 
classification of (and level of veneration accorded to) extrahuman beings. This historical 
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overview also delved into the postulated isomorphism between ling and de (the personal 
charismatic power typically associated with political leaders), and noted the extent to which 
imperial ideology and popular mythology mandated a (semi-)divine understanding of political 
leaders. From a functional (and narratological) perspective, this metaphorical rapprochement is 
understandable, as, for an average pre-modern Chinese, imperial edicts (and their impact upon 
day-to-day life) would have likely seemed as inscrutable and capricious as the postulated actions 
of the ghosts and gods, as can be read into the popular idiom “Heaven is high and the emperor is 
far away” (天高 皇帝遠 Tian gao, Huangdi yuan). 
 
 Once this historical background was established, it was possible to explore these themes 
in various posthumous evaluations of the deceased Chairman, where they were indeed quite 
prevalent. Indeed, considerable evidence exists suggesting that the living Mao’s undeniable 
spiritual efficacy (de) – demonstrated by his successes in building a unified China (a traditional 
signifier of possession of the Mandate of Heaven) and reified through ritual means during the 
Cultural Revolution – has begun to be reinterpreted through the historically-mandated ling 
framework, whereby many individuals (from big city taxi drivers to rural peasants) have come to 
credit miraculous outcomes to his posthumous influence.2 More broadly speaking, I argue that 
the prevalent use of spiritual and imperial terminology in descriptions of Mao is quite a propos, 
as such language helps to construct (and reiterate) meaningful parallels between present social 
and political realities and the broader context of Chinese culture. Given the general resurgence 
(and reconstruction) of religious practice in China since Mao’s death,3 it should not be surprising 
that these images (and the worldview(s) that they imply) remain salient. 
 
 A final set of parallels was drawn between various Cultural Revolution-era rituals (such 
as Chairman Mao study sessions, denunciation rallies and the Zao Qingshi/Wan Huibao) and 
their traditional antecedents (which included ancestor veneration rites, practices from popular 
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Daoism, and pre-modern indictment rituals). These parallels help explain why the Mao-era 
practices were seen as valid expressions of devotion to their leader, while simultaneously 
reifying the supernatural efficacy that was even then credited to him. Further, in the years after 
his death, Mao’s person and the aura of sanctity that surrounded him (which was at least partially 
generated through ritual means) became decoupled from historical realities: a process that, I 
would argue, allowed him to become an “empty signifier” – a semi-depersonalized source of 
spiritual efficacy in the traditional mold of Mazu, Guan Gong, Zhongli Quan and even (to a 
lesser extent) Confucius.4 
 
One of the reasons that the existence of these parallels is significant is that they have been 
relatively underrepresented in current academic literature. This is not to say that Chinese cultural 
continuity has not been discussed: as noted in the introduction to this study, such an 
acknowledgement is a relatively well-established position. This being said, when the majority of 
scholars make the case for continuity, they typically approach the issue from an elite perspective, 
considering parallels between erstwhile authorities (emperors, the imperial bureaucracy and 
Confucian literati) and modern ones (such as the CCP and Mao himself).5  In contrast to this, the 
present research is predominantly situated in the popular tradition, allowing it to help address 
this lacuna by focusing attention on a manifestation of cultural continuity whose significance and 
ultimate form have yet to be determined. 
 
 This being said, while the continuities noted above are suggestive, they do merit 
additional (avenues of) research. First and foremost, future investigations would benefit from 
additional field research – especially in those locales where the lionization of Mao is the most 
prominent (such as the Chairman Mao mausoleum, and the shrines in Shaoshan and Gushuicun). 
Detailed explorations these pilgrimage sites, which included participant interviews and 
observational records of the actions of visitors, would be invaluable for charting the growth and 
evolution of these devotional practices, as well as providing more grist for the historical-
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comparative mill. In addition, further research into the ling framework (especially concerning the 
relationship between ling and de) would be desirable, especially if it were to utilize ethnographic 
observation and/or source-language textual resources. Similarly, the role of Mao-era ritual in 
reinforcing these images and interpretations could be fleshed out using interviews and 
psychological studies, not to mention the fact that additional Mao-era rituals could be explored 
using the same framework outlined in chapter four. Finally, this research could be broadened to 
include the vast textual corpus of Mao-studies by exploring the role of classical imagery, tropes 
and styles of thought and governance in Mao’s writings, speeches and actions, which would 
present an interesting comparison to the present study’s focus upon his characterization within 
Chinese popular culture. 
 
This inevitable (and obvious) divergence between the officially endorsed perspective of 
the Great Helmsman and its popular reinterpretation (as especially evidenced in the years after 
his death) provides an elegant segue into the next important topic covered by the present study – 
namely, the role of cultural creativity in the religious veneration of Mao. 
 
Cultural Creativity/Adaptability in Religious Interpretations of Mao 
As much as there are undeniable cultural precedents for the religious interpretations of 
Mao detailed above, it would be demeaning to the individuals under discussion to ignore the 
roles of pragmatism and cultural creativity in encouraging the development of these viewpoints. 
The first (and most obvious) of these culturally creative impulses can be seen in the fact that 
religious characterizations of Mao (especially those that arose in the years after his death) were 
profoundly counter-cultural – at least when the “culture” under consideration is the anti-
historical, atheistic Marxism of the Party elite. By choosing to leverage traditional imagery, 
tropes and worldviews in understanding Mao, the individuals involved actively expanded the 
canonical resources usable for their own processes of worldmaking.6 Though such popular 
sensibilities were occasionally harnessed and exploited by those in power (as was the case in the 
Cultural Revolution), they by and large remained a means through which individuals could 
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meaningfully understand their newly defined political and social environments, allowing them to 
avoid becoming “passive cultural dopes” (to borrow a phrase from Ann Swidler). Indeed, as 
predicted by Bell, Boyer and others, these cultural materials (which included both beliefs and 
practices) were meaningful for those who utilized them due to their appreciable effects upon 
social relationships, wherein their perceived efficacy and practical effects reinforced each other 
in a self-stroking cycle.7 Finally, this cultural creativity is particularly evident in cases where the 
(posthumous) apotheosization of Mao allowed believers to laud their own identities (as members 
of “revolutionary classes”) while simultaneously critiquing the perceived (“immoral”) excesses 
of the current administration (as discussed in Dorfman (2003) and Barmé (1999)), as this process 
provided (and provides) them with a meaningful narrative context within which to exist. 
 
 The religious reappropriation of Mao, when interpreted as evidence of cultural creativity, 
would serve as an excellent starting point for numerous additional studies. First, an ethnographic 
exploration of the utility of these beliefs in the popular context (delving into their social 
functions, the narratives used to explain them, and the rituals that are used to reinforce them) 
would be tremendously instructive, providing similar insights into modern Chinese society akin 
to those demonstrated by Richard Madsen’s eloquent Morality and Power in a Chinese Village 
(which catalogued the peasant response to the Cultural Revolution). Moreover, if it is indeed 
correct to describe the Mao-centric socialization process of the Cultural Revolution as a type of 
“brainwashing”8 (or even as a type of religious conversion), some interesting results could no 
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doubt be achieved by comparing the life-narratives of its “victims” to those created by cult-
inductees and religious converts, as both would hypothetically evidence a similar tendency to 
define their lives in reference to these “canonical” experiences.9 Finally, it would be interesting 
investigate the extent to which various generations of Chinese citizens were “creative” in their 
reappropriation of Mao, as I would conjecture that this tendency would vary based on the 
personal salience of Mao as a signifier. 
 
Concrete Application of Ritual Theory 
 Finally, this project also proposed a composite theory of ritual, drawing upon insights 
from experts in religious studies, anthropology, psychology, sociology, and linguistics. This 
theory characterized ritual as a multifarious mode of human behaviour, which non-discursively 
defines social relationships (as well as postulated relationships with extrahuman beings), 
embodies cultural axioms, demonstrates social responsibilities, proves community membership, 
and provides an efficacious means of generating and explaining social transformations (as in the 
case of marriage and other rites of passage). In demonstrating the validity of this 
characterization, I utilized the cognitivistic typology proposed by Lawson and McCauley to 
explore the structure and function of various Mao-centric rituals, and to compare them to various 
unambiguously religious rites. While the undisputed centrality of ritual in Chinese society made 
this approach a natural fit, I would argue that it could also be fruitfully applied in various 
contexts. Indeed, the study of religious ritual is perhaps ideally suited to cross-cultural analysis, 
as noted by Lawson and McCauley: 
We examine religious ritual in particular because of all aspects of religious thought and 
activity it is the most constrained. Ritual is relatively easy to isolate as a theoretically 
manageable subsystem within the larger religious system. Its theoretical manageability 
arises from the fact that even as a surface phenomenon it is a highly rigid system of 
corporate action which changes far more slowly, most of the time, than other symbolic-
cultural systems. When we observe a ritual we expect it to be largely the same as it was 
when it was performed the last time; novelty in ritual is mistrusted. … Because of its 
relative stability, ritual can more easily be freeze-framed than other more volatile 
symbolic-cultural systems. … The formality of ritual is not only an obvious fact making 
it susceptible to systematic analysis [however]; its formality has also made it a candidate 
                                                 
9
 One excellent resource for such a comparison would be Peter Stromberg’s Language and Self-Transformation: A 
Study of the Christian Conversion Narrative (1993). 
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for cross-cultural analysis and comparison and the object of cross-cultural 
generalization.10 
 
 
As with the use of any theory (especially in the humanities), my approach to ritual (in 
general) and my usage of Lawson and McCauley’s typology (in particular) is best seen as a 
particular lens through which external phenomena gain a level of detail, definition and coherence 
that was previously lacking. This being said, the specificity of Lawson and McCauley’s theory 
transforms it into a scientific approach (i.e., one that can be supported or falsified). While my 
successes with this method demonstrate its interpretive utility (and provide inductive justification 
for the viability of its premises), it would obviously derive additional salience from any 
additional study that demonstrated its predictive validity. Given the utility of this approach in my 
present research, I will certainly consider applying it in future projects. 
 
 
Reflections and Speculations 
 Given that the religious interpretations of Mao described above are as of yet on-going, it 
is not possible to definitively conclude what the final shape of these beliefs and practices will be. 
That being said, if one takes the historical correspondences uncovered through the present 
analysis seriously, they suggest one possible branch along which these devotions may evolve 
over time. I will now briefly sketch in this hypothetical timeline.  
 
In the years to come, it is quite possible that (like many other traditional religious beliefs) 
Mao veneration will gradually decline in the cities, a process that would likely be tied to the 
gradual passing of all individuals who actively experienced his de (i.e., the erstwhile Red Guards 
and their seniors). This is not to say that people would somehow forget about him (given that his 
picture will likely remain festooned throughout the country for the foreseeable future) but that 
his perceived power would wane. As such, he could eventually come to simply be seen as a 
“great man” (wei da de ren 偉大的人) among the giants of Chinese history (such as Confucius, 
Han Wudi and others). Indeed, as my interviews with Chinese students in 2005 demonstrated, it 
appears that this process is already underway. 
 
                                                 
10
 Lawson and McCauley, 49-50. 
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Conversely, it is quite possible that, in the countryside, public perception would develop 
differently depending on whether (and to what extent) religious approaches to Mao were actively 
censored by the PRC government.11 Given the extent to which theological, cosmological and 
shamanistic understandings of Mao have already been attested to in modern China (as 
demonstrated at length above), it would be reasonable to assume that such religious thinking 
would continue in the future, with various mythological, liturgical and ritualistic practices aiding 
in the transition from the living Mao’s de to the dead Mao’s ling. If this did continue, it is likely 
that Mao, like many before him (including Guan Gong and Zhongli Quan), would eventually 
earn a permanent position in the pantheon(s) of popular religion. This Mao – the benevolent 
celestial Helmsman of taxi amulet fame – could potentially become a substitute for the gods of 
prosperity and/or protection, based upon his association with the foundation of a new, prosperous 
China. More fancifully, I could even imagine a millenarian Maoist group, initiated after a 
theophanic appearance of the dead Chairman and modeled (perhaps unintentionally) on the Five 
Pecks of Rice movement. This group, mobilizing the disenfranchisement of rural peasants and 
allowing them a supernatural framework within which to define their own experience of the 
world, could even become a potentially destabilizing political force. 
 
Conclusion 
 As in many Sinological topics, the present study has been consistently confronted with 
ambiguities and polyphonies. Just as the porous worldview of Chinese popular religion collapses 
the distinctions between ghost, god and ancestor, as well as the cosmological “distance” between 
the human and extrahuman realms, so too does the religious characterizations of Mao detailed 
above admit (and even require) multiple interpretations. Regardless of the form that public 
                                                 
11
 Interestingly, the government’s perspective on this issue is less clear than one might expect. Just as Mao’s 
successors were loathe to overtly critique him (given the extent to which their own power was contingent upon his 
“supernatural” charisma), so too has their response to these religious movements been less-than-entirely consistent. 
While the government has certainly been responsible for crackdowns on rural Mao worship (as noted in Cohen 
(1993), “Don’t Kowtow to Mao” (2001), “China Rooting Out Mao Worship” (2001), etc.), they have also 
(implicitly) endorsed the religious sentiments that underlie them. Indeed, if one supposes that the government was 
entirely unsupportive of these practices, one is left with many unanswered questions: Why would the official gift 
shop in the Zhou Enlai museum carry traditional good luck charms bearing Mao’s image? Why are they so 
supportive of the Mao cult in Shaoshan (and the pilgrimages that it requires) that they have financed the expansion 
of the highways leading into and out of the town (Li, 22-23)? Why do local cadres participate in Mao veneration 
rituals? Why does the Chairman Mao Mausoleum contain various religious/geomantic symbols (Wagner (1992); 
Cheater (1991); Wakeman (1989))? These issues, which are obviously tied to the ineradicable bond between Mao’s 
charismatic legacy and the political legitimacy of the Party as a whole, are worthy of future investigation. 
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perception of Mao eventually takes, it remains the case that these phenomena provide 
intriguingly multivalent insights into the issues of cultural continuity and cultural creativity in 
the Chinese context. With this in mind, I will continue to observe these developments with 
interest, as I believe that they provide a microcosmic arena within which the issue of China’s 
relationship with its own history and traditions will (continue to) play out. 
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